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Page 15
NEGOTIATION PROCESS
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THE NEW CYPRUS
In order to meet this new development and the
already existing situation which needed an internal reorganization, Turkish
Federated State of Kibris, was proclaimed on 13 February 1975. By means of
this the Turkish side aimed at contributing towards a federal solution.
Its new constitution was put to the referendum
of the Turkish Cypriot people on 8 June 1975, which was approved by a two
thirds majority.
The Turkish Federated State, did not seek
international recognition, because its aim was to keep the door open for
federation and it was hoped that in a short while the Greek side as well
would follow suit and thus open the way for a federal settlement.
DENKTAS-MAKARIOS GUIDELINES
The President of the Cyprus Turkish Federated
State (CTFS) Mr Denktas sent a letter to the Greek Cypriot leader Makarios
on 9 January 1977, expressing his readiness to meet under the auspices of
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the hope that a
compromise solution could be reached on the respective positions of both
sides.
(Ertekün, Op. Cit, p. 45 )
Archbishop Makarios agreed and thus the first
summit meeting between the two leaders took place on 27 January in the
presence of Perez de Cuellar, the Special UN representative. This was
followed by a second summit on 12 February under the auspices of the UN
Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim.
During this meeting the two leaders agreed on
instructions which would be a basis for the future intercommunal
negotiations.
They came to be known as the FOUR GUIDELINES,
and are as follows: 1. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned,
bi-communal Federal Republic. 2. The territory under the administration of
each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or
productivity and land ownership. 3. Questions of principles, like freedom of
movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific
matters, are open for discussion taking into consideration the fundamental
basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties
which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community. 4. The powers and
functions of the Central Federal Government will be such as to safeguard the
unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal character of the
State."
(UN Document S/12323, para 5 )
The Four Guidelines has been a landmark and
forms the basis of all negotiations since its adoption.
The political initiatives of the Turkish side
continued with the submission of new proposals to the UN Secretary-General
on 13 April 1978 in Vienna. .
K. Waldheim found the Turkish proposals worth
considering and thus he visited Nicosia and handed them over to the Greek
leader for consideration, on 19 April.
On 18-19 May 1979 Waldheim was successful in
bringing the two leaders around a table which resulted in a joint
declaration known as the 'TEN POINT AGREEMENT'.
Accordingly, both sides agreed to resume
intercommunal talks on 15 June 1979, on the basis of Denktas-Makarios
guidelines of 12 February 1977.
The ten points agreement prepared the ground for
the resumption of intercommunal talks, in Nicosia, under the auspices of the
UN special representative Perez de Cuellar. The talks started on 15 June
1979 and recessed sine-die on 22 June 1979.
There had been another long recession and the
new talks resumed 14 months, later on 9 August 1980.
The main reason for failure was the negative
attitude of the Greek Cypriot side, manifested in the refusal, in
contravention of point 6 of the 19 May agreement, to lift the economic
embargo imposed upon the Turkish Cypriot community since 1974. They also
refused to , under the same agreement, provisions related to bi-zonality and
security of the Turkish Cypriots.
THE CAMPAIGN FOR
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE PROBLEM
Meanwhile the Greek Cypriot leader Kyprianou
launched an intensive international campaign at the expense of the
intercommunal talks.
The UN Secretary General in his report to the UN
General Assembly on 8 November 1979, referred to the Greek Cypriot
activities at international gatherings and at non-aligned conferences at
Colombo, Lusaka and Havana between June and September 1979, which were
regarded by the Turkish side as a violation of point 6 of the
Denktas-Kyprianou agreement of 1979.
(UN Report A/34/620, p.5, Para. 17 )
After intensive efforts of the UN
Secretary-General, another series of intercommunal talks resumed on 9 August
1980 under the auspices of the new UN special Cyprus representative
Ambassador Hugo Juan Gobbi.
On 5 August 1981 the Turkish Cypriot side
presented comprehensive proposals for the solution, which for the first time
offered specific territorial concessions. In return they demanded the
establishment of a bi-zonal federal republic in which the "equal co-founder
partnership status of the Turkish Cypriot community would be protected."
Diplomatic observers welcomed this move, but the
Greek Cypriot leadership did not share their enthusiasm.
(Denktas, op. cit, p.112 )
The Turkish Cypriot proposals were not regarded
worth considering by the Greek Cypriot leadership, because their policy was
not based on intercommunal negotiation but on the internationalization of
the issue by pursuing an "agressive diplomacy" .
In February 1982 the new Greek premier Andreas
Papandreou visited Cyprus and completely ignoring the intercommunal talks,
proclaimed that Cyprus, 'a Greek land' was under foreign occupation and that
unless this was ended there could be no solution of the problem.
(Ibid, p.113 )
The combined efforts of Athens and the Greek
Cypriot leaders to internationalize the issue had completely paralysed
intercommunal negotiations under the UN auspicesSeveral resolutions were
passed by the Non-Aligned meetings and while Kyprianou was in New Delhi, to
obtain one such resolution, the Greek Cypriot negotiator requested
postponement of the intercommunal talks. Meanwhile the Cyprus issue was
taken yet again to the UN by the Greek side.
Denktas appealed to the Greek Cypriot side not
to take the issue to New Delhi and to New York and not to give up the
dialogue. He warned them: "You will not find us in the same position and
with the same status if you leave the negotiating table."
(Ibid, p.114 )
No one heeded this warning. Kyprianou and
Papandreou were determined to internationalize the problem. As a matter of
fact the Greek Cypriot leader, Kyprianou, was doing only what the Greek
premier was telling him to do.
While the 1980-1983 intercommunal talks held at
the Ledra Palace (known as the Ledra Palace Talks) were in its full swing,
the Greek Cypriot side decided to break off the talks and without waiting
for the regular UN General Assembly meeting in September decided to have
recourse to the UN General Assemble, in May 1983, which led to the
Resolution 37/253 of 13 May 1983. The one sided resolution of the General
Assembly, which was taken without hearing the Turkish Cypriot side, in
favour of the Greek Cypriot side, left no other alternative to the Turkish
Cypriot people, but to assert its rights by establishing the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus in November 1983.
When the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was
established in 1983, the Turkish Cypriot side declared that "the
proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will not hinder the
two equal peoples and their administrations from establishing a new
partnership within the framework of a genuine federation, on the contrary,
such a proclamation can facilitate efforts in this direction by fullfilling
the necessary requisites for the establishment of a federation."
In August 1984, the Secretary General separately
presented in Vienna the "Vienna Working Points" to the two sides. After the
proximity talks which were conducted in Nwe York between September-December
1984 under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, the Secretary-General
invited the two sides to come to a summit meeting on 17 January 1985, not
with their bargaining positions, but with their final positions in order to
take major political decisions.
The Turkish Cypriot side compyling with this
request took crucial political decisions by accepting the draft framework
agreement documentation proposed by the Secretary-General. At the summit
meeting of 17 January 1985, Mr. Kyprianou who was strongly and repeatedly
urged by the Secretary- General to accept the draft framework agreement
raised fundamental objections to each and every paragraph of the document in
concern. This negative attitude of Kyprianou was bitterly criticised not
only in diplomatic circles and in the world media, but also in the Greek
Cypriot press and in the Greek Cypriot Parliament.
