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Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

From the Greek Cypriot Press  

 

 

Cypriots hopeful about a solution - By Stefanos Evripidou (archive article - Thursday, April 9, 2009)

TALAT'S BRAVE PLEDGE IS A LESSON FOR OUR POLITICIANS- By Loucas Charalambous (archive article - SUNday, MARCH 22, 2009)

TIME HAS HEALED THE PROPERTY ISSUE FOR US - Opinion by Loucas G. Charalambous - 1 March 2009 - SUNDAY MAIL

Inertia biggest threat to a solution - By Jean Christou (Cyprus Mail, 20 November 2008)

Spotlight on Turkish Cypriot lives in Limassol - By Jean ChristoU (19 OCTOBER 2008)

The violent road to division  - (archive article - Sunday, October 12, 2008)

How the Zurich agreements unravelled  - By Rauf R. Denktash (archive article - Friday, October 10, 2008)

 

 

Cypriots hopeful about a solution

By Stefanos Evripidou
(archive article - Thursday, April 9, 2009)

A RECENT survey revealed that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots may be pessimistic about a Cyprus solution yet both communities remain hopeful that the two leaders can reach a mutually acceptable solution.

According to a study presented yesterday by the Brussels-based think tank, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 56 per cent of Greek Cypriots and 61 per cent of Turkish Cypriots are pessimistic about the direct talks ongoing between the two community leaders.

However, the study revealed that 64 per cent of Greek Cypriots and 65 per cent of Turkish Cypriots expressed hope that the two leaders reach a mutually acceptable solution.

The poll, conducted in partnership with local researchers in January and February of this year, involved 1,000 respondents on the island.

According to the poll, 80 per cent of Greek Cypriots want a unified state with a central government, while 71 per cent of Turkish Cypriots are in favour of two separate states with international recognition.

A solution entailing a bizonal, bicommunal federation gets 44 per cent of the Greek Cypriot vote and 49 per cent of the Turkish Cypriot vote.

Only ten per cent of Greek Cypriots, compared to 33 per cent of Turkish Cypriots, wish to see the continuation of the status quo.

A federal solution with two sovereign states is preferred by nine per cent of Greek Cypriots and 39 per cent of Turkish Cypriots.

Asked what they would vote in a new referendum, assuming the talks end in agreement, 19 per cent of Greek Cypriots and 30 per cent of Turkish Cypriots said they would certainly vote YES, while 25 per cent of Greek Cypriots and 29 per cent of Turkish Cypriots would certainly vote NO.

The swing vote remains substantial with 44 per cent of Greek Cypriots and 21 per cent of Turkish Cypriots stating they are undecided as to which way they’ll vote.

Among the Greek Cypriot community, 24 per cent of DISY supporters would certainly vote YES, as would 21 per cent of AKEL voters, 19 per cent of DIKO voters and 16 per cent of EDEK voters.

Among the Turkish Cypriot community, 61 per cent of the Republican Turkish Party would certainly vote YES, as would 46 per cent of the Communal Democracy Party, 11 per cent of the Democratic Party and 16 per cent of the National Unity Party.

 

Talat’s brave pledge is a lesson for our politicians
By Loucas Charalambous
(archive article - Sunday, March 22, 2009)

TURKISH Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat, made a statement in Istanbul on March 6, which was given very little coverage by our media. However I think it was one of the most significant statements made by a Cypriot politician in 50 years and deserved much more attention than it was given.

Talat said: “My aim is to achieve a settlement in 2009. But the procedure is moving at a very slow pace. If the hope of settlement vanishes, then my mission will come to an end.” In such a case, Talat said, he would not be a candidate in the elections scheduled in the north for this time next year.

This was the first time that a political leader in Cyprus directly linked his political career to the achievement of something tangible in the national problem. Ever since 1960, the politicians of our side have been doing the exact opposite. They link their political career to the course of the Cyprus problem in reverse fashion. They use the prolonging of the problem as an excuse to prolong their own participation in political life.

