This is an important question, because the ability of the Greek
Cypriot Administration to enforce an embargo on Turkish Cypriot trade, sport,
and communications derives from their acceptance by other countries and
institutions as if they were the lawful government of all Cyprus.
On 25th April 1980 the Secretary of State for Foreign
& Commonwealth Affairs delivered the following statement to the House of
Lords: “We have conducted a re-examination of British policy and practice
concerning the recognition of Governments. This has included a comparison with
the practice of our partners and allies. On the basis of this review we have
decided that we shall no longer accord recognition to Governments. The British
Government recognises States in accordance with common international doctrine.”
On 30th July 1980 the Minister of State reiterated
that “the British Government recognises States, not Governments” and this
was affirmed again on 12th November 1987 The United States takes the
same position.
Accordingly, if the British and US Governments recognise States
not Governments, neither the Greek Cypriot nor the Turkish Cypriot
administration is recognised by them as the Government of Cyprus.
On 25th April 1980 the British Government also
declared that “………..we shall continue to decide the nature of our
dealings with regimes which come to power unconstitutionally in the light of our
assessment of whether they are able of themselves to exercise effective control
of the territory of the State concerned, and seem likely to continue to do so.”
There is a UN Security Council resolution (541) which calls upon
the world not to recognise any Cypriot State other than “the Republic of
Cyprus,” but there is no UN resolution which gives the Greek Cypriots alone
the right to call themselves the Government of Cyprus. The international
community has merely dealt with them on a day to day basis as if they were the
Government of Cyprus. Even Resolution 541 is advisory, not mandatory.
This is what happened:
When the British granted independence in 1960 they did so on the
basis of a bi-communal partnership constitution, negotiated between the Turkish
and Greek Cypriots and endorsed and guaranteed by Britain Greece, and Turkey.
From its very inception the Republic of Cyprus was never a unitary state in
which there is only one electorate with a majority and minority. It is important
to note that the President, the Vice-President, and the Members of Parliament
were all elected by their own people. The Greek Cypriots have never had the
right to elect all those officials themselves and to create a government wholly
within their control.
The two peoples were political equals, and successive
Secretaries-General of the UN have acknowledged that fact. Most recently
the Annan Plan (2004) provided that the relationship between the Turkish
Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots is not one of majority and minority but of
political equality where neither side may claim authority or jurisdiction over
the other. The two peoples were each asked by the UN to exercise their
democratic right of self-determination in separate referenda on 24th
April 2004. The Turkish Cypriots voted to accept the Annan Plan for unification
of Cyprus and the Greeks Cypriots voted to reject it.
The case of Cyprus is sui generis, for there is no other State
in the world which came into being as a result of two politically equal peoples
coming together by the exercise by each of its sovereign right of
self-determination, to create a functional federation within a single territory,
and guaranteed by international treaty, to which each of them consented.
THE EVENTS OF 1963/4
It would not be surprising if readers of this note had a
different view of those events, because for the past forty years the world has
been given an extremely skilful version of the story almost entirely from the
Greek Cypriot point of view. This is because the Greek Cypriots have had all the
Cyprus Embassies and High-Commissions for themselves since 1963, they occupied
the Cyprus chair at the United Nations and in all other international bodies,
and the Turkish Cypriots were excluded from that time until now from all the
normal channels of international communication.
The Turkish Cypriot people, knowing that they were outnumbered
by Greek Cypriots, and could not enforce the founding Agreement themselves,
would never have agreed to join the 1960 Republic if the Greek Cypriots had not
also accepted a Treaty of Guarantee which gave Turkey a legal right to
intervene, with troops if necessary.
It became clear very soon after independence that the Greek
Cypriots did not intend to abide by the Constitution, and that their entry into
that legal obligation with the Turkish Cypriots in 1960 had been a deception. On
28th July 1960 Makarios said “the agreements do not form the goal - they
are the present and not the future. The Greek Cypriot people will continue their
national cause and shape their future in accordance with THEIR will.
In a speech on 4th September 1962, at Panayia, Makarios said "Until
this Turkish community forming part of the Turkish race which has been the
terrible enemy of Hellenism is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA can
never be considered as terminated."
It would be difficult to imagine a more openly racist, policy
than this. It is also an expansionist policy – the very charge which the Greek
Cypriots laid against Turkey when Turkey intervened twelve years later to put an
end to it.