When the Secretary-Geeral finally presented his
new "Draft Framework Agreement" to both sides in March 1986, the Greek
Cypriot side gave a negative reply to it. The Turkish Cyprot side, however,
accepted the "Draft Framework Agreement" as a whole, from the very
beginning. As a result, the Secretary-General submitted to the UN Security
Council in June 1986 his additional report (S/18102), pointing his finger at
the Greek Cypriot side as the party responsible for the impasse in the
current UN initiative.
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In 1986 another opportunity was missed when
the Greek Cypriot side rejected the UN Secretary-General's Draft Framework
Agreement of 29 March 1986 which the Turkish Cypriot side accepted as a
whole. In August 1988 a new effort was undertaken. The UN
Secretary-General, in agreement with the two parties, initiated a new
negotiating process. The Turkish Cypriot side made a genuine effort to
seek a compromise solution with the Greek Cypriots.
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Difficulties Encountered in the Process:
The confrontational approach which escalated to new heights throughout
these years deepened the mistrust between the two sides. The Greek Cypriot
side pursued with new vigor its embargo against Northern Cyprus designed
to isolated the Turkish Cypriots from the world. A rearmament campaign was
undertaken in South Cyprus which in its early days required a spending of
$ 1.5 million a day. This military build-up re-kindled adventurist
tendencies in the Greek Cypriot community, further deepened the lack of
confidence between the two sides and complicated seriously the search for
an agreed settlement. A campaign of hostility was launched against the
Turkish Cypriot side in general and its leadership in particular. No
opportunity was missed to exploit international and especially European
for to distort the true nature of the problem in Cyprus.
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The Need for a Fundamental Change:
Looking at this situation, the Turkish Cypriot ever more transparently saw
that those who were not only the same people who had created the fait
accompli of December 1963, but that they also wanted to preserve it. They,
therefore began to stress that a federation could only be achieved between
friendly units who wanted to come together on equal terms for their common
benefit, and that a fundamental change was required in the mentality and
approach of the Greek Cypriots before a new political partnership became a
viable project. In October 1989, they proposed a declaration of intent for
this purpose which would help the two sides to give up the confrontational
approach and begin to replace it with a non-adversarial relationship. This
proposal was side-stepped, but continued to be the major requirement for
giving any agreement on paper the chance to be implemented.
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The New York Summit of 1990 began with the
unsuccessful meeting between the leaders of the two sides with the UN
Secretary-General. From the Turkish point of view, this meeting was
abortive because the Greek Cypriot leader was unprepared to genuinely
negotiate on the real issues which divided the two sides and expected
others to do the work for him. The tensions which continued to rise in the
island hardly promoted the right kind of atmosphere. The issues used
against the Turkish Cypriot side at this phase were arbitrary and
unjustified. It is clear that there is not one "people" in Cyprus, but two
of them defined and organized as communities the 1960 Constitution. They
have the unquestionable capacity to freely determine their political
future. It is desirable that they should do so far common purposes. This
requires a freely negotiated and mutually acceptable agreement to which
the two communities will be in a position to express their consent through
separate referenda on the two sides.
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Resolution No.649 of the Security Council
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Council Resolution No.649 adopted on 12 March
1990 brought a welcome clarity to the situation. Turkey and the Turkish
Cypriot side publicly expressed their agreement with its content as a long
sought step in the right direction. This resolution makes clear that the
problem is more than 32 years old. It addresses the two leaders in Cyprus
as political equals. It calls on them to reach freely a mutually
acceptable solution on an equal footing. It defines the already agreed
basis of the solution as a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation. It also
calls on the parties to refrain from any action that could aggravate the
situation. Finally, it gives strong support to the UN Secretary General's
mission of good offices. The Turkish side is in agreement with all of
these elements and has characterized this resolution in many statements as
a historic opportunity that would not be missed
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.
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The position and actions of the two sides
during the period which followed the adoption of Resolution No.649 are in
stark contrast to each other. While paying lip-service to the resolution,
the Greek Cypriots and Greece have done nothing to promote its
implementation through working towards an "outline for an overall
agreement". They have been unwilling to promote talks in the light of this
resolution. They have taken various steps which contradict the call for
avoiding any action which could aggravate the situation. They have sought
to involve the European Community in this question, which is not competent
to act objectively on Cyprus because of the existence of Greece among its
members. Greek Cypriot application for full membership in the EC on behalf
of Cyprus as a whole in July 1990 brought all efforts for a negotiated
settlement to the brink of total collapse. Such an outcome was averted
only due to Turkish and Turkish Cypriot restraint. Neither community in
Cyprus has the capacity to act on behalf of Cyprus as a whole or to
attempt to create international obligations which might be binding on the
other community. Such steps require the explicit consent and agreement of
both sides in the island. The EC has the responsibility to give support to
the efforts within the UN Secretary-General's mission of good offices
without interfering in the substance of the talks.
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The Gulf Crisis: Following the onset of
the crisis in the Gulf, Greece and the Greek Cypriots attempted to draw
false parallels between Kuwait and Cyprus. This was just another attempt
to distort the nature of the problem in Cyprus. Their intention was, once
the crisis had blown over, to go to the Security Council and to ask the
same treatment for Cyprus. Such action would have in effect nullified
Resolution No.649 and all the efforts under the UN Secretary-General's
mission of good offices. This tactic has been adequately exposed. As the
Gulf crisis was drawing to a close, Greece and the Greek Cypriots began to
toy with the idea of including Cyprus on a Middle East conference. This is
the most far-fetched idea that they could come up with and obviously no
such linkages exist or can be established. But all the these attempts are
indicative of the Greek and Greek Cypriot frame of mind-doing nothing that
could contribute to an initial agreement in the form of an outline and the
creation of the necessary political atmosphere for the success of this
exercise, but doing everything that is not compatible with the letter and
spirit of Resolution No.649.
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Informal Talks of the Turkish Side with the
UN Secretariat: Despite adverse signals from the opposite camp, the
Turkish Cypriot side entered into informal talks with the UN Secretariat
in 1991 on the elements of an outline for an overall agreement. If today
there is any chance of positive developments within the UN
Secretary-General's mission of good offices, we owe it to these talks.
This has been a major effort for the Turkish Cypriot side, supported by
Turkey as a guarantor power. This effort had to be reciprocated and the
Greek Cypriots had to travel the distance already covered by the Turkish
Cypriots in order to make a fair deal visible. The talks of the UN
Secretariat in March 1991 with the Greek Cypriot side gave on indication
of a comparable effort or any commitment to the parameters of a
settlement. If this evasive attitude continues, it will block progress.
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side have plain expectations on the
situation in Cyprus. Clear answers should be given to the following two
questions:
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Is there an "occupation"; in Cyprus, or are we
trying to resolve a question which started 33 years ago with the breakdown
of the bi-communal partnership? Is there, in fact and in law, a joint
political authority on the island competent to exercise sovereignty all
over Cyprus and to speak for both communities?
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This is not a matter of non-recognition or
recognition, despite the totally unjustified situation which prevails. But
the true nature of the problem and the true nature of the relationship
between the parties should be acknowledged. This is vital in order to be
able to work towards a solution.
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In June 1992 the new UN Secretary-General,
Boutros Ghali invited the leaders of the two communities for discussion on
a new UN initiative, namely the "set of ideas", for an overall framework
agreement on Cyprus.
