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Page 14
ESTABLISHMENT OF
TRNC
TOWARDS THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
Declaration Of
TRNC
Extracts
FromTheDeclaration
More
Negotiations Which Led Nowhere
The Final Declaration of the New
Delhi Non-Aligned Conference, adopted on 12 March 1983, expressed full
solidarity with and support for `the Government of Cyprus'.
(Necatigil Zaim, The Cyprus
Question And The Turkish Position In International Law, (Oxford, 1989)
p.159-160 )
The Greek side intensified its
propaganda campaign in international fora to mislead world public opinion
that the Cyprus problem was a problem of `invasion and occupation' , rather
than a problem between the island's two communities.
Accordingly, instead of
continuing intercommunal negotiations, they took the issue once more to the
UN and insisted that the matter be discussed not at the Political Committee
but at the General Assembly, where the Turkish Cypriot side was barred from
participating in the debate.
The UN General Assembly on 13
May 1983, passed a resolution demanding for the immediate withdrawal of all
the "occupation forces and the voluntary return of the refugees to their
former homes".
It was also suggested that the
Security Council should examine within a specified time-frame the question
of implementation of various UN resolutions on Cyprus.
The Turkish Cypriots were
especially concerned by paragraph two of this resolution which affirmed,
"the rights of the Republic of Cyprus and its people to full and effective
sovereignty and control over the territory of Cyprus and its natural and
other resources and calls upon all states to support and help the Government
of the Republic of Cyprus to exercise these rights.
(Necatigil, Op. Cit, p.164
)
Denktas described this
resolution as fatal to our interests and therefore unacceptable.'
(Denktas, Op. Cit, p.115
)
Kyprianou wanted to use the New
Delhi decisions the aforementimed UN General Assembly resolution as a basis
for further talks, thus imposing the Greek Cypriot hegemony over the Turkish
Cypriot people and the whole island.
The Turkish Cypriot side refused
to bow to this pressure and one-sided resolutions which were neither legatet
nor morally binding.
The May 1983 UN resolution
heightened awareness of Turkish Cypriots that they were being downgraded to
the status of a minority. It had also eroded the negotiating status of the
Turkish Cypriot side without having even listened their case.
Denktas, considering this total
injustice and prejudice against Turkish Cypriot rights , decided to take
steps for the declaration of an independent state in the North. He pointed
out that the General Assembly resolution was the `last drop' which caused
the Turks to reassert their partnership rights.'
(Ibid, p. 166 )
But before taking that step,
Denktas invited Kyprianou to declare publicly that he accepted the
partnership status of the Turkish Cypriots and to confirm that it was the
desire of the Greek side to establish a bi-communal, bi-zonal federal
republic. He also `called for lifting of the economic embargo and a
`moratorium' on internationalization of the Cyprus problem.
(Ibid, p. 166 )
Meanwhile the Legislative
Assembly of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus reacted to the UN
resolution by adopting a motion on 17 June by which it underlined the equal
rights and status of Turkish Cypriots in an independent and sovereign
Cyprus. This was based on the fact that when Britain ended its
administration in the island, sovereignty was not transferred exclusively to
one community but to both communities conjointly as co-founder partners of
the Republic.
Kyprianou rejected the offer of
Denktas for a high level meeting under the auspices of the UN
Secretary-General.
Moreover, Perez de Cuellar's
efforts for the resumption of the intercommunal talks on the basis of his
`indicators' failed, because Kyprianou was instructed by Athens to turn down
this initiative.
Nicosia Rolandis, the Foreign
Minister of the Greek side, at last realized that Kyprianou was not serious
about a bi-zonal federation when he rejected the UN Secretary' General's
`indicators' which were intended to give a new impetus to the intercommunal
talks. Therefore he wrote to Kyprianou explaining his reason for
resignation.
In his written statement on 25
September 1983, Rolandis said that the Greek Cypriot leader, Kyprianou, had
adopted a negative approach towards the UN Secretary-General's `working
points' right from the beginning.
Denktas explained his reasons of
declaring independence saying that he had many reasons to believe that
nothing short of declaration of independence and some movement to seek
international recognition would oblige the Greek side towards a settlement
based on a bi-comunal partnership under a bi-zonal federal system.
He stated:
"I believe that it was our
rightful due to be free first and to assert our right to statehood if we
were ever to enter into a venture of political partnership with the Greek
Cypriots. If we did not assert our right of statehood as free people I saw
no reason why the Greek Cypriot side should ever settle the Cyprus problem
by accepting us into a partnership."
(Ibid, pp. 121-2 )
Denktas added that there was no
alternative. The Turkish Cypriots were deprived of all their rights and were
treated as outlaws by the Greeks. As long as the Turkish Cypriots stayed
dormant in their present position the existing state of affairs would
continue.
"We had to break this vicious
circle. The world had to see that we existed... The key to a federal
settlement was the assertion of our statehood."
(Ibid p. 123 )
And the 'vicious circle' was
broken on 15 November 1983, when Denktas addressed the Turkish Cypriot
Assembly and read the declaration of independence. Over ten thousand of
Turkish Cypriots had gathered in front of the Assembly who had expressed
their joy and pleasure by thunderous applause and cheers when Denktas
declared the birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).
Following Denktas's adress, the
Assembly (parliament) unanimously adopted the resolution of independence.