Turkish Cypriots were told by the outside world to take no
notice of statements of this kind. They were told that they were just rhetoric.
However, the Turkish Cypriots were to discover that when Greek Cypriot leaders
make statements of that kind they should be taken seriously.
The Constitution provided for separate municipalities for
Turkish Cypriots in the five main towns. The Greek Cypriots refused to obey this
mandatory provision and in order to encourage them to do so the Turkish Cypriots
said they would not vote for part of the Government's taxation proposals. The
Greek Cypriots remained intransigent, so the Turkish Cypriots took the matter to
the Supreme Constitutional Court of Cyprus. The court comprised one Greek
Cypriot judge, one Turkish Cypriot judge, and a neutral President.
In February 1963 Makarios declared on behalf of the Greek
Cypriots that if the Court ruled against them they would ignore it. On 25th
April 1963 the Court did rule against them and they did ignore it. The President
of the Court (a German) resigned and the rule of law in Cyprus therefore
collapsed.
In November 1963 the Greek Cypriots went further, and
demanded the abolition of eight of the basic articles which had been included in
the 1960 Agreement for the protection of the Turkish Cypriots, to which
abolition the Turkish Cypriots were naturally reluctant to agree. The aim was to
reduce the Turkish Cypriot people to the status of a mere minority, wholly
subject to the control of the Greek Cypriots, pending their ultimate expulsion
from the island. They had prepared a written plan for this purpose, called the
Akritas Plan.
"When the Turkish Cypriots objected to the amendment of the
constitution Makarios put his plan into effect, and the Greek Cypriot attack
began in December 1963" (Lt. Gen George Karayiannis of the Greek
Cypriot militia reported in "Ethnikos Kiryx" 15.6.65). This
plan was prepared in 1960 before the new constitution had been given any chance
to work.
On 28th December 1963 the Daily Express carried the following
report from Cyprus: "We went tonight into the sealed-off Turkish Cypriot
Quarter of Nicosia in which 200 to 300 people had been slaughtered in the last
five days. We were the first Western reporters there and we have seen sights too
frightful to be described in print. Horror so extreme that the people seemed
stunned beyond tears."
British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, said "I
was convinced that if Archbishop Makarios could not bring himself to treat the
Turkish Cypriots as human beings he was inviting the invasion and partition of
the island."
The American Under-Secretary of State, George Ball, said in his
own memoirs, "Makarios’ central interest was to block off Turkish
intervention so that he and his Greek Cypriots could go on happily massacring
Turkish Cypriots. Obviously we would never permit that." The fact is
however that neither the US, the UK, the UN, nor anyone, other than Turkey
eleven years later, took effective action to prevent it.
On 12th January 1964 the British High Commission in Nicosia
wrote to London (telegram no. 162) “The Greek (Cypriot) police are led by
extremists who provoked the fighting and deliberately engaged in atrocities.
They have recruited into their ranks as “special constables” gun-happy young
thugs. ....... Makarios assured Sir Arthur Clark that there will be no attack.
His assurance is as worthless as previous assurances have proved.”
The Turkish Cypriot MPs, civil servants, judges, and other
officials were all excluded from their positions by the threat or use of force.
Greek Cypriots often claim that the Turkish Cypriots caused the
violence and withdrew voluntarily from their positions in the State, but this is
absurd. The Turkish Cypriots were heavily outnumbered, they had no modern
weapons, and Turkey was at that time in no position to protect them. On 12th
January 1964 the British High Commission in Nicosia wrote to London (telegram
no. 162) “The Greek (Cypriot) police..... threaten to try and punish any
Turkish Cypriot police who wish to return to the Cyprus Government.
Further, the UK Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs
found that “When in July 1965 the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of
Representatives had sought to resume their seats they were told that they could
do so only if they accepted the legislative changes to the operation of the
Constitution enacted in their absence" (ie. if they agreed to
fundamental constitutional changes to the great disadvantage of their community,
imposed upon them by force of arms).