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Between 18-23 June 1992, the Secretary-General
held five meeting with each leader in New York and also arranged a brief
joint encounter between the two leaders. It was agreed that these talks
would be resumed on 15 July. During the period of resumed proximity talks
(15 July - 11 August) the UN Secretary-General and his representatives had
various separate meetings with the two leaders and numerous informal
contacts with them and their delegations. The Greek Cypriot leader, Mr.
Vassiliou insisted that the Turkish Cypriot side concede to his demands
for territorial concessions before other issues could be taken up. These
talks focused on territorial adjustments and displaced persons,
constituting two of the eight headings of the Secretary-General's Set of
Ideas (Annex to the Report of the Secretary- General to the Security
Council, S/24472 dated 21 August 1992).
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The Secretary-General stressed that he would
not proceed to a discussion of the other issues unless he was satisfied
that reasonable progress had been in bringing the parties within agreement
range on those two issues. The Turkish Cypriot side showed maximum
flexibility at the talks with the understanding that the draft outline of
a settlement to be negotiated with the Greek Cypriot side would be an
integrated whole which would eventually be submitted to the referendum of
the two peoples separately.
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However, it became clear that the Greek
Cypriot leader had not come to New York to negotiate in a spirit of
goodwill and reconciliation but merely to win territorial concessions from
the Turkish Cypriot side without conceding to anything in return.
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It was the Turkish Cypriot side that
facilitated the progress of the talks by making the above concessions. In
view of this, the Secretary-General considered that enough progress was
made to bring the parties within agreement range on the above issues. On
14 August the talks were recessed, to be re-convened at UN Headquarters on
26 October.
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Between 28 October and 11 November, 1992, the
third round of talks between the two leaders on the "Set of Ideas" were
held on New York under the Chairmanship of the UN Secretary- General. The
eight heading of the "set of ideas" were taken up in sequence: Displaced
persons, constitutional aspects and territorial adjustment, overall
objectives, guiding principles, security and guarantee, economic
development and safeguards and territorial arrangements.
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During the course of the joint meetings the
Secretary-General took record of the positions taken by each side. In
general terms, the Turkish Cypriot side affirmed that it was in "basic
agreement with 91 out of the 100 paragraphs" of the "set of ideas". The
Greek Cypriot side, on the other hand, stated that it accepted the "set of
ideas" as "a basis for reaching an overall framework agreement" but
subject to negotiation.
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The Greek Cypriot side once again chose to
look constructive but in effect to push the process to a deadlock by
leaving everything achieved open to further negotiation. Basic difference
between the positions of the two sides could not be bridged and the talks
were adjourned to be resumed in early March 1993, after the "presidential
elections" in South Cyprus.
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In his report to the UN Security Council on
his mission of good offices in Cyprus, dated 19 November 1992 (S/24830),
the UN Secretary-General described the progress of the New York talks and
the position of the two sides in relation to the UN "set of ideas". The
Secretary-General observed that "there is a deep crisis of confidence
between the two sides". It is difficult to envisage any successful outcome
to the talks for as long as this situation prevails (parag.63). With
the UN Secretary-General's evaluation of the situation as such, the
exercise on instituting Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between the
two sides got underway.
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In February 1993 "presidential elections" were
held in South Cyprus. Mr. Clerides who had backing of Mr. Kyprianou's
Party, which is known for its rejectionist policy towards the UN
initiatives, was elected. After the elections in the South, the UN
Secretary-General as well as the President of the Security Council, urged
the two leaders (Denktas and Clerides) to resume negotiations on the basis
of the "set of ideas" starting with the CBMs.
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Proximity talks on the implementation of the
CBMs were held with the UN representatives in Cyprus from February through
June 16, 1994. In line with the call made to the two sides by the UN
Secretary General, the Turkish Cypriot side displayed a constructive and
flexible stance throughout this process with a view to facilitating an
early settlement on the package.
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The Turkish Cypriot side expressed its
readiness in June 1994 to conclude and sign a CBM agreement. The Greek
Cypriot leader, Mr. Clerides, on the other hand, began making public
remarks, which reflected the position of the Greek Cypriot National
Council, to the effect that "the package of CBMs and the process is dead".
The opportunity which had thus been created by this process towards
fostering confidence between the two sides was marred due to the
rejectionist attitude of the Greek Cypriot side.
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Between 18-31 October, 1994 President Denktas
and Mr. Clerides met for a series of informal consultations. The agenda
was determined by the Secretary-General's call for an effort "the
exploring in a practical and concrete manner ways in which progress might
be made both in respect of the implementation of the Confidence-Building
Measures and the long- contemplated overall settlement of the Cyprus
problem".
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Mr. Clerides, however, put the EU membership
of "Cyprus" as a precondition for talks and thereby altered the agenda.
Mr. Clerides made it abundantly clear he did not want to discuss the
Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) until after a settlement. Despite this
negative stance of the Greek Cypriot leader, President Denktas made
constructive proposals which entailed further sacrifices for the Turkish
Cypriot people. However, the consultations ended without any progress as a
result of the rejectionist attitude of the Greek Cypriot side.
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On January 20, 1995, President Denktas, took
the initiative on Cyprus by launching a new peace offensive directed at
the Greek Cypriot side. President Denktas produced a 14-point proposal
aimed at paving the way towards a new atmosphere of trust and an eventual
overall agreement.
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With this new peace offensive, the Turkish
Cypriot side expressed its readiness to implement the UN-sponsored
Confidence Building Measures and to begin talks without preconditions
towards a viable bi-communal, bi-zonal Federal solution. President
Denktas, in his statement before the world press, announced that the
Turkish Cypriot side is prepared to discuss the subject of EU membership
of the federal Republic once an overall agreement was reached. He also
stated that the Turkish Cypriot side would support the approach of "land
for a viable solution" which reflects the "give and take understanding
necessary for reaching a realistic and viable solution".
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On January 21, the Greek Cypriot leader,
Glafcos Clerides, responded to the Turkish Cypriot side's proposal with a
written statement in which he basically rejected the Turkish Cypriot
document of January 20. Whereas the Greek Cypriot side rejected the
Turkish Cypriot document of January 20, both the UN and US circles
acclaimed the document as containing "positive elements" which should be
carefully examined.
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On January 23, US Presidential Envoy for
Cyprus, Mr. Richard Beattie handed to President Denktas a special message
from President Bill Clinton, which underlined the support of the US for a
"bi-zonal, bi-communal federation in which the two political
communities can exist as a single state". President Clinton emphasized
that the way forward in Cyprus was the implementation of the Confidence
Building Measures.
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A meeting was held in Athens on May 4, 1995
between the Greek Government and the Greek Cypriot National Council headed
by Mr. Glafcos Clerides. The meeting once again highlighted the true
objectives of the Greek-Greek Cypriot camp. The rejection of the Turkish
Cypriot side as a party to the negotiations became the hall-mark of Greek
Cypriot policy.
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The then Greek Prime Minister Papandreu's
statement after the conclusion of the Athens meeting, to the effect that:
"when we refer to the Turkish Cypriot side, we are in fact referring to
Turkey" and Greek Cypriot Leader Mr. Clerides' statement to the effect
that if the Greek Cypriot side were to engage in any process of secret
diplomacy it would do so "with Turkey, not Denktas. Because it is not
Denktas who makes the decisions" are clear manifestations of the true
intentions of Greece and the Greek Cypriot Leadership.
