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Page 13
THE COUP OF 15 JULY &
TURKISH PEACE OPERATION
The Coup of 15 July
Makarios Addressed to the
Security Council
The First Turkish Peace
Operation
Its Direct Result
The Geneva Conference
The Second Peace Operation
The new leader of Athens' junta,
Brigadier Ioannides, the chief of the military police, was considered to be
more authoritarian than his predecessor. He was a man known for his fiery
anti-communist views and intense hatred of Archbishop Makarios.
Makarios gave an interview on 6
June on the letter he sent to Ghizikis and stated that Athens was financing
and directing EOKA B with the aim of dissolving the Cyprus state.
On 15 July 1974, the National
Guard, led by Greek mainland officers staged a coup and overthrew the
Makarios government.
At about 8.30 am, tanks of the
National guard reached the presidential palace and started shelling it.
At the same time the Cyprus
Broadcasting station, the telecommunication centre, and the Nicosia Airport
were occupied.
The presidential palace was
destroyed by shells fired from tanks and armoured vehicles and within
minutes the building was on fire.
Makarios hardly escaped via the
back garden. He stopped a passing van in which he arrived in Palechori
Village and from there he was driven to Kykko Monastery in the Troodos
Mountain. From there he went to Paphos and issued a statement informing the
Greek Cypriot people and the world that he was alive. He also used a local
radio in Paphos to broadcast messages to the Greeks and asked them to resist
the Junta.
Acting on instructions from
Athens, the Greek General Yiorgitsis in Nicosia, started looking for a
candidate to be appointed as thepresident of the Republic. After a few
leading Greek Cypriots refused to accept the offer, Nikos Sampson, an EOKA
terrorist who had killed the first British soldiers and then in 1963-64 many
Turks, had been appointed. He was sworn in as president at 3. p.m on 15 July
According to Clerides, "the real
objectives of the conspirators were to oust Makarios and his government in
order to proceed with direct negotiations with Turkey, and with the use of
the good offices of the United States, to achieve ENOSIS of the major part
of Cyprus with Greece, conceding a smaller part of Cyprus to Turkish
sovereignty"
(Ibid, p. 343 )
From Paphos, Makarios was flown
the Akrotiri Base a the British helicopter; and from there to Malta and
thence to London by an RAF transport plane on 17 July 1974.
He visited 10 Downing St, and
conferred with the British Premier Harold Wilson and then with Foreign
Minister James Callaghan.
When Makarios requested that
Britain, as a Guarantor power, had an obligation to restore constitutional
order and therefore should intervene, he was told that the British
Government would not intervene to restore constitutional order.
Nevertheless, Britain still considered Makarios to be the legal President of
the Cyprus Republic.
From London, the next day,
Makarios went to New York and addressed to the Security Council on 19 July
1974.
The Turkish delegation in the UN
supported both the validity of the credentials of the Greek Cypriot
delegate, Zenon Rossides which had been cancelled by Nikos Sampson and the
right of Makarios to address the Security Council.
(Clerides, op. cit, p. 350
)
In his speech Makarios
underlined the fact that the coup was organised by the military regime in
Athens and carried out by Greek army officers who were serving in the
National Guard and were commanding it.
Makarios categorically denied
that what was happened in Cyprus on 15 July was not a revolution but "it was
an invasion which violated the independence and sovereignty of the
Republic."
He accused the Athens regime of
being `double faced' ; because while it agreed that the intercommunal talks
should be based on independence, on the other hand, it established and
supported the EOKA B terrorist organisation whose professed aim was to
create union of Cyprus with Greece."
He stated the following:
"As I have already stated the
events in Cyprus do not constitute an internal affair of the Greek Cypriots.
The Turkish Cypriots are also affected. THE COUP OF THE GREEK JUNTA IS AN
INVASION AND FROM ITS CONSEQUENCES ALL THE PEOPLE OF CYPRUS BOTH GREEKS AND
TURKS WILL SUFFER ."
In conclusion he asked the
Security Council to invite the Athens military regime to bring to an end its
INVASION of Cyprus.