Accordingly, even if there had been any substance to Greek
Cypriot claims that they were operating the government alone of necessity
because the Turkish Cypriots were leaving their places vacant, there can be no
justification for that claim after July 1965
Professor Ernst Forsthoff, the neutral President of the Supreme
Constitutional Court of Cyprus told Die Welt on 27th December 1963 “Makarios
bears on his shoulders the sole responsibility of the recent tragic events. His
aim is to deprive the Turkish community of their rights.” In another
interview with UPI press agency on 30th December 1963 he said: "All this
happened because Makarios wanted to remove all constitutional rights from the
Turkish Cypriots."
Glafcos Clerides, later the President of the Greek Cypriots,
said at the time “the Turkish Cypriots the Greek Cypriots are in full
control of the Government. All the Ministers are Greeks. Their government is the
only one recognised internationally - why should the Turkish Cypriots bring the
Turks back in? The Turks today control only 3% of the land. They have no rich
resources and they are living through difficult times from an economic point of
view. They will ultimately have to accept their point of view - or go.”
The UK House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs
further reported unanimously that, "Although the Cyprus Government now
claims to have been merely seeking to "operate the 1960 Constitution
modified to the extent dictated by the necessities of the situation" this
claim ignores the fact that both before and after the events of December 1963
the Makarios Government continued to advocate the cause of ENOSIS and actively
pursued the amendment of the Constitution and the related treaties to facilitate
this ultimate objective".
The Committee continued : "Moreover in June 1967 the
Greek Cypriot legislature unanimously passed a resolution in favour of ENOSIS (annexation
of Cyprus to Greece) in blatant contravention of the 1960 Treaties and
Constitution." (Art. 1 of the Treaty of Guarantee declares prohibited
any action likely to promote directly or indirectly union with any other state
or partition of the island, and Art. 185(2) of the Constitution is to similar
effect).
And at para. 28 "The effect of the crisis of December
1963 was to deliver control of the formal organs of Government into the hands of
the Greek Cypriots alone. Claiming to be acting in accordance with “the
doctrine of necessity” the Greek Cypriot members of the House of
Representatives enacted a series of laws which provided for the operation of the
various organs of government without Turkish Cypriot participation."
Insofar as the Constitution became unworkable, it was because
the Greek Cypriot leadership refused to respect the obligations to which they
had agreed. The “doctrine of necessity” or “principle of obligation” in
international law applies to supervening impossibility due to extraneous causes.
It does not apply to self-induced causes.
Even Greece was embarrassed by this behaviour. On 19th April
1963 Foreign Minister Averoff wrote to Makarios "It is not permissible
for Greece in any circumstances to accept the creation of a precedent by which
one of the contracting parties can unilaterally abrogate or ignore provisions
that are irksome to it in international acts which this same party has
undertaken to respect."
The UK Commons Committee continued at para, 29 "Equally
damaging from the Turkish Cypriot point of view was what they considered to be
their effective exclusion from representation at, and participation in, the
international fora where their case could have been deployed............."
"An official Turkish Cypriot presence in the international political scene
virtually disappeared overnight." It is not therefore surprising that
the world has been persuaded to the Greek Cypriot point of view, and they have
been able to influence the proceedings of the United Nations.
THE UNITED NATIONS
By Security Council Resolution 186 on 4th March 1964, the United
Nations failed to condemn the usurpation of the legal order in Cyprus by force,
and used the words “Cyprus Government .” The Turkish Government was willing
to accept this resolution because in their view the term “Cyprus Government”
could, properly construed, only mean a government which, according to the 1960
Constitution, acted with the concurrence of both its Turkish Cypriot and Greek
Cypriot members.
The British representative at the UN was instructed to vote
for resolution 186, and in telegram 1131 of 12th March 1964 to Ankara the
British Government said “as regards the definition to be given to the
expression “Cyprus Government” we agree with the Turkish Government.”
However, this was soon forgotten, and the British Government and all others
except Turkey has dealt with the Greek Cypriot administration to the present day
as if it alone were the Government of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots had by this
time been driven into defended enclaves where they survived as best they could
for the next 11 years until rescued by Turkey in 1974. The Greek Cypriots never
gained control of those enclaves.
British thinking at the time can be gathered from secret
documents released by the Public Record Office in 1994. On 12th August 1964 the
UK Representative to the UN, sent a telegram to his government in which he said:
“What is their policy and true feelings about the future of
Cyprus and about Makarios? Judging from the English newspapers and many others,
the feeling is very strong indeed against Makarios and his so-called government
and nothing would please the British people more than to see him toppled and the
Cyprus problem solved by the direct dealings between the Turks and the Greeks.