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In the aftermath of the aforesaid Athens
meeting, Mr. Clerides expounded the foundation of Greek-Greek Cypriot
policy on Cyprus:
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(1) Securing full membership for "Cyprus" to
the EU with the assistance of Greece.
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(2)Proceeding with the further implementation
of the Greek-Greek Cypriot joint defence doctrine.
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Both these objectives aim at abrogating the
Treaty of Guarantee (which has prevented the full implementation of the
Akritas Plan i.e. the extermination of the Turkish Cypriots and annexation
of the island Greece) and annulling the agreed principles of the 1977 and
1979 high level agreements on the basis of which a solution to the problem
is envisaged.
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Mr. Clerides saw no objection in telling his
people that once "Cyprus" is accepted as a member of EU the national of
Hellenism will triumph because the Treaty of Guarantee will be
inapplicable against a member-state of EU and further, that by virtue of
EU laws, all concessions so far seemingly made to Turkish Cypriots will be
of no effect.
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Between 21-24 May, confidential meetings
aiming "at identifying areas where a position can be placed before the two
sides find whether they can start considering what they can do for a new
partnership in Cyprus and show understanding about each other's needs and
concerns" (in the words of the US Ambassador Richard Boucher) were held in
London between two teams of officials from both sides representing the two
peoples of the island. Officials from the United States and Britain were
also present during the "exploratory discussions" as they were labelled by
the British Foreign Office.
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During these talks, each side first met
separately with the Anglo-American representatives and later on were
brought together for a working lunch. The reason for the talks to end
without any real progress came into light with the assessment of the talks
by the Greek Cypriot leader himself Mr. Clerides virtually rejected
outright the idea of continuing with the US-British initiative and stated:
Continuation of talks cannot go on if there are no concrete indications
of a change in the Turkish Cypriot position..."
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It is abundantly clear that the Greek Cyprus
side had no intention to soften its intransigent position but attended the
talks only because it expected more sacrifices from the Turkish Cypriot
people. This is also evident from the fact that while President Denktas
proposed a meeting at "leadership level" in order to give advance
instructions to the negotiators, without which, he said, they would stick
to their positions and the talks would lead to nothing, Mr. Clerides
stated that there was no point in arranging face to face talks.
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Over the past years, the Greek Cypriot side
has placed an ever increasing emphasis on the military instrument of
policy and is endeavoring to divert the Cyprus issue from the track of
diplomacy and set it on a military platform. The Greek Cypriot
administration is diverting more and more funds for new arms purchases and
setting up new militia units throughout Southern Cyprus under the pretext
of strengthening its "defences".
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The current spending on new weapons purchases
by the Greek Cypriot side has been estimated to be around 2 million
dollars per day. Military preparations in the south have intensified after
the adoption of the so called "joint defence doctrine" by Greece and the
Greek Cypriot administration in November 1993. Greek Cypriot leaders have,
on numerous occasions, openly declared that the nature of these military
preparations were not merely defensive. The Greek Cypriot leader Mr.
Glafcos Clerides himself has recently made the ultimate aim of the Greek
Cypriots clear;
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"Our struggle that has started forty years
ago has not yet been completed. Our struggle will only end with the
'liberation' of the whole of Cyprus".
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(AGON, April 2, 1995)
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The ongoing massive military build-up in South
Cyprus coupled with the "defence pact" between Greece and Greek Cypriot
administration and the war-mongering by the Greek and Greek Cypriot
political and military leaders, are the main pillars of the recent
strategy of the Greek-Greek Cypriot camp. The Greek Cypriot side is trying
to introduce the concept of "military might" in efforts to solve the
Cyprus problem.
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The Greek-Greek Cypriot camp announced in
March 1995, after a series of joint military maneuvers in August and
October 1994, that the implementation of the first phase of the "joint
military doctrine" by the Greek Cypriot administration and Greece had been
completed beyond success and the preparations for the opening of the
second phase were underway.
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Joint military activity by Greece and Greek
Cypriots will only result in a dangerous escalation of tensions on the
island. It is a paradox that the Greek Cypriot side on the one hand is
trying to militarize the Cyprus issue while the UN, US and European
circles are trying to promote confidence-building and pave the way towards
a peaceful settlement to the Cyprus problem on the other.
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In spite of the obvious negative implications,
the Greek Cypriot side is insisting on this dangerous course, in full
collaboration with Greece. In fact, the Greek Defence Minister, Mr.
Arsenis made the Greek-Greek Cypriot views amply clear on the role of the
international community in solving the Cyprus problem when he commented
about the United Nations during his recent visit to South Cyprus:
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"For 20 years, you have a beautiful
collection of resolutions which have not been implemented. I, for one, am
not prepared to rely on decisions that create illusions and lead to
frustration. It would be a terrible error for Greeks to believe that the
international organisations can solve the Cyprus problem".
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(CYPRUS WEEKLY, March 31-April 6, 1995)
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On his return to Greece, Mr. Arsenis offered
his solution of the Cyprus problem; "the protection of 'Cyprus' the
second State of Hellenism' by creating a strong joint military pact".
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In 1990 the Greek Cypriots side made a
unilateral application for membership of the European Union ostensibly on
behalf of the whole of Cyprus, in the absence of the Turkish Cypriot
partner's consent, with a view to shifting the ongoing process of
negotiations on to the EU platform. The Greek Cypriot application under
the false pretence, and usurped title, of the "Government of Cyprus", is
devoid of any legal and moral basis and cannot be binding on the Turkish
Cypriot people or on Cyprus as a whole.
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Under the 1960 Agreements, in all matters
affecting foreign affairs, each community had a veto power and issues such
as membership in international bodies needs and needed consensus. It
should also be noted that the international agreements on Cyprus preclude
the membership of Cyprus to any organisation to which both Turkey and
Greece are not members. Furthermore such developments contradicts the need
of "mutual consent" which is essential in the case of Cyprus if it is to
enter the EU as an "undivided island".
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In undertaking such initiatives without the
consent of the Turkish Cypriot side, the Greek Cypriots are acting in
total disregard and contravention of the ongoing negotiating process which
is directed towards a bi-communal, bi-zonal federal solution. The Greek
Cypriot stance demonstrates that the very existence of their former
Turkish Cypriot partner is not a matter worthy of consideration and that
they have no intention of acknowledging Turkish Cypriot rights and
aspirations on the island.
-
The Turkish Cypriot side fully shares the
European vision of democracy, secularism, human rights, respect for the
rule of law and free enterprise but due to the conflict on the island, the
Turkish Cypriot side has been and is proposing that following an overall
settlement, the two sides in Cyprus discuss and agree on matters related
to the EU membership of the federation, before submitting the membership
issue to the approval of the two communities in separate referendums as
envisaged by the UN Secretary-General's 1992 Set of Ideas in paragraph 92.
-
In spite of the above, and contrary to the
rule of law and to the guiding principles set out by the UN for a
settlement in Cyprus, the EU has unjustly decided that the unilateral
application by the Greek Cypriot side is an application proper by and on
behalf of "Cyprus". The decision to treat the Greek Cypriot side as the
sole interlocutor for "Cyprus" can only serve the Greek Cypriot aspiration
to derogate the Turkish Cypriot community from its "co- founder status" to
that of a "minority" within a Greek Cypriot state, and to water down the
Treaty of Guarantee and bi-zonality through EU membership. It should be
surprising therefore that the Greek Cypriot side has been avoiding the
negotiating table ever since the said decision.