He also described Nikos Sampson,
the appointed new president of Cyprus, "A well known criminal", and said
that the coup had cost much bloodshed and many lives.
(Ibid, p.344 )
During the coup, many of the
Makarios supporters were killed and buried in mass graves. A Greek Cypriot
priest, Papatsestos disclosed to Athens daily TA NEA that, he himself have
buried 127 bodies during the coup and he was forced to bury another 77
bodies in mass graves.
This revelation in TA NEA was
later reproduced in all Greek Cypriot papers on 27 February 1976.
Papatsetsos was in charge of the
Nicosia Greek Orthodox cemetery and admitted that truck loads of dead Greek
Cypriots were hastily buried without identifying the bodies. He said: "The
worst ordeal in my life was to witness a wounded young Greek Cypriot buried
alive". He also admitted that approximately 10 Turks were buried in the same
cemetery.
The coup staged by Sampson on 15
July 1974 had raised alarm and deep concern in Turkey. The Turkish Prime
Minister Bulent Ecevit, who was in coalition with Erbakan's National
Salvation party ordered the Turkish Forces to be ready for all
eventualities.
On 16 June, Ecevit sent a note
to the British Government asking to cooperate with Turkey in emplementing
the Treaty of Guarantee. Despite the irresponsive attitude of Britain he
flew to London with Foreign Minister Prof. T. Günes on 17 June 1974 for
consultations in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee. But the British
Government led by Harold Wilson declined to participate in a joint action as
envisaged by the Article (2) of the Treaty, to protect the independence of
the island and to re-establish the state of affairs.
The American reaction to the
coup was similarly disappointing. Makarios was widely distrusted and the
then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger regarded him as a "loser" . He also
was apprehensive that the Ioannides regime in Athens, if challenged, might
be overthrown by more radical officers with anti-American sentiments.
(Prof. Oberling, op. cit,
p.161 )
According to a State Department
official, Kissinger followed a policy of "constructive ambiguity" and sent
his deputy Joseph Sisco, to shuttle between London, Athens and Ankara to
negotiate a peaceful settlement to the conflict.
Thus the Americans not only had
not condemned the coup but also gave the impression that they might
recognise the Sampson regime and the new state of affairs created by the
coup.
Both the US and the UK had also
prevented the UN of condemning the military coup in Cyprus by the Greek army
officers and the puppet administration of Nikos Sampson, arguing that too
little information was available to come to any conclusion.
(Ibid, p. 162 )
Among the permanent members of
the Security Council only the Soviet Union condemned the coup and had been
supportive for a Turkish intervention to save the independence of Cyprus and
to reinstate Makarios.
Ecevit's ultimatum of 18 July to
the Greek Government demanding the resignation of Nikos Sampson and the
withdrawal of the 650 Greek officers together with a firm pledge that the
island would remain independent was refused by Athens.
There was no time to be wasted.
The Turkish Cypriot people were besieged by the Greek National Guard and
both the declaration of enosis and yet another massacre of the Turks were
imminent. At this juncture, Turkey had no alternative but to intervene. On
19 July, Ecevit ordered the Turkish Army to launch a `peace Operation' and
exercise the right of intervention, according to Article IV(2) of the Treaty
of Guarantee.
The aim of this operation was to
maintain the independence of Cyprus and to protect the Turkish Cypriot
people.
The Turkish Peace Operation
started at early hours of 20 July 1974. It was a difficult amphibious
operation involving air, sea and land forces.
Three brigades of Turkish troops
arrived by sea and landed, on a beach, 5 miles west of Kyrenia, with 40
tanks and light weapons.
Paratroopers had landed a few
miles north of Nicosia between Gönyeli and Hamitköy.
A bridgehead was established and
Turkish forces had a link up with local Turkish Cypriot fighters in St.
Hilarion area and in Kyrenia Boghaz. Heavy fighting took place between the
Turkish Contingent and the Greek Contingent which were in Cyprus in
accordance with the Treaty of Alliance of 1960.
