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Page 16

Negotiations between 1997-2002

TROUTBECK AND GLION TALKS

TURKISH STANCE

GREEK CYPRIOTS INTRANSIGENCE

EU LUXEMBOURG SUMMIT

TURKISH CYPRIOTS CONFEDERATION PROPOSAL

PROXIMITY TALKS

TALKS ENDED

FACE TO FACE TALKS 2002
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN DECEMBER 2003 – JUNE 2004

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE REFERENDUM
RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 2005-2006

In the week of 17 March 1997, the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Cyprus, Gustave Feissel, commenced a new series of proximity talks in line with the intensified efforts of the UN Secretary-General to facilitate the resumption of face-to-face negotiations between the leaders of the two communities. The Turkish Cypriot side, which has repeatedly been expressing its readiness to engage in meaningful direct negotiations, welcomed this development and displayed its usual constructive approach during the course of the UN sponsored proximity talks.

The UN Secretary-General wrote to the leaders of the two communities on 9 June inviting them to the first session of face-to-face negotiations to take place in the New York from 9 to 13 July 1997. As both leaders received the formal invitations delivered to them by the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Cyprus, Gustave Feissel, the preparations for the New York summit set off with full force.

TROUTBECK AND GLION TALKS

At the end of the month-long run-up period, the first round of the 1997 Cyprus talks commenced at Troutbeck, New York. In his opening statement, the UN Secretary-General stressed that there was a sense of greater urgency, more of a consensus, than ever that the Cyprus dispute must be brought to an end. The Secretary-General added that the consequences of failure were likely to be more dire than at any time in recent decades. The direct talks between the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus were led by the Special Advisor of the UN Secretary-General on Cyprus, Diego Cordovez in complete media blackout. However, the existence of a document "outlining a solution to the Cyprus problem" and its entire contents were leaked to the media by the Greek Cypriot side. It was revealed at the end of the talks, which concluded a day earlier than expected, that the UN had actually presented two "non-papers" to the sides, requesting them to work on the revised version in preparation for the next round of direct talks expected to take place in Switzerland the following month.

After briefing the UN Security Council on the course of the face-to-face negotiations on 14 July, Mr. Cordovez told reporters that the gap between the two sides was still "enormous" but he believed commitment existed to move forward. The comments of the US Presidential Envoy, Richard Holbrooke, who had separate meetings with the two leaders both before and after the Troutbeck talks, echoed those of Mr. Cordovez. Mr. Holbrooke stated that he was optimistic about future progress despite the existence of a wide gap between the positions of the two sides.

In a statement issued in New York on July 14, President Denktaþ expressed his gratitude to the new UN Secretary-General for convening the direct talks which he described as a positive first step in a new settlement process. President Denktaþ added that this was an opportune time for the UN and the world community to act given the imminent threat next year of the deployment of Russian S-300 missiles by the Greek Cypriot side.

The promising atmosphere created by the first direct negotiations between the leaders of the two communities since October 1992 was frustrated by the European Union only three days after their conclusion. On 16 July, the European Commission submitted to the European Parliament a document entitled "Agenda 2000" which, among other things, included "Cyprus" among the six countries to start accession negotiations with the European Union early next year. This decision of the European Commission, taken in complete disregard of the rule law, the international Treaties governing Cyprus and the well known position of the Turkish Cypriot side on EU accession, can only help eliminate the chances of success in the ongoing negotiations by encouraging the Greek Cypriot side to become ever more intransigent.

In fact, the Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Clerides had made it clear long before the Troutbeck negotiations commenced that the Greek Cypriot side would be attending the direct negotiations only to ensure the European Union membership of the Greek Cypriot administration. On 3 June 1997, Mr. Clerides was reported by the Greek Cypriot press to have said that the Greek Cypriot decision to attend direct talks was "a purely cosmetic move in order not to appear the negative side and so harm the Republic's prospects of accession to the European Union." It is amply clear that the Greek Cypriot side will have no incentives to be constructive given the recent decision of the European Commission.

The actual reason behind Greek Cypriot’s attendance to the talks both in Troutbeck and Glion (Montreux) was evident in Mr. Clerides’s words, which he uttered at a press conference in November 1997, when he was referring to the talks:

“The trick here is to give the impression that you are going to accept a proposal in order to get the other side to reject it and then portray the other side as the intransigent party to the world”.

TURKISH STANCE

Emphasizing the blow dealt on process of negotiations by EU decision on the commencement of the membership negotiations with the Greek Cypriot side, Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) issued a joint statement on 20 July 1997 which expressed their will and determination to further deepen and strengthen the existing cooperation established between the two countries within the framework of the 20 January 1997 Joint Declaration made by their Presidents. The statement which listed nine economic, financial, security, defence and foreign policy measures to be implemented, declared that ".....every structural cooperation and harmonization measure to be initiated between the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus and the EU will be similarly implemented between the TRNC and Turkey."

In spite of the negative atmosphere created by the "Agenda 2000" report of the European Commission and its strong disappointment at the one-sided approach of the European Union, the Turkish Cypriot side once again displayed its usual constructiveness and announced on 4 August 1997 that it would be attending the second round of the direct talks scheduled to start in Glion, Switzerland on 11 August 1997.

On 6 August 1997, an Agreement to establish an Association Council between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, in line with the Joint Statement dated 20 July 1997, was signed by the Foreign Ministers of the two countries during the working visit the Turkish Foreign Minister paid to the island.

In a joint press statement issued after the signing of the Association Council Agreement, the two parties underlined once again that the negotiating process should be based on the political and sovereign equality of the two sides in Cyprus and that the settlement should safeguard the balance between Turkey and Greece stipulated by the 1960 Agreements. It was also noted that the EU, which should acknowledge the political realities of the island and the region, would bear the responsibility for any negative developments arising from the commencement of the accession negotiations between the Greek Cypriot administration and the European Union.

It needs to be stressed that the Association Council Agreement was nothing beyond a legitimate self-defence mechanism established in the face of the Greek Cypriot attempt to impose its will on the Turkish Cypriot side through EU membership, which was unfortunately being encouraged by the words and deeds of the European Union itself. It is in this spirit that the Turkish Cypriot side attended the second round of the direct talks held at Glion which it saw as an opportunity to make a global review of the Cyprus question and to find out whether there was a chance for the two sides to meet on cardinal points in order to achieve a settlement.