-
The involvement of the EU in the efforts
towards a negotiated settlement would only further complicate the issue.
Given that Greece is a member of the EU whereas Turkey is not, it is clear
that the EU is not in a position to make a constructive contribution to
the resolution of the Cyprus question. Therefore facilitation in the
negotiation process should be left to the mission of good offices of the
UN Secretary-General, thus avoiding the possibility of one side gaining an
unfair advantage over the other in the negotiating process in Cyprus. If
the EU wants a solution to the Cyprus problem, it should urge the Greek
Cypriots to resume intercommunal negotiations. Any intervention outside
this framework would make the Greek Cypriots even more intransigent.
-
-
US Presidential Envoy, Mr. Richard Beattie and
US Special Cyprus Coordinator, James Williams visited Cyprus between
December 4 and 6, 1995 to explore ways in which talks between President
Denktas and Mr. Clerides could start with a view to backing up the UN
Secretary- General's Cyprus mandate. Over two days, they and Ambassador
Richard Boucher met with President Denktas and the Greek Cypriot leader,
Mr. Clerides for extensive talks.
-
On December 6, President Denktas took the
initiative on Cyprus with a view to giving new impetus to the negotiation
process and drafted an offer to the Greek Cypriot side with the help of
Presidential Envoy Richard Beattie, demonstrating once again the readiness
and political will of the Turkish Cypriot side to reach a mutually
acceptable solution.
-
Satisfied with this constructive new proposal
and the flexibility of the Turkish Cypriot side during his contacts, US
Presidential Envoy, Mr. Richard Beattie instantly took the proposal to Mr.
Clerides, convinced that this was he had wanted. However, Mr. Clerides
rejected the proposal in its entirety after only thirty minutes of
consideration. Mr. Clerides argued that there was still no common basis
for negotiations but failed to clarify how a common basis could be reached
without dialogue and negotiation.
-
Another chance of working towards a viable
solution in Cyprus was once again wasted by the Greek Cypriot leader who
claimed the proposal had "nothing new" to offer, despite the fact that it
had been considered "a very significant development" by foreign observers.
Although the Turkish Cypriot side once again displayed its readiness and
political will to re-start the negotiation process and reach a mutually
acceptable solution, Mr. Beattie was left with no alternative but to leave
the island by saying that was no "common ground" due to the intransigent
position of the Greek Cypriot side.
-
A new text, revised by Mr. Beattie based on
the proposal he conveyed to Mr. Clerides during his visit, was offered to
the two side after his departure by Ambassador Boucher which relied on
both sides concession for the sake of peace. In a vote on December 13, the
Greek Cypriot National Council unanimously rejected the revised draft.
-
On December 28, President Denktas and Turkish
President Demirel signed a joint declaration in Ankara outlining common
positions on the Cyprus issue. The declaration reiterated the full
commitment of the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey to reaching a
bi-communal, bi-zonal federal settlement in Cyprus based on the sovereign
equality of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot sides. Coming at a time
when the US initiative on Cyprus came to a halt due to the rejectionist
attitude of the Greek Cypriot side, the declaration once again displayed
the political will of the Turkish Cypriot side to conclude and sign a
mutually acceptable settlement in Cyprus.
-
The Turkish Cypriot side continued to believe
that a viable settlement in Cyprus can only be achieved through dialogue
and negotiation between the two sides as recalled in the aforesaid
declaration. In this belief, President Denktas responding to comments by
Mr. Clerides that "indirect talks" should be held first because there was
no "common ground" for direct talks, made a statement on January 4, to the
effect that the Turkish Cypriot side would be ready to engage in "indirect
talks" with the Greek Cypriot side for the solution of the Cyprus issue.
-
In his statement, President Denktas added that
the principles which would constitute the basis of an agreement were
already on the table but Mr. Clerides had so far declined to discuss these
with him by claiming that there was no "common ground". He went on to
remind Mr. Clerides that sooner or later they would have to come
face-to-face as this was essential for an agreement.
-
It is noteworthy that while Mr. Clerides
continued to avoid the negotiating table the UN Secretary-General
reaffirmed that all elements required for a settlement were on the table,
in his report to the UN Security Council dated 8, December 1995 which has
also been mentioned in the US President's bi-monthly report on Cyprus
dated March 7, 1996.
-
The current impasse in the negotiating process
bears testimony to Greek Cypriot intransigence. So long as the Greek
Cypriot side is accorded treatment as the "legitimate government of
Cyprus" and the doors of the EU are kept open to them, they will have no
incentive to settle the Cyprus problem on the basis of establishing a new
partnership between the two sides.
-
-
It will be recalled that two more changes of
working towards a viable solution in Cyprus was once again wasted by the
Greek Cypriot side at the end of 1995 when an offer drafted by President
Denktas with the help of the US Presidential Envoy, Mr. Richard Beattie
was rejected by the Greek Cypriot leader on December 6 and a new text
revised by Mr. Beattie based on this proposal was subsequently rejected by
the Greek Cypriot National Council in a unanimous vote on December 13,
1995.
-
On April 17, 1996 the representatives of the
five permanent members of the UN Security Council met in New York to
discuss the present situation in Cyprus and ways to end the protracted
stalemate arising from the Greek Cypriot refusal to return to the
negotiating table. In a statement issued after the meeting, reaffirming
their full support for the good offices mission of the Secretary-General,
the representatives of the permanent members underlined the importance of
reaching an overall settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the efforts by
the Secretary-General and the High-level agreements reached between the
two sides.
-
The meeting, reportedly ended with a decision
to support the forthcoming American initiatives provided they were carried
out in close cooperation with the UN, marked the beginning of an
increasing number of visit to the island by American officials in addition
to those of the UN.
-
The US Assistant Secretary of State, John
Kornblum, accompanied by the Office Director for Southern Europe, Carey
Cavanaugh, visited Cyprus between April 25 and 27 after his contacts in
Ankara and Athens. Over two days, Mr. Kornblum met with President Denktas,
the Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Clerides and other senior officials as well
as political party leaders from both sides to explore the prospects for
progress in the search of a solution in Cyprus and the role the US could
play in these efforts.
-
US Ambassador Richard Boucher, during his
farewell statement on the conclusion of his term of duty in Cyprus,
stressed that the two parties to the Cyprus problem, namely the Turkish
and Greek Cypriots, must make it clear that they are prepared to share the
power, the island and their future. Mr. Boucher also stressed that many of
the elements necessary for a comprehensive and peacefully negotiated
settlement in Cyprus had already been agreed upon, thereby refuting the
Greek Cypriot excuse that there is no "common ground" for avoiding the
negotiating table.
-
On June 6, President Denktas met with UN
Secretary-General, Boutros Ghali in Istanbul and conducted an extensive
review of all aspects of the Cyprus problem. After the meeting the
Secretary-General expressed the hope that it would be possible to create
the basis for the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus to resume
direct talkes. In other words, the Secretary-General joined the Turkish
Cypriot side in its repeated calls for Mr. Clerides to return to the
negotiating table.
-
On June 11, the UN Secretary-General met with
the Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Glafcos Clerides in Geneva. Speaking after
the meeting, the Secretary-General emphasized the importance of both sides
working with his new Special Representative for Cyprus, Professor Han
Sung-Joo and his deputy Special Representative, Mr. Gustave Feissel.