The Times Correspondent observed
that "thousands of Turkish Cypriots were taken hostage after the Turkish
forces landed. Turkish women were raped, children were shot in the street
and the Turkish quarter of Limassol burned by the (Greek) National Guard."
(The Times, 23 July 1974.
)
The brutality of the Greek
National Guard in Limassol and other Turkish areas they surrounded was
widely reported in the world press. For instance, a German tourist described
the atrocities of the Greek soldiers saying that "the human mind cannot
comprehend the Greeks' butchery" and added: "In the villages around
Famagusta, the Greek National Guard have displayed unsurpassed examples of
savagery. Entering Turkish homes, they ruthlessly rained bullets on women
and children. They cut the throats of many Turks. Lining up Turkish women,
they raped them all.
(Broadcast from `The Voice of
Germany' July 30, 1974. )
The New York Times Correspondent
witnessed that, 15 of the Turkish Cypriot men, who were trying to defend
themselves, were lined up after they surrendered and were shot by EOKA
gunmen in the mixed village of Alaminos, of the Larnaca District.
(The New York Times, 29 July
1974 )
Many Turkish Cypriots were taken
away as hostages. For instance, the Turkish Cypriot men in Limassol, Larnaca
and Paphos were all herded into the courtyards of the Greek hospitals, Greek
schools and stadiums.
Many Turkish Cypriots who
managed to escape were sheltered for many weeks in the AKROTIRI British Base
area, in a makeshift camp.
On 22 July Kyrenia was freed by
the Turkish Army. Thus the Turks acquired a sea port which had been very
vital for their supplies. Then the call for a cease-fire by the UN Security
Council was implemented.
On the second day of the Turkish
Peace Operation the Athens military Government collapsed. Karamanlis
returned from Paris and formed his civilian Government. In Cyprus, Nikos
Sampson resigned and Clerides assumed the acting presidency.
First Turkish brought about
favorable results : Democracy returned to Greece, Cyprus's independence was
secured and the way to constitutional order was opened. But the Greek side
was still not prepared to accept a new order which would provide full
security in a federal and cantonal new system.
Meanwhile the UN Security
Council adopted Resolution No: 353 (1974) on 20 July.
The said resolution `deplored
the outbreak of conflict and continued bloodshed' and `expressed grave
concern about the situation which led to a serious threat to international
peace and security in the whole Eastern Mediterranean area.
It `called upon Greece, Turkey
and the U.K to enter into negotiations without delay for the restoration of
peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus and to keep the
Security Council informed.'
In conformity with this
resolution and the Treaty of Guarantee, Foreign Ministers of the three
guarantor powers attended to a conference in Geneva , on 25 July 1974. They
discussed the problem of Cyprus until 30 July and issued a joint declaration
which underlined "THE EXISTENCE IN PRACTICE IN THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS OF TWO
AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATIONS, THAT OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY AND THAT OF
THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY."
However, terms of the
declaration were not implemented. The Greek side did not comply with the
undertakings to evacuate the occupied Turkish enclaves and to cooperate in
establishing a security zone. Instead it continued to attack Turkish areas
and took hundreds of Turkish Cypriot civilians as prisoners, in addition to
the hundreds they had taken hostage before the Geneva Conference. Thus, the
Greek attacks a further 33 Turkish villages to be evacuated. In addition
this, the Greek atrocities which also included women and children increased
and became more brutal. Almost the whole population of Aloa, Sandallaris and
Maratha near Famagusta and Tokhni, Zyyi and Mari at Larnaca district were
massacred and wiped out.
The Second Geneva Conference
which took place between 9 and 13 August, did not yield any result on a new
Constitution and a cantonal system as proposed by Turkey. The Turkish view
was based on a federal type of arrangement providing for autonomous areas.
Whereas the Greek and Greek Cypriot sides insisted on a unified Cyprus on
the basis of 1960 Constitution which, ironically, they considered to be
still in force.
By maintaining such a position
the Greek Cypriots were intending to covert the emerging realities in the
island which were a direct result of the coup aimed at uniting the island
with Greece, contrary to the 1960 Agreements.