GREEK CYPRIOTS INTRANSIGENCE

However, the talks at Troutbeck and Glion did not produce the desired results because Mr. Clerides refused to budge an inch from his entrenched fundamental position of trying to reduce the Turkish Cypriot people to a "protected minority" in a "Greek Cyprus", while the EU Commission's report entitled "Agenda 2000" envisaging the commencement of accession negotiations with "Cyprus" in early 1998 dashed hopes for any progress towards a comprehensive settlement. This illtimed development, which occurred totally outside the will of the Turkish Cypriot side and in spite of its justified objections to EU membership prior to a settlement and the maintenance of the Greco-Turkish balance in the Eastern Mediterranean, dealt a devastating blow to the course of the negotiations.

EU LUXEMBOURG SUMMIT

The intervention of the European Union which was instigated by Greece and the Greek Cypriot side, reached a climax at the Luxembourg Summit, held on 13 December 1997. The Luxembourg European Council took the decision to start the accession negotiations with “Cyprus”. Moreover, it request “the willingness of the Government of Cyprus to include the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community in the negotiation delegation to be acted upon”. Acceptance by the Turkish Cypriot side to take part in the so-called Cyprus delegation would have meant, recognition of the Greek Cypriot side as the “government of Cyprus” and abandonment of their equal political status and sovereignty rights enshrined in the 1960 Treaties.

The Luxembourg decision put the final blow to the intercommunal talks in 1997, by destroying the parameters established through the good offices mission of the UN Secretary-General for a solution and the very basis of the intercommunal talks – namely the equality of the two sides and bi-zonality – which have been continuing on and off for many years, with no outcome due to the recognition of the Greek Cypriot side as the “government” of the whole of Cyprus.

Following the unfortunate Luxembourg decision of the EU, the Legislative Assembly of the TRNC passed a resolution, on 10 March 1998, which states that “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is an undeniable fact… Denying this reality… does not serve the efforts for a peaceful solution on the island… It is, therefore, imperative that any future of the existence of two states in Cyprus and the grave mistake of treating the Greek Cypriot administration as the ‘government of the Turkish Cypriot people be put an end to’.” Thus, it was decided that, from then on, the negotiations between the two sides can only take place between the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot State in Southern Cyprus.

The Joint Declaration of 23 April 1998 between the Turkish President and the President of the TRNC reinforced this resolution by reiterating that the EU decision to open the accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriot side “…dealt a blow to the efforts for a solution… Thus, it was noted the continuation of the existence of the TRNC as an independent and sovereign state is fundamental”. For the Turkish Cypriot side there existed no ground to proceed with the negotiations.

TURKISH CYPRIOTS CONFEDERATION PROPOSAL   

On 31 August 1998, the Turkish Cypriot side put forward proposals which provides a realistic and valid foundation for a lasting solution on the island, on the basis of confederal partnership, by protecting the vital and legitimate rights and interests of all the parties concerned. The Turkish Cypriot proposal of 31 August was consistent with the spirit and the underlying philosophy of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions in that

·        It calls for a just and lasting settlement

·        It provides for a freely negotiated and mutually acceptable solution

·        It is based on the equality of the two sides

·        It facilitates the UN Secretary-General’s mission of good offices. Unfortunately the Greek Cypriot side, encouraged by the prospect of EU membership, immediately rejected the Turkish Cypriot proposal.

The confederation proposal, in essence, updated the 1960 State of affairs pertaining to Cyprus by preserving the internal balance in and external balance over Cyprus. These are the main elements for peace in the island and in the Eastern Mediterranean. The proposal reflected the realism and the vision in that it represented a common future based on full equality, symmetry and unity. However, the Greek Cypriot side in a traditional manner rejected the confederation proposal, as well.

Whilst, in one hand the Turkish Cypriot side was coming forward with proposals in line with its tradition of courage, responsibility and creativity on the way for a viable settlement, the Greek Cypriot side was in an effort of building up armaments and ordering Russian made S-300 missiles.

The Greek Cypriot side, in the meantime, was dealing with its massive militarization campaign carried out under the pretext of strategic cooperation (“Joint Defence Doctrine”) with Greece, coupled with the deployment of S-300 missiles and the opening of a military airbase for Greece in South Cyprus. This was another adventurous policy of the Greek-Greek Cypriot front which was abolished later as a result of the determined stand against it by Turkey and the TRNC.

Efforts of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, to restart negotiations between the TRNC and the Greek Cypriot administration after two years of stagnation, gave fruit when the two leaders accepted to meet late in 1999.

The talks would be held between the two equal parties without any preconditions, the parties being free to bring to the table any issue which they deemed as a “core issue”.

PROXIMITY TALKS

On the first round of proximity talks, TRNC President Rauf R. Denktaþ and the Greek Cypriot Leader Glafcos Clerides met in New York, between 3-14 December 1999.

Then, this was followed by the second round of proximity talks in Geneva, between 31 January – 8 February 2000. The Turkish Cypriot party joined the talks with profound disappointment over an incident which occurred in Southern Cyprus on the eve of the second round.

On 11 January 2000, a Turkish Cypriot television crew from BRT crossed to the South to cover a joint news conference that was to be held by the visiting Greek Foreign Minister, Mr. George Papandreu, and his Greek Cypriot host, Mr. Yiannakis Cassulides. Papandreuou’s  visit was stated to be aimed at promoting better relations between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, as an extension of the positive climate between Greece and Turkey in recent months, emerged amid the earthquake disasters in both countries.

At the said joint press conference, the Greek Cypriot Press and Information Office (PIO) officials, tried to conceal the microphone with BRT logo behind a bunch of flowers when the BRT officials asked to remove it, did not. The banning made the BRT crew and other Turkish Cypriot journalists walk out in protest. This showed the utter intolerance of the Greek Cypriot side of any indication, sign or symbol of Turkish Cypriot existence, and the tough road that lied ahead in achieving reconciliation.