-
Professor Han Sung-Joo, appointed by the UN
Secretary-General as his Special Representative for Cyprus in May, arrived
on the island on June 25 for a six-day visit. Mr. Han held two rounds of
talks with President Denktas and the Greek Cypriot leader Mr. Clerides as
well as meetings with senior officials and political party leaders from
both sides during his stay in the island.
-
Speaking to correspondents after briefing the
Security Council on his visit to Cyprus on July 17, Professor Han Sun-Joo
noted that there was still sizeable gap between the positions of the two
sides. He added that when he expressed concern over the large number of
mediators, he has given assurances that all the other mediators from
various countries would cooperate with and support the efforts of the
Special Representative. Answering a question on the kind of solution he
was seeking, the Special Representative pointed out that the UN Set of
Ideas would have to form the basis of a settlement in Cyprus. It is
noteworthy, in this context, that Mr. Clerides was reported in the Greek
Cypriot press on May 24, as saying that the Set of Ideas were not the
basis on which they were seeking to settle the Cyprus question when
responding to statements made by US Ambassador Richard Boucher to the
effect that the Set of Ideas remained part of the negotiating process. It
was abundantly clear from the foregoing that the Greek Cypriot side had
once again fallen completely out of line with the UN-US stance.
-
The Turkish Cypriot side sharing the concern
of the Special Representative on the large number of mediators, strongly
believes that a viable settlement in Cyprus could only be achieved through
dialogue and negotiations carried out under the auspices of the UN
Secretary-General. In this belief, President Denktas oftenly called on the
Greek Cypriot side to abandon its rejectionist attitude and made numerous
proposals with a view to reactivating the negotiation process. On July 18,
President Denktas took the initiative on Cyprus once again and sent a
letter to Mr. Clerides through the UN inviting him to enter into
negotiations to find a peaceful settlement to the Cyprus problem.
President Denktas stressed the need for direct talks in order to find an
early and mutually acceptable resolution and expressed his belief that
there existed enough common ground established over the years, through the
High-level agreements and subsequent clarifications, to make a resolution
on already agreed principles and parameters possible. However, Mr.
Clerides returned the letter under the pretext that it was written on
official letter-head, claiming also that, in any case, the contents of the
letter could not help create common basis for talks.
-
The Greek Cypriot side aimed at creating
a smokescreen for its unabated militarization campaign through unfounded
allegations and misrepresentation of facts.
-
The Greek Cypriot administration made repeated
representations to the UN over alleged "violations of the airspace of the
Republic of Cyprus by Turkish aircraft" with a view of shifting the focus
from its own militarization campaign. It was stressed that all flights
within the airspace of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge
and consent of the appropriate authorities of the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus (TRNC), over which the Greek Cypriot administration of
Southern Cyprus has no control or jurisdiction.
-
It was beyond doubt that the reason behind
this endless barrage of allegations of the Greek Cypriots, directed
towards the Turkish Cypriot side are to cover up its intensive
militarization campaign, carried out as part of the so-called "joint
defence doctrine" with Greece. It was noteworthy that, in the context of
the said scheme, the Greek Cypriot administration and Greece carried out
joint military exercises code-named "Toxotis" (Bow), held in and around
South Cyprus. A-7 and F-16 warplanes and frigates from the Greek air and
naval forces, in addition to the Greek Cypriot National Guard, took part
in these exercises.
-
The following statement made by Lt. Colonel
Venetis of the Greek Air Force, who participated in these exercises,
encapsulated the provocative and aggressive posture of the joint
Greek-Greek Cypriot front. The statement appeared in the Greek Cypriot
press on 12 May 1996:
-
"For us each and every corner of
Cyprus is like the corner of our Aegean, our Trace. The Greek Air
Force personnel consider the airspace of Cyprus as an
extension of the Greek airspace. We are in a position to reach within
the
shortest period of time any spot and whichever target we want on the
territory, sea and skies of the 'Great Island' (meaning Cyprus)".
-
Hardly a day passes without reports of new
additions being made to the Greek Cypriot military arsenal. For instance,
the Greek Cypriot press of 19 April 1996 has reported that, within the
context of the "military technical cooperation" agreement signed between
the Russian Federation and the Greek Cypriot administration on 22 March
1996, the latter will be purchasing 27-T-BOU tanks, 14 T-BOK tanks and
some other military equipment from the Russian Federation, involving a
spending of $200 million (1996).
-
Joint ventures for the establishment of
weapons production facilities in Southern Cyprus are also said to be among
the provisions of the agreement, and this was confirmed by the Russian
Ambassador in Nicosia Mr. Boris Zenkow, after a meeting he had with the
Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Clerides, on 2 May, 1996. Furthermore, it was
also reported in the Greek Cypriot press of 9 May 1996, on the eve of the
said joint maneuvers, that within the context of the so-called "joint
defence doctrine", Greece had decided to grant the Greek Cypriot
administration 50 more tanks.
-
Madeleine Albright accompanied by the US
Presidential Envoy then, Richard Beattie, arrived on the island on July 17
for a 24-hour visit and had separate meetings with President Denktas, the
Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Clerides and military commanders on both sides.
The Turkish Cypriot side has welcomed the proposal of the US Permanent
Representative to the UN, Madeleine Albright to start a dialogue aimed at
reducing tension in the island as a long awaited development.
-
The US envoy, who had already visited Athens,
held a news conference at Ledra Palace Hotel shortly before leaving for
Ankara and announced that a meeting would take place between the military
commanders under the auspices of UNFICYP. She added that the US
Presidential Envoy, Richard Beattie and the then US Ambassador, Kenneth
Brill would be continuing the process intensively in the following.
-
It has not been surprising for the Turkish
Cypriot side that the Greek Cypriot administration started placing
obstacles in the way of the proposed military dialogue engineered by the
US Envoy Madeleine Albright during her brief visit shortly after her
departure from the island. The Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Clerides started
making public statements to the effect that the Greek Cypriot side would
boycott the military talks if the Turkish Cypriot forces were represented
as indicated by Ms. Albright at a press conference in New York.
-
It was abundantly clear that the Greek
Cypriots are opposing the participation of the Turkish Cypriot side in the
proposed military talks only to use it as an excuse to avoid any dialogue
on military issues as this would hinder military preparations aimed at
"settling" the Cyprus problem through aggressive means.
-
The Greek Cypriot side has for long been
rejecting the signing of a non-aggression agreement between the two sides,
repeatedly proposed by President Denktas, and blocking the extension of
the "Unmanning Agreement" of 1989. It would only be natural for the Greek
Cypriot side to become a party to such agreements both of which could help
diffuse tension on the island if it were sincere to facilitate a
negotiated settlement through rapprochement and cooperation in all areas.
-
While the Greek Cypriot side is engaged in a
campaign of rearmament, it is a real paradox that the so-called
"demilitarization" offer is often repeated by the Greek Cypriot
administration. In fact, the Greek Cypriot "demilitarization" offer is
simply a ruse for doing away with the Treaty of Guarantee, the only
effective instrument which stopped the Greek-Greek Cypriot drive for union
with Greece.
-
The UN sponsored Tripartite Committee on
Missing Persons (CMP) faces the danger of being due to the Greek Cypriot
insistence to avoid realities.
