It is generally agreed that a
united and stable Cyprus could contribute to stability in the Eastern
Mediterranean. The status quo on the island is not favourable to any of
the parties, mainly because the potential danger of confrontation between the
Turkish and Greek Cypriots, between Turkey and Greece, and now, with the
forthcoming admittance of Greek South Cyprus to the EU, between Turkey and the
EU, is looming in the background.
There is no doubt that the
economic and other benefits of a reunited Cyprus within the EU would be
tremendous. Of course, it would have been more acceptable, and legal, had the EU
allowed both peoples on the island more time to thrash out their differences
before taking the ill-advised stop, under duress, to admit a divided island to
its ranks. Many researchers and publicists, including German academics, have
criticised the EU for going ahead with a rather reckless policy of admitting a
divided island as a member, and thus risking the alienation of Turkey and of
many well-informed Turkish Cypriots.
The EU has gone to considerable
lenghts to explain to the Turkish Cypriots the benefits of EU membership, while
rejecting, out of hand, the arguments of many eminent international jurists that
the membership application by Greek South Cyprus, in the name of all Cyprus, is
invalid, and that the EU, which poses as the champion of legality, justice and
fairness, has completely forgotten these principles as regards the legal and
constitutional status of the island, and in particular, of the Turkish Cypriots
and Turkey, under the 1959-60 international Cyprus Treaties.
The EU has also completely
ignored the fears of Turkish Cypriots, about their security and the danger of
losing their hard-gained freedom from oppression and discrimination. While the
economic benefits of EU membership may be attractive to many Turkish Cypriots,
who suffer privations and unemployment owing to the embargo unfairly imposed on
them by the EU, well-informed Turkish Cypriots are wary about their future,
thinking that they may be swamped by the Greeks in the absence of solid and long-lasting
EU derogations that may enable them to preserve Northern Cyprus permanently as a
Turkish Cypriot homeland. However, if Turkey is also admitted as a member, such
problems will hardly arise.
Many attempts have been made by
international organisations, mainly by the UN, to find an equitable, acceptable
and lasting solution to the Cyprus imbroglio; but these were not successful,
because the experts of these organisations failed to understand the internal
conditions of the island and the needs of the two main populations. Even the
drafters of the Kofi Annan plan have failed to grasp and address such needs. In
fact, the Annan report created more problems in solving some of the old ones.
My personal opinion, for what it
may be worth, is that, the Turkish and Greek Cypriots should themselves try to
solve their differences, without external intervention. They know very well what
these problems are and could work out a modus vivendi that would enable
them to co-exist without rancour, and hopefully in peace and prosperity. In
their attempt to find such a solution the EU can help tremendously, not by
favouring one community over the other, but by advancing concrete proposals that
would go a long way to satisfy the needs, and address the real fears, of both
communities. The EU has the moral and legal onus to do so, for it is mainly
responsible for the present impasse on the island.
While this process of negotiation
continues, the EU should also consider the needs of Turkey, a candidate member,
who has made tremendous sacrifices in terms of finance and manpower, in securing
a safe haven for the Turkish Cypriots in Northern Cyprus. This can best be done
by giving concrete assurances to Turkey that she would be treated as an EU
member in her relations with Cyprus, and that her Treaty rights under the
1959-60 international Cyprus Treaties will be guaranteed, until Turkey also
becomes a member of the EU.