Despite little evidence of progress by the end of the talks on February 8, the leaders agreed to attend a third round of proximity talks on 23 May. However, Clerides’ ill-health following an operation forced the third round to be postponed to July 5 in Geneva, which lasted on 13 July, 2000. The talks were resumed again in Geneva, on 24 July after the 20 July, Peace and Freedom Day Celebrations in the TRNC.

UN Special envoy Alvaro de Soto, put forward some ideas in this meeting and asked for the responses from the two sides. However, the intransigent attitude possessed by the Greek Cypriot side, which targetted to acceed the EU, did not intend to settle for an agreement. The efforts of the UN did not give fruit and De Soto wrapped up the talks on 4 August to fix the next round for September 12, in New York. Alvaro De Soto, seeing the difficulty in bringing the sides to a common ground noted that, he doubted a solution could be found by the end of the year.

On his return to the island a day later, Clerides said the Greek Cypriot side would not be prepared to continue the negotiations indefinitely if there were no signs of progress. The Greek Cypriot stance became even further offencive, after the Secretary-General’s statement on the opening of the forth round of proximity talks in New York on 12 September, 2000.

Secretary General H.E. Kofi Annan spoke of a “new partnership”, “the equal status of the two parties” and the fact that “each represents its side – and no one else”. H.E. Kofi Annan put forward his desire as “-as the political equal of the other, a comprehensive settlement enshrining a new partnership..” However, the Greek Cypriot side’s reaction to this statement, its boycotting of the talks for two days and the UN’s efforts to appease the Greek Cypriot party dashed hopes for carrying that statement to its logical conclusion, which should have been the acknowledgement of the realities in Cyprus, i.e. the existence of two sovereign, independent States on the island. The Secretary General’s statement was rejected also by the Greek Cypriot government, in Southern Cyprus.

In the subsequent phases of the proximity talks, the UN, with the non-papers it presented, adopted an approach which fundamentally reflected the position of the Greek Cypriot party and ignored the legitimate demands and concerns of the Turkish Cypriot party.

The two leaders met in Geneva between 1-10 November 2000, during which the Secretary General presented his 11-page “Oral Remarks” composed of 20 points, on 8 November 2000. In the Turkish Cypriot view, the “Oral Remarks” of the Secretary-General fundamentally departed from the concept of “a new partnership” and “the equal status of the two parties” as well as from the very objective of finding a just, realistic and viable settlement. In his “Oral Remarks”, the Secretary-General envisaged that there should be “one sovereign, indissoluble common state” with a “single international legal personality” and a “common government” with a “basic law”. These were the characteristics of a “unitary State” that did not conform to the idea of a new partnership which was not acceptable for the Turkish Cypriot party. The Turkish Cypriot viewpoint was and still today is that the two existing sovereign States would establish a partnership structure, and the respective States would exercise all competences and functions not assigned by them to the partnership structure. The “Oral Remarks” had many other deficienties like, the term “community” was used for the two peoples, in reference to the EU membership it was stated that the “provision of the comprehensive settlement should not represent an obstacle to such membership”, and issues like “territorial adjustments”, and guarantees were not satisfying. The Turkish Cypriot party realizing that the “Oral Remarks” had been tailored to meet the demands of the Greek Cypriot party, in disregard of even the most vital needs and interests of the Turkish Cypriot people, concluded that the process had turned into a vehicle by which legitimate rights, existence and identity would be sacrificed in a predominantly “Greek Cyprus”, within the European Union.

Moreover, in an interesting “coincidence”, on 8 November 2000, the EU issued it  is Accession Partnership document making the Cyprus issue a political criterion and a precondition for Turkey’s own EU membership.

TALKS ENDED

As a result of the above incidents, President Rauf R. Denktaþ announced on 24 November, 2000 that the Turkish Cypriot side would not continue the talks unless the original parameters of “State-to-State talks” are accepted through the acknowledgement of the TRNC, and recognition of the reality that the Greek Cypriots are not the government of the Turkish Cypriots or the whole of Cyprus, and do not represent the Turkish Cypriots or the whole of the island.

Following the Summit Meeting held in Ankara on 24 November, between the delegation of the TRNC and Turkey, headed respectively by President Rauf R. Denktaþ and President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, President Denktaþ announced that the proximity talks had deviated from their declared objective and continuing the proximity talks without Turkish Cypriot parameters having being accepted was harming Turkish Cypriot interests. He added that the Turkish Cypriot party would only sit at the table, once the Turkish Cypriot parameters had been accepted. In a subsequent statement, Turkey expressed its full support for the TRNC decision.

With this decision, the proximity talks which had started with the UN Secretary-General’s statement of 14 November 1999, aimed at preparing the ground for meaningful negotiations leading to a comprehensive settlement, after five intermittent rounds starting in New York on 3 December 1999 and ending in Geneva on 10 November 2000, came to a halt.

After about six months, Secretary-General Kofi Annan met President Rauf Denktaþ in Salzburg, Austria on 28 August 2001, as part of efforts for the resumption of talks on Cyprus. H.E. Kofi Annan announced that they held a “very good and very useful meeting”. He asked his Special Adviser on Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto, to travel to the island for consultations with both President Denktaþ and Greek Cypriot Leader Glafcos Clerides.

De Soto made his contacts between 30 August – 5 September 2001 with the two sides after which he made an announcement on 4 September 2001, that he invited the two leaders to initiate a new reinvigorated phase of the Secretary General’s good offices in the following week, in New York. Whilst, Greek Cypriot Leader Glafcos Clerides accepted the meeting, President Rauf Denktaþ announced that he is not able to go to New York, adding that “it was premature to invite the two parties to New York for a meeting for resuming the talks”. He pointed out that, the rejection of H.E. Kofi Annan’s 12 September 2000 statement by the Greek Cypriot side had left nothing, no common ground whatsoever to engage in invigorated meaningful talks.

The intransigent and chauvinist attitude by the Greek Cypriot side during the year 2001, did not give hope to the Turkish Cypriot people for a new partnership. A few of such attitudes are given below which were published in the Greek Cypriot press.

-         “Turks, Turks, you will die. You will die in front of the blue and white flag.”

-         “All Turks must be driven out to sea”.