Every time they need to justify their candidacy, they invoke the Cyprus problem, which supposedly requires their continued services. Has anyone ever heard any of our politicians seeking a political post for any reason other than the burning desire to serve his country for the sake of the Cyprus problem? I have not. They are all supposedly needed by their country because the Cyprus problem is unsolved and, invariably, going through “its most critical phase”.

An unsolved Cyprus problem is necessary so that our illustrious leaders can justify their political careers, as former DISY deputy Constantinos Lordos astutely pointed out several years ago. In the absence of the problem, their services would not be needed.

In this desert of political cant, Talat is offering everyone a lesson in correct behaviour. If I am not mistaken, the Turkish Cypriot leader must be about 57 today, an age at which our political elephants start to entertain ambitions for the presidency, in the next 20 years (our previous two presidents were governing us in their 70s and 80s).

And why would Talat step down? As he said, if he did not realise his dream to solve the Cyprus problem this year, he would have no reason to stay in politics. It takes a lot of political and moral courage for someone who is in the highest public post of his society to take such a decision at the age of 57.

This commendable political decision by Talat has once again exposed the political immaturity that plagues our side. None of our politicians responded to Talat’s comment, presumably because they would feel uncomfortable with comparisons of their own choices.

On our side, none of those who created – or failed to solve – the problem has had the decency to come out and publicly state that he had failed, that his mission was over and he would be going home. Not once in the last 50 years has this happened.

Sometimes, there is no shame in learning things from your rival. In this case, Talat gave our politicians a very useful lesson in decent political behaviour.

 

 

 

TIME HAS HEALED THE PROPERTY ISSUE FOR US

Opinion by Loucas G. Charalambous

1 March 2009 - SUNDAY MAIL

 

THE PROPERTY issue was once again discussed between Presi­dent Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Talat last Wednesday. All the media reported that there was a sig­nificant divergence of views as regards the criteria for settling the matter.

 

Christofias reportedly is insist­ing that the owner must have the first say about what will happen to a property, while Talat supports a more general approach to the matter, based on three options: ex­change, compensation and return. He has also said that before a prop­erty is disposed of, the view of the owner should be heard.

 

If these are indeed the two approaches, I have to say that Talat's is the more practical of the two. Christofias' approach is correct in theory but in practice it is not con­ducive to resolving the problem.

It effectively ignores the fact that this problem has, to a large extent, been addressed by the time factor - and exacerbated by the demagoguery of our politicians.

 

As I have written in the past, the property owned by Greek Cypriots in the north is roughly 1.5 million donums and by the Turkish Cypri­ots in the south about half a million donums. The land that would have been returned to the Greek Cyp­riots by the territorial re-adjust­ments proposed in the Annan plan would have covered half a million 10 donums.

 

So if there were to be an exchange of properties, there would have to be some decision over the remaining half a million donums of land in the north belonging to Greek Cypriots (assuming that the Turkish Cypri­ots would still accept the old plan) .

 

If the Turkish Cypriot side agreed to return half this land to its own­ers, all that would remain would be the issue of compensation for the remaining 250,000 donums. In such a case, the problem would become more manageable.

 

The property issue for the Greek Cypriots has for decades been ad­dressed by the slogan that all refu­gees should return to their homes. It is a slogan that encapsulates the hypocritical populism of our politi­cians. From the moment we agreed to a settlement of a bizonal federa­tion, we knew that it would not be possible for all refugees (not even most refugees) to return to their homes.

 

In short, the slogan of return was nothing more than demagoguery. In this way, it was left; to the passing of time to solve this problem and I think this is exactly what happened. Most refugees who were over 45 in 1974 are now dead. In the next 25 years, most refugees who were between 20 and 45 during the invasion will also have passed away.

 

In 25 years there will hardly be any refugees left to return to their homes. I will not even go into the fact that from most of those who are alive today, a tiny number would want to settle in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state. This is why I be­lieve Christofias is not being practi­cal.

