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2
December 2003
WHAT
WE WANT?
Rauf R. DENKTAÞ
We
want to enhance intercommunal cooperation based on
mutual respect and equality. There are a great
number of longstanding humanitarian problems waiting
to be taken up in good will. Settling the property
questions and all losses arising from the attempt to
convert the partnership state into a Greek Cypriot
state and such like will help to redress ongoing
grievances and this will be in the interest of
Cyprus as a whole.
We
have the will to face the current realities.
Denouncing our legitimacy has brought no solution
and will bring no solution. We should leave aside
such denunciations and seek ways of working with
each other as absolute political equals with a view
to solving common problems.
I
waited for eleven years for Mr. Kyprianou to agree
to a federal solution in line with the 1975, 1977
and 79 agreements. He never believed in a federal
settlement. His ambition was to stick to the title
of “the government of Cyprus” and continue the
policy of converting Cyprus into a Greek Cypriot
Republic. According to Archbishop Makarios, keeping
the title of the partnership state was the nearest
thing to Enosis. Mr. Vasiliou wowed to follow this
national line and was concerned with establishing a
unitary state which would sail under the name of
federalism. Mr. Clerides, who challenged Vasiliou to
settle the problem on the basis of the UN “Set of
Ideas” if he dared, took over from Mr. Vasiliou.
He refused to talk to me for two years saying that
there was nothing in common to talk about. When the
UN Secretary-General finally brought him to the
table, he wanted me to accept “Cyprus
Government’s” application for EU membership in
order to talk to me. He knew that from a legal and
political point of view this was not possible.
Talks
helped the Greek Cypriot side to project “the
Cyprus problem” as a problem of occupation which
took place in 1974 and which should be resolved
through the return of refugees to their old habitats.
He assured the world that “the Government of
Cyprus” would treat the Turkish Cypriot
“minority” very generously and all would be well
if only the minority stopped seeking partnership
status (involving sovereignty). “We attend these
talks for tactical reasons” he said to a Greek
Cypriot journalist following ours talks in Glion, (Switzerland)
in 1997, “our tactic being to show the Turkish
Cypriot side as intransigent. We have been very
successful so far, so why should we change tactics”
he declared.
Our
goodwill in continuing the talks while the playing
field was so “unlevel” has worked against us to
the point that a world recognising the Greek Cypriot
side as the legitimate government of Cyprus has shut
its eyes to the legal and political rights and
status of Turkish Cypriots as embodied in the 1960
International Agreements. “Cyprus problem is not a
legal problem, it is a political problem” we are
told by honourable representatives of the EU and
representatives of the super power who champions the
rule of law and democracy world-wide. We have now
reached the stage where even self-defence is being
branded as intransigence!
The
Greek Cypriot side is so sure of victory under the
existing circumstances that the former Greek Cypriot
leader Glafcos Clerides, in a recent statement
reported in the Greek Cypriot daily Mahi on 30
November 2003, even confirmed his Glion statement
regarding the established tactics used and the real
intentions they pursued in negotiations. About the
recent face-to-face talks Glafcos Clerides is
reported to have said;
“It
was necessary for us to pursue an attitude in the
talks that would, without accepting anything,
without making any concessions, show that the
responsibility for the failure is on the shoulders
of the Turkish Cypriots. In order for the Helen side
to have this excuse, we had to show that the reason
for the lack of progress in the talks was the
intransigence of the Turks. Naturally to do this you
needed to have contacts to inform the EU members
fully so that the UN Secretary-General would say the
same thing. Because I can say that they used to pay
much more attention to what De Soto has to say”.
It
is for the UN in particular and the international
community in general
to evaluate the possibility of success in talks
where one of the equal parties take part just for
tactical reasons in order to keep and maintain its
unjustly acquired advantageous position and to show
the other side as intransigent.
Naturally,
all these do not deprive us from our sense of
direction that is to reach a negotiated settlement
to the Cyprus issue which would be based on the
sovereign equality of the two ex constituent
partners of the 1960 partnership Republic of Cyprus,
which would respect the agreed principle of
territorial separation (bi-zonality) and which would
be guaranteed by the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and
Alliance.
We
will not deviate from this course which we believe
is the only course that can yield a sustainable
settlement to the deep-rooted identity related
conflict of Cyprus - a conflict in which the equal Greek Cypriot partner has been
trying since 1963 to deprive the equal Turkish
Cypriot partner of its vitality and equal status and
attempting to speak on behalf of the whole island. |