We are of course supporting the latter course, but I have never seen any
expression of the official disapproval in public against Makarios and his evil
doings. Is there an official view about this, and what do we think we should do
in the long run? Sometimes it seems that the obsession of some people with
"the Commonwealth" blinds us to everything else and it would be high
treason to take a more active line against Makarios and his henchmen. At other
times the dominant feature seems to be concern lest active opposition against
Makarios should lead to direct conflict with the [Greek] Cypriots and end up
with our losing our bases.
I ask these questions, partly for background and partly
because it really would be useful to know how far you feel we are inhibited from
taking up a more actively hostile attitude to the Greek Cypriots. Their
representative here is, as you know, a horror. Even the communists are
thoroughly fed up with him, and it is therefore not necessary for us to do
anything more to weaken his position. But it is curious and sometimes very
frustrating to sit in the Security Council and walk around the UN and have to
listen to all the stuff about the wickedness of the Turks and their threats of
invasion, when I and all my staff know very well what the real state of affairs
is, and how much Makarios and Co. are to blame. One can say what one thinks of
course to a few people, but one cannot produce the evidence or argue the case
fully with the vast majority of my UN colleagues so long as the official public
attitude seems to be not to say anything rude about Makarios and his gang.
Throughout the 1960-63 period of his Presidency, and before,
Makarios had been assiduously courting the “Non-aligned Movement” of which
the Burmese UN Secretary-General, U Thant, was an enthusiastic supporter.
Makarios had also been courting the Soviet Union and its satellites. When
therefore the Cyprus question came before the Security Council in February 1964
he was in a strong position. The fatal step taken by the Security Council was to
accept the credentials of the representatives of Makarios after December 1963,
despite the protest made to the Council in Turkish Cypriot Vice-President
Küçük’s telegram of 27th December 1963 that there was no longer a lawful
government of Cyprus. This was not simply an internal matter for Cyprus, because
the 1960 Constitution was guaranteed by international Treaty, to which a
permanent member of the Security Council (Britain) was a signatory.
What the UN should have done was to leave the “Cyprus”
seat vacant until such time as constitutional order was restored and allow the
representatives of both peoples of Cyprus equal status at the United Nations.
As former Greek Foreign Minister, Bitsios, observed “In
the United Nations issues are not won through speeches in the Council Room, but
in hard battling behind the scenes. It is there that the texts of resolutions
are bargained, pressures are exerted, and the raw language of vested interests
is heard.” The Turkish Cypriots were excluded from this process, and by
the time Rauf Denktas was allowed to address the Council on 28th February 1964
the issue had already been decided against him.
The Greek Cypriots were jubilant. On 5th March
1964 Makarios declared “We have secured a resolution in the first phase of
our struggle in the international field.” He added that in his opinion
Turkey could no longer intervene under the Treaty of Guarantee. Having got away
with this, the Greek Cypriot leaders were emboldened to believe that at the
United Nations they could get away, literally, with murder.
The Resolution could not have passed if Britain or the United
States had voted against it.
Sir Anthony Kershaw MC, MP, Chairman of the UK House of
Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs until 1987 explained how the UN came
to accept the Greek Cypriots as the Cyprus Government as follows: "It
was decided that UN troops should be sent to preserve order, but the UN can only
send troops if the legal government of the country concerned asks for them. The
only organisation which could in 1964 be called the Government of Cyprus was the
administration headed by Makarios. The Turkish Cypriots pointed out that this
was not the legal government of Cyprus but such was the pressure of the times
that the UN said: Look your people are dying - let's get the troops out right
away and the lawyers can sort it out later – they never did.
So it was decided, but since that time the UN has treated the
Greek Cypriots as the only government of Cyprus, basing this upon a treaty and a
constitution which had been repudiated and broken by the Greek Cypriot
government itself. I do not deny that the Greek Cypriot government is the de
facto government of the South of Cyprus. It has all the attributes of
sovereignty, but so has the government of Northern Cyprus."
During those eleven years, when the Turkish Cypriots were living
in defended enclaves, the Greek Cypriots were establishing themselves in the
world as if they were the lawful government of Cyprus, which they are not; and
they persuaded people that the Turkish Cypriots had voluntarily given up their
governmental rights. Amazing as it may seem, they were believed by many.