-We hereby declare before the
world and before history the establishment of the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus as an Independent State.
- On this historic day, We
extend once again our hand in peace and friendship to the Greek Cypriot
People.
The two Peoples of the island
are destined to co-exist, side by side.
- We can, and must, find
peaceful, just and durable solutions to all our differences, through
negotiations on the basis of equality.
- The proclamation of the new
State will not hinder, but facilitate the establishment of a genuine
federation.
- The new Republic will not
unite with any other State.
- The new State will continue to
adhere to the Treaties of Establishment, Guarantee and Alliance.
- The good offices of the UN
Secretary-General and negotiations must continue.
- The new state will not allow
any hostile activity against any country on its territory.
- It shall attach the greatest
importance to the preservation of peace, stability and of the balance of
power in the region.
The resolution unanimously
passed by the Turkish Cypriot parliament underlined that the Turkish Cypriot
side, `firmly adhered to the view that the two peoples of Cyprus were
destined to co-exist side by side and could and should find a peaceful, just
and durable solution through negotiations on the basis of equality'.
It also expressed the firm
conviction that the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
would not hinder but facilitate the re-establishment of the partnership
between the two peoples within the federal fremework and also facilitate the
settlement of problems between them.
In accordance with the
Assembly's resolution, Denktas presented on 2 January 1984, only 6 weeks
after the declaration of independence the goodwill measures, for
establishing a federal partnership republic. The UN Secretary-General found
the Turkish Cypriots good will measures constructive but the Greek side did
not accept to have talks on them.
On 17 April Turkey and the TRNC
exchanged ambassadors and thus two states diplomatically recognized each
other.
Perez de Cuellar, the UN
Secretary-General, invited the representatives of both sides to meet him
separately in Vienna between 6-7 August 1984. On 7 August the Turkish
Cypriot side accepted the Secretary-General's `working points' as a basis
for a summit meeting.
On 10 September 1984 'proximity
talks' started. The leaders of both sides met the Secretary General
separately and exchanged views on a draft agreement.
Denktas says, he accepted the
draft put before him on 27 September , when Perez de' Cuellar gave him his
solemn word that the concessions he had extracted from him would not be
binding if the Greek Cypriot side refused to accept the paper as an
"intigrated whole."
(Ibid. p. 133 )
Thus the document prepared by
the UN Secretary-General had to be accepted as a whole by both sides or
rejected. Because, this was a package deal.
Kyprianou, the Greek Cypriot
leader, was reported to have stated that for the first time in 10 years the
Cyprus problem was showing positive developments.
He also added "without any doubt
the Turkish side has taken important steps for a just and viable solution of
the Cyprus problem."
(Haravghi, 3 January 1985
)
Despite this correct assessmet
Kyprianou asked 10 days adjournment `to consult his people and to see the
Greek premier, Andreas Papandreou', when he returned to Washington after
having talks in Cyprus and in Athens the Secretary-General announced the
date of the summit as 17 January 1985. That was a clear sign that all
obstacles were removed and the draft for an overall agreement as an
`intigrated whole' was ready to be signed at the summit.
But when on 17 January 1985 both
leaders met with Perez de' Cuellar in New York, to sign the draft, Kyprianou
rejected all the elements and criteria contained in the draft and asked to
begin negotiations, all efforts made and all agreements reached during those
paintaking three rounds of proximity talks had been in vain.
Now it had once more become
clear that the Greek Cypriot side intended to extract further concessions in
order to reduce the Turkish Cypriots' position to that of a minority in a
Greek Cypriot state.
All attempts of the
Secretary-Genaral to convince Kyprianou that he was letting go of an
historical opportunity were of no avail. Thus the summit of 17 January 1985
had been a disastrous failure.
The Greek Cypriot press and
leadership put the blame on Kyprianou and strongly criticised him for this
`lost opportunity'.
The Times reported the
following:
"Un officials said Kyprianou
even questioned the basic tenets and principles of an accommodation with the
Turkish Cypriots, including the concept of `bi-zonality' and equal political
status for the (two) communities."
(The Times, 22 January 1985
)
The Greek Cypriot daily Alithia
declared:
"As long as Kyprianou is in
office, no solution is possible."
Kyprianou rejected to sign the
Draft Framework Agreement because as the leader of AKEL, Papaiannou rightly
stated: "This document could have been rejected only by those who oppose
federal solution to the Cyprus problem."
Denktas concluded that, "The
Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence and the existence of the TRNC
did not then, and do not now, constitute obstacles in the search for peace
in Cyprus.
The international recognization
and relations the Greek Cypriot side enjoy, encourage them to play with
time, to resort to dilatory tactics and to persist in their deliberate
misrepresentation of the nature of the Cyprus question".
(Denktas op. cit, p. 149)
"As long as the Greek Cypriots
have the benefit of exclusive and unqualified diplomatic and political
recognition and support of the international community, it is evident that
they will have neither the political will nor the incentive or motivation to
reach a settlement through direct negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots.
The only way of breaking the
impasse over Cyprus and of overcoming Greek and Greek Cypriot intransigence
and obstructionism is for the international community to treat at an equal
level and on equal terms both the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and
the Greek Cypriot state. The Turkish Cypriot people hope and expect that
countries in sympathy with their cause will be the first to act in this
constructive direction".
(Ibid, p. 152)
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