(Slogans chanted each morning by soldiers in the Greek Cypriot National Guards published in the Greek Cypriot daily Haravghi, 22 March 2001)

-         “We could bring the S-300s at any time”

(Glafcos Clerides, English Language Greek Cypriot daily Cyprus Mail, 3 April 2001)

-         - “…the rearmament of Southern Cyprus continues within the framework of Greek-Greek Cypriot Joint Military Doctrine”

(Glafcos Clerides, Greek Cypriot daily Politis, 23 April 2001)

-         “Tonight we are closer than ever to the beloved territory of Kyrenia”

(AKEL party leader Dimitris Christofias, 19 May 2001)

The Greek Cypriot party, encouraged particularly by the European Union’s one-sided and misplaced approach to the issue, turned its back on the concept of a bi-zonal settlement. The Greek Cypriot side started talking about a “German-style federation” in which there could be no limits or regulations on the freedom of movement, settlement and the right to property. This would make a mockery of the principle of bi-zonality, which has since evolved into a two-state situation, and is a clear recipe for a return to the past, and, ultimately, for disaster. It should be reckoned that Germany was one nation divided along ideological lines during the Cold War, whereas in Cyprus there has always been two peoples belonging to two different nations.

However, the acknowledgement of the usurped title of the ‘Government of Cyprus’ by the Greek Cypriot administration in the international arena influences their intransigent stance which blocks the efforts for cooperation between the two sides. The conditions “to engage in a new and reinvigorated phase of the search for a comprehensive settlement” were not prevailing.

The Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides, accepting the invitation by the UN Secretary-General for a meeting on 12 September 2001 flew to New York. However, his plane had to be diverted to Canada due to the terrorist attacks which took place mainly in New York and Washington. His meeting with the UN Secretary-General had been cancelled and he had to return to Cyprus on 14 September.

The Turkish Cypriot side in the meantime confirmed on each occassion that as per his Excellency’s 12 September 2000 statement the Turkish Cypriot party is still prepared to establish a new partnership with the Greek Cypriots, based on the equal status of the two parties. It seemed imperative that a fresh and realistic approach conducive to progress in the negotiations be adopted, in order to open the way for reconciliation. With this aim, President Rauf Raif Denktaþ took the initiative and sent letters to the Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides on 8 November 2001. This was followed by two more reciprocal letters between the two leaders, as a result of which Clerides accepted to meet President Denktaþ on 4 December 2001, in the UN residence in Lefkoþa in presence of the UN Special envoy on Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto who only took notes. The historically important meeting which drew the attention of the whole world, passed in a very sincere and positive atmosphere after which the following press statement was issued:

“That the Secretary-General, in the exercise of his mission of good offices, would invite the two leaders to direct talks;

These talks will be held in Cyprus starting in mid-January 2002 on UN premises;

That there will be no preconditions;

That all issues will be on the table;

That they will continue to negotiate in good faith until a comprehensive settlement in achieved;

That nothing will be agreed until everything is agreed”.

After the face-to-face talks, it was stated that the two leaders had agreed to resume a second round of direct talks on the Cyprus issue on 15 January 2002, which was later postponed to 16 January 2002.

FACE TO FACE TALKS 2002

The following is the full text of President Denktaþ opening statement which was read out during the meeting:

“The Cyprus Question is approaching a critical point. At this juncture, we have the political will and readiness to start a genuine new process based on the political equality of the two parties for negotiating the establishment of a new partnership.

We have a major role to play in reaching a comprehensive settlement and in creating a desired environment of confidence, cooperation and partnership. I believe the time has come for Mr. Clerides and myself to move ahead and to take the necessary initiatives so that future generations do not go through the bitter experiences we have endured.

A few facts need to be reiterated at this juncture. The Turkish Cypriot people and the Greek Cypriot people are the co-owners of Cyprus and this Island is the common home of both peoples. The independence and the sovereignty of the Partnership Republic of Cyprus were entrusted in 1960 to these co-founding partners with equal status upon explicit recognition of their separate rights to self-determination, while establishing a balanced status between the two guarantor motherlands and their rights over Cyprus. Today there exist functioning democratic institutions on both sides, which reflect the political will of their respective peoples.

In shaping our future the basic requirement is realism. This realism must be solidified with an atmosphere of mutual respect, reconciliation and a working relationship between the two parties.

We took note of the recent statements by the EU officials that the EU will accommodate itself to the terms of the political settlement to be agreed by both parties. In this respect, we will support the membership of the Cyprus Partnership in the EU within the terms of a political settlement. The balance established between Turkey and Greece with regard to Cyprus by the 1960 Treaties is also crucial and has to be maintained in every respect.

I believe that this face-to-face interaction provides a new and significant opportunity for both parties in reaching a common understanding on how we can move forward.

Our vision is a peaceful Cyprus where our two peoples live in harmony and cooperation under a new partnership structure based on the equal status and sovereign equality of the two Partner States. The new Partnership will have single international personality in its areas of competence. We believe this vision is within reach.

We should focus on what our common interests are and how we can serve them by mutual efforts. What needs to be done now is to lay down the objectives and elements of a comprehensive settlement addressing the legitimate concerns of both parties.

Efforts for a viable settlement in Cyprus could yield desired results only in an environment of mutual trust. The way to a Cyprus settlement is through positive relations between the two parties in the Island. Therefore, if we are to initiate a process for settlement with the expectation of a successful outcome, the issue of trust and confidence must also be addressed.

With this understanding, I propose, the setting up of a Bilateral Committee under our Co-Chairmanship. Such a Bilateral Committee could take up and discuss:

I)          All major issues of the Cyprus Question

II)                The steps to be taken for generating a climate of mutual respect and confidence.

We should continue to discuss all aspects of the Cyprus Question. I suggest that we start to take up the core issues in a detailed manner in our next meeting. As we proceed, we may seek the support of our respective experts and the UN.

We may not have a common understanding on all issues but the process of consultation has to continue so that through dialogue and interaction we may be able to tackle content and find a way forward.

The ideas I have put forward constitute a new pattern of relationship. I believe that our objective is to leave future generations a Cyprus on which the two peoples could live in prosperity, security and cooperative on the basis of equality”.

On 5 December, 2001 the Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides, crossed over to the TRNC, first after the 1974 Peace Operation, in order to attend a dinner being hosted by President Denktaþ, held at the Presidential Palace. UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser to Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto, Presidential Undersecretary, Ergün Olgun and the former Presidential Adviser on Political Affairs, Necati Münir Ertekün attended the dinner. No statement was issued after the meeting.