On the other hand, the First
Peace Operation and the cease-fire resolution did not bring the required
security to the Turks of the island . Many Turkish villages were under seige
by Greek forces and several of them were hostages in the hands of the Greek
gunmen.
`In the meantime Greek Cypriots
started massacres once again. 16,000 Turks had to abandon 38 more villages.
Within the walls of Famagusta 10,000 Turks facing the danger of more
starvation, while 4,000 flocked to Konedra (Knodhara) village surrounded by
the Greek National Guard.'
(Ertekün, Necati Münir, In
Search of Negotiated Cyprus Settlement, (Nicosia 1981), p. 30 )
In Limassol and Larnaca, the
Turkish Cypriot men, after their surrender, were herded into makeshift
concentration camps while the women and children were left at the mercy of
roving Greek gangs. In Limassol some 1980 men were detained in the open, in
the summer heat in the city's soccer stadium. In Larnaca, 873 men, ranging
in age from 12 to 90 were confined in a school building which was built to
accommodate only 100 students.
(Oberling, op. cit, p.173
)
All Turkish Cypriots outside the
areas held by the Turkish army were in imminent danger of annihilation.
Therefore Turkey could not waste any more time by trying to challenge the
diplomatic maneuvers and the Byzantine tricks of the Greek side. Diplomatic
negotiations were leading nowhere as was exhibited in Geneva, and the
annihilation of Cypriot Turks outside the protective umbrella of the Turkish
Peace Force could not be risked any further.
The vulnerable position of the
Turkish Army itself which was restricted in a narrow area also necessitated
a second operation.
`What was becoming increasingly
obvious in Geneva was that British Foreign Secretary Callaghan was
encouraging the Greeks in their intransigence, in an apparent effort at
buttering the new democratic regime in Athens.'
(Oberling, op. cit, p.178
)
On 12 August Callaghan announced
that Britain was sending 600 Gurka troops to Cyprus and had cancelled the
return of 12 Phantom jets and that 600 marines had been sent to Cyprus at
the height of Turkish military intervention. This meant that Britain would
resist militarily to any Turkish advance and thus created false hopes on the
part of the Greeks.
`The Turkish Cypriots had
suffered too much and the Turkish Government had invested too much effort
and money in its military operation in Cyprus to be contented with a
proposal that constituted at best an overture to what could have been
lengthy negotiations.
Creigh R. Whitney of The New
York Times observed:
"It seems clear that the new
Greek civilian Government in Athens felt itself unable to accept a
far-reaching solution now."
(The New York Times, 15
August 1974 )
Therefore the Greek side started
to play with time in Geneva and asked for a 48 hours adjournment on 13
August. This was not acceptable to the Turkish side for obvious reasons and
thus the Conference came to an end.
Denktas, explained that the
Greeks' demand for adjournment was aimed at taking advantage of it to bring
Makarios back and reinforce their forces on the island. He said that Greek
Cypriots were simply not yet ready to negotiate realistically and were still
hedging on the key question of bi-zonality; "namely that the Turks are
entitled to full security and that this can only be provided by a
geographical area".
(The Times, 15 August 1974
)
The well informed foreign
observers had also expressed almost identical views:
The Greek Cypriot demands for
`additional consultation' were reminiscent of years of political haggling
during which the Greek side had not yielded an inch."
Cyprus: Minority Rights Group
Report, No: 30 (London, 1976) p.6
Ecevit, ordered the second peace
operation as soon as he learned that the Turkish proposals were rejected and
additional consultations had to be commenced demanded.
Thus, on 14 August 1974 the
second peace operation started at dawn and was concluded on the 16 August ,
after the Turkish Army reached Famagusta on the East and Lefke on the west.
Since then, the Turkish Army is
stationed in the Northern part of Cyprus within the frontiers established at
the second peace operation. And since 16 August 1974, intercommunal fight
has ceased Over two decades, both communities are living separately within
their regions and under their own democratic system of government. |