By 1983 Turkish Cypriots had come to the conclusion –
correctly as it now proves – that it was impossible to achieve a
reconciliation with the Greek Cypriots. One important reason was the power of
the Greek Orthodox Church and the extreme views of its leadership. It is clear
from the attitude of the Church to the Annan Plan in 2004, including threats to
Greek Cypriot voters that they would be barred from heaven when they died, that
this is as true today as it ever was.
Turkish Cypriots therefore had no alternative but to establish
their own state. They were saddened to find that the compelling reason for this
was not understood by the international community, and that the Greek Cypriots
were able to obtain Security Council Resolution 541 and subsequent resolutions
which, whilst not mandatory, have dissuaded other states from recognising the
Turkish Cypriot State. It is time for these resolutions to be repealed.
THE EMBARGO
The United Nations has never authorised an embargo against the
Turkish Cypriots, but the Greek Cypriots were able to place the Turkish Cypriots
under restrictions from 1963 to 1974 because they had physical control of the
island.
After1974, Greek Cypriot officials had already been accepted for
the purposes of day-to-day business by most states and international
organisations as if they were lawful representatives of Cyprus, and they were
able to persuade the world that Cyprus had been subjected in 1974 to an
unprovoked attack by Turkey. In fact, when the civil war between the Greek
Cypriots broke out on 15th July 1974 the Turkish Cypriots again
feared for their lives and called upon the Guarantor Powers for help, as the
United Nations force could not or would not prevent the violence. This time,
after waiting eleven years, Turkey did respond to their call by landing troops.
Some years later, on 26th February 1981, the Greek Cypriot
leader of the anti-Makarios faction, Nicos Sampson said “Had Turkey not
intervened I would not only have proclaimed ENOSIS (annexation to Greece) - I
would have annihilated the Turks in Cyprus.” Having dealt with Sampson it
would have been absurd for Turkey to depart and leave the Turkish Cypriots again
at the mercy of Makarios, who had been responsible for their persecution for the
past eleven years. Turkish soldiers are needed in the North of Cyprus until the
Turkish Cypriots can survive without them. Their past experiences have not given
the Turkish Cypriots much faith in international protection, and they could not
fail to notice what happened recently to the Moslem people of Srebrenica whilst
under international protection.
After 1974, the Greek Cypriots were able to enforce their
embargo against the Turkish Cypriots by persuading other countries, and more
recently by persuading the European Court of Justice, that it was illegal to
trade with or fly to any part of Cyprus, or even to play international sport,
without the permission of the “Government of Cyprus” - which meant in
practice the permission of the Greek Cypriots. The purpose of the embargo was to
bring the Turkish Cypriots to their knees and force them to accept a settlement
on Greek Cypriot terms. Fortunately they have not succeeded, but it puzzles most
Turkish Cypriots to find the Greek Cypriots calling the Turkish Cypriots their
brothers and sisters whilst at the same time doing their best to strangle their
economy.
They could not have enforced this embargo without the tacit
acceptance of the international community, and it is time for this acceptance to
be withdrawn. Turkish Cypriots have done nothing to deserve such treatment.
Within the EU, the lifting of the embargo would require amendment to subordinate
legislation which could not be vetoed.
The Greek Cypriots were also able, by using international
recognition to their advantage, to get judgements against Turkey in the European
Court of Human Rights in property cases. In fact the second division of the
island in 1974, which caused property losses on both sides, was caused by the
incomparably more serious violation of the human rights of the Turkish
Cypriots, none of whom has ever been compensated.
The Turkish Cypriots have suffered a serious injustice for the
past 40 years by international willingness to deal with a Greek Cypriot
administration as if it were the lawful government of all Cyprus, where in fact
it had destroyed the constitutional order by force of arms.
The Greek Cypriot journalist, Stavros Angelides, wrote in Fileleftheros
on 16th September 1990 “With the passage of time we the Greek Cypriots
forget, or wilfully disregard, the events which led to the present situation in
Cyprus. We forget our faults and we ask all the more emphatically everybody else
to deliver to us justice as we understand it. We talk in generalities and
in vague terms about UN Resolutions, and actually mean those which favour us.
The rest can go to hell”