In recurrence to this, the Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides invited President Denktaþ for a dinner, which took place on 29 December 2001 at his private home in Southern Lefkoþa.

It is announced after the dinner that, the two leaders agreed to try to resolve the fate of more than 2000 people missing in the years of intercommunal clashes, until the Peace Operation in 1974.

The ideas I have put forward constitute a new pattern of relationship. I believe that our objective is to leave future generations a Cyprus on which the two peoples could live in prosperity, security and cooperation on the basis of equality”.

On 5 December, 2001 the Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides, crossed over to the TRNC, first after the 1974 Peace Operation, in order to attend a dinner being hosted by President Denktaþ, held at the Presidential Palace. UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser to Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto, Presidential Undersecretary, Ergün Olgun and the former Presidential Adviser on Political Affairs, Necati Münir Ertekün attended the dinner. No statement was issued after the meeting.

In recurrence to this, the Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides invited President Denktaþ for a dinner, which took place on 29 December 2001 at his private home in Southern Lefkoþa.

It is announced after the dinner that, the two leaders agreed to try to resolve the fate of more than 2000 people missing in the years of inter-communal clashes, until the Peace Operation in 1974.

The face-to-face talks were announced to start on 16 January 2002 which was later brought forward to 11 January 2002. In a following meeting on 14 January, the leader of the Greek Cypriot administration, Glafcos Clerides agreed to exchange documents regarding the issue of missing persons and the two leaders pointed out that  the issue of missing persons would be held separate from the process of the face-to-face talks since the possibility of finding a formula on this issue had increased.

The two leaders have met for a series of  talks in the presence of the UN Special Envoy in Cyprus Alvaro de Soto who briefly stated that the two leaders are “engaged in discussing the substance, and that they had agreed to meet for a pattern of meetings on Monday, Wednesday and Friday evenings,  the meeting being closed to the press”. Alvaro de Soto also said that the meetings were “an encouraging start and had been very good and cordial”.

The two leaders in the following meetings until the end of February worked on identifying the “ points of disagreements and the functions of the two sides” in case of establishing a new Republic. Nonetheless, the two sides showed that they are “cautiously optimistic”, for a lasting settlement.

Until the end of April, three rounds of face-to-face talks were undertaken as a result of which the two sides respectively put on the table non-papers, which included the interests of each side.  

Whilst the forth round of talks were continuing, between 14-16 May 2002 the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan visited Cyprus. On his arrival Mr. Annan stated that “he came to the island to highlight the great responsibility the two leaders had undertaken , to urge them to forge ahead with a shared sense of urgency and willingness to compromise the earnest”. He added, referring to the face-to face talks that, “this was an historic opportunity”.  

After meeting with the Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides on 14 May, on 15 May 2002, H.E. Mr. Kofi Annan crossed over to TRNC and got together with President Rauf R. Denktaþ, at the Presidential Palace. The TRNC Foreign Affairs and Defence Minister Tahsin Ertuðruloðlu, the Presidential Undersecretary Ergün Olgun, The Undersecretary of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministry Reþat Çaðlar and President’s Adviser on Constitution Mümtaz Soysal were also present at the meeting.  

Following the two hours meeting , President Denktaþ expressed his pleasure on seeing Annan in the TRNC and said the talks had been useful adding that they discussed the Cyprus issue in detail.  President Denktaþ pointed out that the Secretary General did not put forward any proposal.  

The UN Secretary General’s day of intensive diplomacy ended with bringing together at night, the TRNC President Rauf R. Denktaþ together with the Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides, at a working dinner in the UN residence at the buffer zone. No statements were made after the meeting other than mutters of satisfaction for the meal and a comment about “good discussions” from the three main parties.  

Before his departure, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan held a press conference evaluating his contacts with the two leaders. The full text of his statement is as follows:

“Yesterday I called on H.E. Mr Glafkos Clerides, the Greek Cypriot leader, and H.E. Mr Rauf Denktaþ, the Turkish Cypriot leader. The three of us met last night and I had the pleasure of hosting them for dinner.

Altogether, I have had several hours of discussions on both the substance and the procedure.

I am concluding my visit sobered by the challenge at hand, but even more deeply convinced that this is the time to press on and rise to that challenge.

As I said on my arrival two days ago, an historic opportunity exists now to reach a comprehensive settlement. There is no doubt in my mind that this would be in the interest of both sides and the region. This opportunity must be seized.

I have reminded both leaders of the responsibility they shoulder, and of my willingness to help them reach the goal they set out to achieve at the end of last year.

The two leaders have stated to me their readiness to intensify their effort. I come away from Cyprus with the commitment of both leaders to go about this effort in a genuine spirit of give and take.

Despite their differences on substance and on the time frame, I am still convinced -- for my part -- that between now and the end of June, they can resolve all the core issues -- provided they go about their task decisively and with the necessary political will. The core issues I have asked them to focus on are governance, security, territory and property. Of course the two leaders agreed last December that all issues are on the table.

I appeal to the two leaders to rise to the challenge and I am looking to the motherlands -- Greece and Turkey -- for sustained and constructive support.”

On June 1, 2002 the Turkish Foreign Minister Ýsmail Cem arrived in the TRNC for a three-day visit. Foreign Minister Cem on his arrival confirmed that Turkey fully supported any efforts aimed at finding a mutually acceptable two-state model as a solution.

The fourth round series of direct talks came to a pause between President Denktas and the Leader of the Greek Cypriot administration Glafcos Clerides, on June 2, 2002. The UN Special Envoy to Cyprus Alvaro de Soto used the break to visit New York and brief the UN Security Council on the situation which he described as a “conundrum”. Alvaro de Soto said, he was “disappointed” that the June deadline had passed without any results adding that there seemed to be lack of political will that negatively influences both sides.

TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence issued a statement on July 11, reiterating that the Turkish Cypriot side will continue with the efforts with goodwill and on the basis of equality, for a lasting and balanced agreement which will not bring about pre-1974 conditions. The statement concluded as “if there will be a compromise in Cyprus, it will be a new partnership established by two separate sovereign States”.