-
Following the resignation in early March of
Mr. Paul Wurth as the third member of the CMP, the UN Secretary-General
wrote to President Denktas and the Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Clerides
starting that he was prepared to consider appointing a new third member
provided that there was clear evidence that the CMP was committed to
making progress in four main areas specified in his letters related to the
collection of information. The Secretary-General added that he would
initiate the procedure leading to the appointment of a new third member as
soon as the tasks to meet his demands were satisfactorily completed by
both sides.
-
The Greek Cypriot side once again chose to
concentrate its efforts on finding ways to keep the missing persons issue
high on the agenda of the international community with a view to
exploiting this humanitarian subject rather than fulfilling the tasks
necessary to achieve progress towards completing the work of the Committee
in the near future.
-
The Greek Cypriot House of Representatives
approved on June 19 to allocate the necessary amount of money to fund the
establishment of a DNA bank for the missing. According to Greek Cypriot
press reports, the samples collected at the DNA bank would be used to
identify the remains of the missing.
-
The Greek Cypriot side has for long been
arguing that only by exhuming the remains of those unaccounted for as
physical proof the fate of the missing could be ascertained and insisted
that his procedure should be carried out of every single case. This is
completely outside the mandate of the CMP and insistence on this course
would practically mean that the CMP would never be able to fulfill its due
mandate.
-
The reasons behind the recent efforts of the
Greek Cypriot side directed towards prolonging the completion of the tasks
requested by the Secretary-General even at the expense of the CMP are in
fact no mystery. In addition to the revelations by the Greek Cypriot side
at the end of 1995 which resulted in the reduction of the number of Greek
Cypriot "missing persons" from1619 to 1493, the Greek Cypriot
administration was finally forced to admit on April 16 that 26 additional
Greek Cypriots whose names were included on the "missing persons" list
were also known to have been dead since 1974.
-
It was abundantly clear from the foregoing
that the Greek Cypriot side has more dark secrets to hide regarding the
missing persons issue and prefers to block the way of progress on this
humanitarian subject rather than facing the realities.
-
The Greek Cypriot side once again displayed
its well known intransigence as international efforts to solve the
Cyprus problem gathered momentum.
-
The Greek Cypriot administration encouraged by
a flurry of international interest on Cyprus, as the US, UN, the EU
presidency and the UK all appointed special representatives to deal with
the Cyprus issue, strengthened its intransigent position with a view to
pressurizing the Turkish Cypriot side to give in their anachronistic
demands after a series of visits to the island by a large number of
foreign officials.
-
The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe
visited Cyprus between April 6 and10 which was followed by a series of
visits by EU officials to the island. The decision of Mr. Tarschys to have
talks only with the Greek Cypriot officials and his comments about the
Cyprus problem during his tour of the Green Line attracted strong
criticism from the Turkish Cypriot officials. The Turkish Cypriot side
made it clear that, our belief for an organization dedicated to the
enhancement of peace, understanding and cooperation between the nations of
Europe and with an active interest in the Cyprus issue should have
respected the principles of equality between the two sides as well as
bi-zonality and bi-communality which are envisaged to form the basis of a
future settlement by the UN. It should also be stressed that efforts
towards a just and viable settlement of the Cyprus problem can only be
successful through dialogue and respect for the views and concerns of both
sides.
-
Britain's Special Representative's for Cyprus,
Lord David Hannay, first appointed in May, paid two visits to the island
in June and subsequently in July to hold meetings on both sides. His first
visit to the island on June 4 lasted for only 24 hours but he paid a
longer visit to the island between July 8 and 12. Speaking at the end of
his series of talks with the two leaders and other senior officials from
both sides, during his second visit, Lord David stated his belief that the
intensification of contacts between the EU and the Turkish Cypriot side
would be a helpful development.
-
The then EU coordinator for Cyprus, Kester
Heaslip which was appointed by Ireland after it took over the six monthly
rotating EU presidency on July 1, arrived on the island on July 28 for a
fact finding visit during which he held talks on both sides. Mr. Heaslip,
who left the island on August 2, expressed his view that progress on the
Cyprus problem was not moving fast enough then to justify a permanent
European coordinator which was a most favored development by the Greek
Cypriot side. However, the French European Affairs Minister, Mr. Michel
Barnier, who was also paying a 24-hour visit to the island on July 29,
disagreed with the EU coordinator. The Turkish Cypriot side announced
their belief that the appointment of a permanent EU Special Representative
for Cyprus could only serve to further complicate the issue and encourage
the Greek Cypriots to become ever more intransigent, which proved true in
the following years.
-
-
Greece based its Turkish policy on a knot,
Greeks and Greek Cypriots always produce and stage new scenarios to keep
this knot tight thinking that this way will wear out Turkey on
International platforms.
-
This "cyclist" scenario, was another filthy
game of diplomacy aiming at introducing Turkey as "bad" and "barbarian".
Only that the Greeks themselves ended in their own trap as the show was a
fiasco.
-
The scenario of cyclists attacking and
penetrating the green line to go to "Kyrenia", was planned in Athens, at
the headquarters of Greek Intelligence (EYP), and it was the result of a
mutual work between Greek and Southern Cypriot intelligence. When the play
ready to be staged, the Greek Cypriot leader Glafkos Clerides and the
Church had taken their places without a seconds hesitation.
-
Preperation for the show took about 2 months.
Everybody adopted the demonstration in Southern Cyprus, TV channels and
newspapers started campaigns to collect donations for the demonstration.
On Sundays the priests collected "donations" for the sky at Girne
(Kyrenia) Castle..."
-
It had been planned that the Greek
intelligence agents among the cyclists made sure that foreign
demonstrations stood at the front line holding EU flags during the attack.
Very well aware of the determination of the Turkish side to protect its
borders and knowing well about the preparations of the Turkish side in
this direction, the agents were going to push these European "friends" to
the arms of the Turks, perhaps would quitely shoot a couple or more of
them to death and then jump out and yell, "see the Turks, the barbarian,
the killers!" to provoke Europe.
-
In the meantime, two days prior to the
cyclists demonstration, the Turkish side was very worried with a piece of
information they had received.
-
The demonstrators' attack would take the form
of a raid. Turkish soldiers would be attacked with molotov cocktails
buildings would be blown up with dynamites. This information was very soon
taken to the UNFICYP.
-
UNFICYP arranged to have an organized
operation.
-
In this operation hundreds of molotov
cocktails, dynamites, chains and iron sticks were found in a house. The
house belonged to the Assistant-Director of the Cyclists federation.
-
As a matter of fact, 24 hours after the hot
events, guns and bombs were found in one of the cyclists houses.
-
On seeing how serious things were getting, the
Turkish Cypriots informed the UN that they would take their precautions
against such an attack.
-
The UN, USA and Britain decided to interfere
upon these developments and as a result of their pressure the Southern
Cypriot leader Glafkos Clerides called off the cyclists demonstration at
the last minute.
-
As soon as the demonstration was called off
arguments started between Athens and Nicosia. The Greek Ambassador, EOKA
supporters, the Church and a group of politicians insisted that the
demonstration continued as planned, but the Greek Cypriot Administration,
putting forward the nation's security, was strictly against it.
-
Inspite of this, on Sunday, 11th August 1996,
Greek provocators and some thousand "neo-EOKA" militants directed by the
Church, managed to break through the UN barricades at the buffer zone with
there motorcycles and jeeps.