On July 16, the talks between the two leaders started again, with Alvaro de Soto in attendance. Reports from the talks said that the two leaders decided on a working programme for the remaining summer months. The fifth round of talks begun under the shadow of the Greek Cypriot administration’s secretly deploying Russian-made attack helicopters. The European Union, on the other hand, was trying to interfere the negotiation process with its open support for the Greek Cypriots. Despite these and other setbacks however, President Denktaþ confirmed that the Turkish Cypriot side would not withdraw from the negotiating table “because we are defending our rights.”

On July 31, the UN announced that both the TRNC President and the Greek Cypriot Leader Glafcos Clerides accepted an invitation by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to meet in Paris “to take stock and see if a course can be charted for the way ahead”.

PARIS SUMMIT

FIRST REVISION

As a result of the criticisms, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan  revised his document which involved slight changes in the framework was released on December 10, 2002. It was only two days before December 12-13 Copenhagen Summit and it caused uproar in the island.

The European Union approved during the summit the Greek Cypriot administration’s unilateral EU membership, in total disregard of the historical, legal and political realities in Cyprus. The EU’s another misguided decision, was taken ostensibly on behalf of Cyprus as a whole, in violation of the principle of the rule of law and in disregard of the existence of two equal sovereign peoples in Cyprus. The unilateral EU membership of Southern Cyprus was the violation of the 1959-60 International Agreements on Cyprus, which envisaged that “Republic of Cyprus” couldn’t join a state or a union to which both Turkey and Greece are not members. Moreover, since the forcible expulsion of the Turkish Cypriot side from the partnership Republic by the Greek Cypriot side in 1963, there exists no single state, government and parliament which have the authority to represent the island as a whole.

Meeting the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in The Hague, both President Rauf Denktaþ and the Greek Cypriot Leader Tassos Papadopoulos rejected to sign the document and holding referenda on March 30, 2003. Following the completion of a 19-hour long meeting with harsh debates, in a written statement Annan stated that “they had reached the end of the road and unfortunately he could not say that the negotiations had ended successfully”. Although both leaders rejected to sign the “Annan Plan”, pointing out that it is not yet ready to be taken to referenda by their peoples, the rejection of Tassos Papadopoulos was overlooked however, President Denktaþ was put on the spot to be blamed for the failure of the process.

CROSSINGS ALLOWED BY THE TRNC

Following these developments, the announcement of the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoðan who declared that Turkey allowed entrance of the Greek Cypriots to Turkey without visa, drew considerable appreciation. The visa requirement for Greek Cypriot citizens to visit Turkey is lifted starting from May 22, and the Greek Cypriot civilians are enjoying traveling to Turkey with uncharged tourist visas.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN DECEMBER 2003 – JUNE 2004

The TRNC’s general elections took place on December 14, 2003. Following the general elections, the Republican Turkish Party - United Forces (RTP-UF), who secured most of the seats in the Parliament with 19 MP’s, and the Democrat Party (DP), who came third in the elections with 7 MP’s, formed a coalition government under the heading, "The Government For Communal Reconciliation and Settlement".

The new government was formed under the leadership of RTP-UF leader, Mehmet Ali Talat who became the Prime Minister. The leader of DP, Serdar Denktas, handled portfolios of the Deputy Prime Ministry and the Foreign Ministry. RTP-UF-DP coalition government’s ultimate aim was the resumption of the Cyprus peace talks on the basis of a UN blueprint namely, the "Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem" dated 26 February 2003, to reach a settlement before May 1, the deadline for the European Union accession of the Greek Cypriot Administration.

Likewise, the Greek Cypriot leadership expressed before its willingness for the resumption of substantive negotiations on the basis of the plan in a letter written to the UN Secretary-General. During their meeting in Brussels on January 29, 2004, the Greek Cypriot leader Papadopulos reiterated this call.

Like the new Turkish Cypriot government, the Turkish government in Ankara also wanted the recommencement of the Cyprus peace talks within the framework of the goodwill mission of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on the basis of the UN document. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan requested from the UN Secretary-General to resume Cyprus peace talks during his meeting with him in Davos on January 24, 2004. Following this, the Greek government in Athens declared that it supported a renewal of the talks in Cyprus.

Appreciating that the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots as well as their respective motherlands, Turkey and Greece, wanted resumption of the talks, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan sent a letter to both sides on February 4, 2004 in which he invited them to come to New York to begin negotiations on February 10, 2004. In his letter, Annan outlined a schedule according to which talks would be resumed in Cyprus on February 16 and wrapped up on March 25, after which he would fill in any blanks in a peace deal that would then be put to a separate referendum in the north and in the south on April 21.

Although the Turkish Cypriot leader Denktas and the Greek Cypriot leader Papadopulos had objections and reservations to the "strict" schedule Annan had proposed, particularly on issues of agreeing to submit an accord to referendum on April 21 and allowing the Secretary-General fill in the blanks in case of disagreement, both leaders accepted the invitation of the UN Secretary-General and went to New York.

When the UN Secretary-General Annan and the delegations of the two sides headed by Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktas and Greek Cypriot leader Tasos Papadopulos came together in New York on February 10, 2004, Annan requested from the sides to submit their proposals. In his proposal presented to Annan on February 11, 2004, Denktas offered a timetable that broadly incorporated proposals already made by Annan. In his proposal, President Denktas offered a three-stage negotiation and finalization process in which Turkey and Greece would involve in the talks if the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot sides could not agree upon issues. He also proposed enlargement of the role foreseen for the UN Secretary-General, from completing any unfinished parts of the plan to resolving any continuing and persistent deadlocks in the negotiations. Following this, the Greek Cypriot side worried with the involvement of motherlands sought certain clarifications by demanding a UN Security Council Resolution which would appoint Annan as "the only authority to fill the gaps". The Greek Cypriot side also proposed that the EU become involved in the talks "at some stage considered appropriate" by the UN Secretary-General. Turkish Cypriot side had accepted everything that was on the negotiating table, excluding the demand for an active role for the EU in the process as it would contravene the framework of the Annan plan. UN Secretary-General Annan considered the proposal by President Denktas as favourable, therefore he suggested a three-phase negotiation and finalization process to the sides. He also added the clarifications sought by the Greek Cypriot side to his final proposal. When the sides declared that they agreed on the UN Secretary-General’s offer, Annan announced the terms of what was known as the 13 February agreement, which committed the parties to a three-phase process leading to referendum on a finalized plan.

Consequently, with a small deviation from the schedule, negotiations restarted on February 19, 2004 in a terminal building of which was known once as the Nicosia International Airport under the chairmanship of the UN Secretary-General’s special envoy, Alvaro de Soto to reach a negotiated settlement before May 1. In line with the agreement reached between the two sides on February 13, 2004, Denktas and Papadopulos met three times a week and tried to solve their differences, while three technical committees - one assigned to work on matters related to international agreements, one on federal legislations needed to be made and one on matters of economy and finance - met daily. A fourth committee, which worked on the flag and national anthem of the "new state", was established towards the end of February.

During the negotiations, both the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots were deeply divided on the complexities and details of the plan. Give-and-take negotiations between the two sides, which were considered as the most critical stage of the negotiations, was set to start on March 12. However, since the two sides were far apart on all outstanding issues, UN envoy on Cyprus Alvaro de Soto did not launch the give-and-take process. He decided to change the format of the talks from direct to proximity on March 15. Alvaro de Soto aimed to narrow differences and facilitate give and take in the run-up to Phase 2 of the process. He put to each side a framework to allow for trade-offs. While the Turkish Cypriot side responded positively, the Greek Cypriot side criticized the suggested framework.

The Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktas announced on March 17 that since no progress had been achieved on the basic principles during the Cyprus negotiation process, he would not attend the quadripartite talks between Turkey, Greece and the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot sides in Switzerland, planned to be on March 24 and added that the TRNC government would go to the talks. He authorized Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat and the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Serdar Denktas to represent the Turkish Cypriot side. In order to clear away some of the secondary issues in the negotiation before the end of the Phase 1, the leaders came together for one last meeting on the island on March 22. After this meeting, President Denktas declared that the UN-sponsored bilateral talks on Cyprus had ended in failure because of the Greek Cypriot rejection of almost everything proposed by the Turkish Cypriot side. Then, Greek Cypriot leader Tasos Papadopulos announced that bilateral talks with the Turkish Cypriots on the UN settlement plan had reached no agreement and he would move to Switzerland, where Turkey and Greece would join them.

Disagreements between the two sides primarily centered on the territorial trade-offs, property claims, security worries and Turkish Cypriot demand for the inclusion of the derogations in the European Union’s primary law.

The UN-brokered Cyprus talks entered its second phase on March 24 as Turkey and Greece formally joined the two rival sides on Cyprus to push for a settlement. Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece, Abdullah Gul and Petros Molyviatis, reciprocally attended to the meeting in Burgenstock, Switzerland - chaired by UN special envoy for Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto- together with Greek Cypriot leader Tasos Papadopulos and Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat. Proximity and unofficial talks at a technical level continued on March 25, between the four participating countries as the Greek and Greek Cypriot sides tried to impose the idea of holding Cyprus talks between the two sides of the island instead of holding four-party conference with the participation of Turkey and Greece.

The summit was halted for one day on April 25 since Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, his Greek counterpart, Petros Molyviatis, and Greek Cypriot leader Tasos Papadopulos had to attend the European Union summit, in Brussels.

The summit in Brussels had considerable importance since the discussions on the Cyprus issue would continue there also. The Turkish government urged that those terms of a new settlement in Cyprus should be made part of the Union’s primary law, which meant these exceptional terms would become permanent derogations from the EU laws. At the end of the summit, the EU reaffirmed its strong preference for the accession of a united Cyprus to the EU and reiterated its readiness to accomodate the terms of such a settlement in line with the principles on which the EU is founded.

Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, along with the Greek Cypriot leader and Foreign Minister of the Greek Cypriot side, returned on March 26 to work for a new settlement in Burgenstock, whilst, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan arrived on March 27. While Greek Prime Minister Kostas Caramanlis arrived in Burgenstock in the afternoon on March 28, the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan came on March 29.

Talks involving the two premiers, as well as the UN Secretary-General, was the final and decisive round before Burgenstock talks were wrapped up on March 31. Annan on March 29 revealed the fourth version of his plan. The 220-page document – accompanied by 9000 pages of appendices- was handed to the parties at a ceremony in Burgenstock. Annan requested from the sides to present their formal views on the proposals on March 30 in order to be able to end talks on March 31. Both sides had objections to the UN’s revised plan. The Greek Cypriot side which gave its submission to the UN asked for changes on several provisions of the plan, relating to "Turkish settlers", restrictions on Greek Cypriots to live in the north, security issue and exceptions the Turkish side want from EU law. On the other hand, the Turkish side had reservations on transition period, which there was a one-year transition period for Northern Cyprus in an earlier version of the plan but it was dropped in the current one, composition and duties of the Central Bank, common currency, economic arrangements for Northern Cyprus and derogations issue.

The main disputes about the plan were how many Greek and Turkish troops will remain on the island and rights to property and freedom of movement between the two communities as well as the rule of EU law. During the talks held between the Turkish Prime Minister and his Greek counterpart, all outstanding issues, excluding the issues covered under the derogations, security and property sub-headlines, were resolved. While the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot governments were sensitive on accommodation of a Cyprus deal in the primary law of the EU and were opposed to arrangements on property issues, the Greek Cypriot side was keen on securing the total withdrawal of Turkish troops.

After intense negotiations at Burgenstock, leaders of the two sides on the island and Prime Ministers of Turkey and Greece failed to come up with a compromise settlement deal. Therefore, it left Annan to fill in the blanks in the UN plan. After filling the blanks, Annan unveiled the final version of the plan to the sides at the closing ceremony and declared that referendum in each side of the island would be held on April 24.

The separate referendum were held as it was set by the UN Secretary-General however, it was rejected by 75.8 % of voters on the Greek Cypriot side and approved by 24.2 % of voters. In contrary, on the Turkish Cypriot side, the plan was approved by 64.9 % of voters and rejected by 35.1 % of voters. Henceforth, the Annan Plan was left aside since, for putting it into force required its approval on both sides.