-
After breaking through, they put the border
wires, cut them into pieces with their jeeps and finally attacked Turkish
borders with stones and iron bars.
-
There were about 30 Turkish Cypriot policemen
who finally proved to be insufficient as the number of demonstrators
attacking the Turkish borderline increased. Turkish Cypriots who were
watching the events, deemed it necessary to help the policemen and the
protect there land.
-
Unfortunately, a group of Southern Cypriots
had the courage to get into Turkish territory and started a fight with a
group of Turks. One of them died.
-
Now they had something to blame the Turks with
and they would do anything to reach their target.
-
Of course, besides the Turkish Cypriots, there
were also some others who know the truth. An article in "The Guardian"
stated that the Southern Cypriot administration had provoked the
aggressors and had not shown enough effort to stop the tension. Waldermar
Rokoszewski, UNFICYP spokesman, reminded that the Turks had warned over
and over again about possible infrigements in the buffer zone but no one
had credited their words.
-
Worldwide famous "Newsweek" magazine also
referred to the Derinya events. "Newsweek" claimed that the Southern
Cypriot demonstrators were holigans who wanted to create problems at the
borders.
-
The reporter of the German TV and radio in his
comment claimed that although the targets of the demonstrators were known
and the demonstration had been cancelled, the Southern police forces
hardly showed any effort to stop the events. The provocations could have
been stopped. The way things look, these events were actually meant to
happen.
-
The Turkish Cypriots were much more sorry for
his death. Some Southern Cypriots and Greeks were probably dancing over
the news of his death because they had something to blame Turkey. They
could put on a show now.
-
The Southern Cypriots started big arrangements
for a big funeral. Many politicians from Greece and Southern Cyprus,
representatives of anti-Turkish organizations (including the
representative of PKK terrorist organization) and others were invited to
attend the funeral. They were asked to make "Hot" and "provocative"
speeches.
-
The funeral was held on Wednesday 14 August.
After hours of provocative speeches in the Church Paralimni (worth
mentioning that the whole thing from start to end was given "live" on all
Southern Cypriot channels, including the events to occur later in Derinya)
a group of Cyclists headed towards Derinya to start a new attack.
-
There were about 40 "cyclists" specially
chosen to direct and control the new attack. These people were making
plans in the backyard of a school in Paralimni while the ceremony
continued in the church. They were informed by the police through the
police channel on the wireless that they were to hit their.
-
There were two leading the whole show. DIKO
deputy Marios Matskasis and Dr. Harris Aristidou. Dr. Aristidou was the
one, who had attacked Her Majesty the Queen of England's car in 1993
during one of her visits in Southern Cyprus. He was also the leader of an
organization which wants to get rid of the Turks and British on the
Island.
-
Dr. Aristidou led the cyclists through the
British base. Although the British soldiers had closed the way with an
iron door, Dr. Aristidou, with his jeep opened the way and let the rest
continue to Derinya.
-
Later, when they had all gathered near the
Turkish borderline, Marios Matsakis lid a newspaper and let fall on the
dry grass and start a fire. This was the starting signal they all had been
expecting. The hoard tried to break through the barricade of UN soldiers.
Many passed through and head the Turkish borderline. One Southern Cypriot
managed to get into Turkish territory. He climbed the flag pole while a
friend of his awaited near by with a Greek flag. He was planning to bring
down the Turkish flag and rise the Greek flag. Even though warning shots
were fired to the sky he didn't stop and he had be shot. If he hadn't been
shot and if warning shots weren't fired to the sky, then the whole crowd
would have entered Turkish territories. This would have led to a war as
the Southern Cypriot soldiers would also have started firing against
Turkish soldiers.
-
This young lad should have known better not to
fool around with the honour and pride of a country.
-
Orthodox Cypriots attempted to burn down a
mosque, an action which was part of their revenge plan. Soon after, news
circulated about Southern Cypriots planning to kill Turkish Cypriots to
take revenge.
-
Not much later did the news prove true. It
happened in the early morning of Sunday, 8 September. At 04.00 am, a
Turkish Cypriot soldier, Allahverdi Kilic, was killed at the age of 20
with 12 bullets. Another one, Burhan Cihangir was badly wounded. The ones
who had practiced this attack were Southern Cypriot militants trained by
Greek officers to attack and sabotage Turkish targets.
-
The Greece-Southern Cyprus duo had attacked
the Turkish borders with Kaleshnikovs this time; instead of motorcycles.
-
A Southern Cypriot newspaper "I Simerini", on
the same day the Turkish Cypriot soldier was killed, published a
seven-column article under the headline, "EOKA SOLUTION LIVE AGAIN".
-
In the meantime, News in the Southern Cypriot
Press about a Greek organization, which introduces itself as "The Greek
Revenge Bridge", legal name "Selected Greek Commandos", stated that the
organization consisted of reserved commandos from the Southern Cypriot
Army and that it was armed with kaleshnikovs.
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A few days before the Turkish soldier was
killed, this organization had published a notice in which it stated that
it was determined to revenge the Turks. The organization's sign was the
slogan of "A Freed Cyprus and ENOSIS. Freedom or Death" written under a
Greek flag.
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During a military oath ceremony, in those
days, new soldiers were oathing to "revenge Turks" and to "drink their
blood" in one voice in the presence of the Southern Cypriot Minister of
the Defence Kostas Iliadis and the Commander of the South Cypriot Army,
Nikolaos Vorvolakos. The determination to rip down the Turkish flags until
the one was also stated during the ceremony.
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The attack on the two Turkish Cypriot soldiers
while on sift duty was an act of Southern Cypriot revenge. This was
something very important. Something that could be proved.
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"STOHOS" newspaper is published in Athens. It
has connections with the Orthodox Church of Southern Cyprus and EOKA. It
also acts as the spokesman of Greek Intelligence. On 21 August, "Stohos"
published a full page referring the Derinya events. The headline said "I
can not forget. I will take my revenge." The Turkish soldier was killed 18
days after this publishment. "STOHOS" wrote the following soon after the
soldier was killed "We took revenge".
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On 16 August, a circulating notice informed
that the ones to pull the trigger against the occupant Turkish Army were
the "Selected Greek Commandos". The notice also mentioned that this was
the "beginning of a national uprise". "Stohos" had also published a copy
of the notice congratulating the organization and hoping that the Greek
youth took them as a good example.
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Two days after the notice's publishment in
"Stohos", the Southern Cypriot and Greek press wrote that someone called
Giannis Hatzistavrou, a retired General was responsible for the "Selected
Greek Commandos" organization.
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The Orthodox Cypriots who attempt to ride
their motorcycles to Girne (Kyrenia) to rise the Greek flag over the
Kyrenia castle, who attack Turks with every opportunity, who do not
respect the Turkish flag, who say that 'the best Turk is a dead one", who
ambush and kill innocent Turks on duty, a government allowing and even
supporting apparantly dangerous incidents, a press which hangs on
everything that will bring the two sides in a collision and low enough to
claim that the Turks brough the dead and wounded soldiers to Guvercinlik
from somewhere else after committing the attack, soldiers made to promise
to drink Turkish blood a blind fanatic Archbishop. These incidents made
the Turkish Cypriot people think that, the Greek Cypriots are not the lot
a decent community with which the Turkish Cypriots would not want to share
a federation with. As President Denktas stated on those days, it would be
much better and much more peaceful for the two communities to live apart.
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