UN Secretary-General Annan presented his report on the Cyprus problem to the Security Council on June 2, 2004 in which he urged members of the Security Council to turn their attention to ending the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. UN Secretary-General also emphasized that the rejection by the Greek Cypriots was the settlement itself, rather than the mere blueprint.

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE REFERENDUM

In line with the attempt to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots and to reward the Turkish Cypriots for their support of a UN-proposed peace plan in 2004, the EU stated its determination to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot people so as to facilitate the unification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Therefore, the EU General Affairs Council decided for 259 million euro financial assistance for the TRNC be left free on 26 April 2004. After the EU Council’s decision, the European Commission prepared an aid package in July 2004, comprising commercial and financial regulations, and to start direct trade between the North and the EU.

After the referendum, the TRNC authorities intensified their contacts with the world to demand ending of the inhuman isolation and the illegal embargoes imposed upon the Turkish Cypriots.

President Mehmet Ali Talat who was Prime Minister then met with the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in New York, on 3 May 2004, during which issues like unjust treatment of the TRNC and expectations of the Turkish Cypriots from the international community, including the lifting of isolation of Turkish Cypriots were held. Then Prime Minister Talat, also met with the US Secretary of State Colin Powell at the UN Headquarters, on 4 May 2004, after which the Prime Minister said the US had prepared a comprehensive package aimed at ending the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot side. He also announced that the US warmly welcomed the issue of direct flights to the TRNC.

The most pleasing development for the Turkish Cypriot people in 2004 took place during the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) meeting held between 14-16 June 2004, in Istanbul. The Islamic Countries approved a resolution that upgraded the status of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus from "Turkish Muslim People of Cyprus" to "Turkish Cypriot State", as it was called in the Annan Plan. Resolution called upon the international community to take immediate concrete steps aimed at ending the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots and furthermore calls were made to the Islamic countries requesting the lifting of the political and economic isolation of the TRNC and for initiating economic ties with North Cyprus.

Azerbaijan supported the resolution adopted in the OIC and the UN Secretary General’s call in ending the isolation. An important step towards lifting the 31 years long isolation of the Turkish Cypriots was taken with the first direct flight from Azerbaijan to the TRNC on 27 July 2005 and on 29 August 2005 from Ercan to Haydar Aliyev Airport in Baku. It was scheduled that flights would continue between the two states, however, it could not due to the pressure exerted by the Greek Cyriot side and Greece on Azerbaijan through the EU.

The visit paid by President Mehmet Ali Talat to the USA upon an official invitation from the US Secretary of State Condolezza Rice was a clear indication of US Government’s continued support to the efforts aimed at bringing about a solution to the Cyprus problem and lifting the isolation on the Turkish Cypriot people. This was a significant development as it was the highest-level invitation from the US administration to date. In other words, the meeting was crucial as a Turkish Cypriot leader was received in the office of the Secretary of State for the first time. During his meeting with Condolezza Rice on 28 October 2005, President Talat reiterated his call for the lifting of the isolations, he requested the encouragement of the other countries by the USA for taking the necessary steps in this direction and the continuation of further initiatives in trying to achieve a settlement. During his US visit, President Talat also met with Kofi Annan on 31 October 2005. President Talat on his return stated that Kofi Annan reiterated his support on the justified request of the Turkish Cypriot people.

In early 2006, the Foreign Minister of the Turkish Republic Abdullah Gul launched a new initiative aimed at overcoming the problems arising from the lack of solution in Cyprus by proposing an Action Plan on 24 January 2006 (see documents). The Action Plan constituted 10 principal elements, which envisaged the opening of Turkish ports and airports to Greek Cypriot ships and planes in return for the lifting of the embargo on trade and other restrictions against the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey proposed reviving UN talks on the reunification of Cyprus and offered the elimination of all restrictions for both sides in Cyprus, providing substantial benefits to all parties and promoting socio-economic development by reducing disparities between the two sides. Although the proposal was welcomed by the international community, the Greek Cypriots rejected.

British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw arrived the island on 24 January 2006. Despite the Greek Cypriot administration’s objections, Straw crossed over to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and met with President Talat at the Presidential Palace. Following the meeting which drew severe Greek Cypriot criticism, Straw organized a press conference at the Ledra Palace Hotel and said the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan supported his visit and contacts on the island and added progress had to be achieved on lifting the Turkish Cypriot side’s isolation as it was in everybody’s interest to bring the Turkish Cypriots closer to the EU. Meanwhile, in a press conference organized at the TRNC Presidency, Talat said his meeting with Straw at the Presidential Palace was a sign of the UK’s respect for the Turkish Cypriot people and added that he had expressed during the meeting the Turkish Cypriot side’s commitment to peace and settlement and the desire to achieve a settlement during 2006.

Within the framework of easing the Turkish Cypriots isolation, the Spokesman for the US Secretary of State, Adam Ereli indicated on 21 February 2006 that the USA would start direct trade with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and said "we are seeking ways of eliminating the economic isolations imposed on the North. There are number of steps we have taken". Following this statement, during a State Department’s daily briefing on 26 February 2006, Ereli stated that, "trade with North Cyprus is legal".

In July 2004, the EU Parliament had approved two separate regulations, which were the financial aid regulation and the direct trade regulation, prepared by the EU Commission. Because of Greek Cypriot objections, regulations could not be implemented in the aftermath of the referendum. While the Turkish Cypriot side demanded the financial aid regulation to be coupled to direct trade with the EU, the Greek Cypriot side insisted on decoupling of them.

COREPER (the Committee of Permanent Representatives) approved to release 139 million euros (120 million of the 259 million euros aid package was lost at the turn of 2005 as the money had to be allocated by 31 December 2005) of EU aid to the Turkish Cypriot community on 24 February 2006 for the development of infrastructures in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Henceforth, the decision for decoupling of funding from direct trade regulation was ratified by the EU’s General Affairs and External Relations Council on 28 February 2006. Moreover, the Council changed the legal basis for the direct trade regulation, which now comes under protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty, meaning that for approval there must be consensus among EU member states. Prime Minister Soyer said, "the Turkish Cypriot side did not approve decoupling of the regulations, the responsibility on this issue belongs to the EU".

Recent Political Developments 2005-2006