 

The English saying 'time is the best healer' has been proved cor­rect. While politicians like Lyss­arides, Kyprianou, Papadopoulos and Christofias were mouthing off the tired rhetoric about the return of all refugees, the problem solved itself without any of them realiz­ing it. In fact it has been solved so comprehensively, one wonders why Christofias is finding it so difficult now to agree to a practical arrange­ment of the issue.

 

Inertia biggest threat to a solution
By Jean Christou (Cyprus Mail, 20 November 2008)

THE BIGGEST obstacle of all to a Cyprus solution is now inertia, and if the current process breaks down it will likely be the last attempt for many years, the International Crisis Group (IGC) said yesterday.

In an article, Hugh Pope, the Turkey/Cyprus project director for the IGC, said that as far as the inertia was concerned, the EU had not yet woken up to the opportunity and risks it faced in Cyprus.

Pope said that on the island, cynicism remained widespread. Polls show that fully40 per cent of the population had become so used to the status quo that they simply did not believe that a settlement would ever happen.

“The leaderships, supported by powerful voices from Turkey, Greece and beyond, must begin to tell the story of what a post-settlement Cyprus could look like,” said Pope.

“If this year's process breaks down… it will likely be the last attempt at a comprehensive settlement for many years,” he added.

Pope said in such an event, the world might “one day” consider a two-state solution on the island.

“All sides should count the costs of waiting indefinitely. The old comfort of an unthreatening status quo is no longer available,” said Pope.

He said now that Greek Cypriots were full members of the EU, the stakes and risks were higher.

“Failure could lead to new insecurity and even military tensions between Cyprus and Turkey,” Pope said.

“For the Turkish Cypriots, meanwhile it would mean becoming completely dependent on Turkey. And for Turkey, Cyprus would become a worse problem than before: an economic cost, a diplomatic burden, and, above all, the biggest obstacle between the Turks and their ambition for a full place in the European family of nations.”

Normalisation of relations between Cyprus and Turkey would on the other hand bring huge economic and other benefits to both countries.

“There are thus many reasons for Christofias to join with Talat to start real work on a settlement,” said Pope, referring to their long-established dialogue and friendship based on their left-wing parties' common anti-nationalist cause.

He said in the past six months, despite altercations in the media, they have held long private discussions after their official meetings.

As far as Turkey was concerned, Pope said a successful outcome of the Cyprus talks would be a chance to set Turkey's EU convergence process back on track.

“As a guarantor power in Cyprus, Turkey will have its word to say on the settlement. As former Chief of Staff General Yasar Büyükanit has said, it will have to agree that the Turkish Cypriots will be safe within a well-constructed agreement,” Pope said.

“Public opinion over Cyprus is not the problem some in Turkey pretend that it is: polls show a majority once again support the goal of EU membership. Most Turks… have internalised the idea that the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots can safely live together within the EU.”

 

 

Spotlight on Turkish Cypriot lives in Limassol
By Jean Christou (19 October 2008)

A NEW book being launched next week gives a unique insight into Limassol from a Turkish Cypriot perspective.

The book, titled Echoes from the past: the Turkish Cypriot community and its heritage, is the work of two former Limassolians, brothers, Selchuk and Ozay Akif.

It is being published in English, Turkish and Greek and will be disseminated free of charge to all secondary schools, colleges and universities on the island.

The project is being launched by Terra Cypria, the Cyprus Conservation Foundation and has been largely funded by the UNDP Programme Action for Cooperation and Trust with support from the Cyprus Ministry of Education and Culture.

It arose from the work conducted by Terra Cypria during a previous UNOPS project called ‘A study of the Old Town Limassol’, through which the two Turkish Cypriot brothers produced a wealth of information, based on their research and personal knowledge. It was all considered too valuable to remain as only an appendix to the project report.

“The publication of a book such as this will act as another milestone on the road to reconciliation in Cyprus through its demonstration of the fact that peaceful multicultural coexistence between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in a community such as Limassol once existed, and will also educate the youth on their heritage,” the UNDP said

According to the overall editor, Dr Artemis Yiordamli, who also translated the book into Greek from the original English text, the book is significant because it fills a gap.

She said that while a number of Greek Cypriots have written memoirs or studies about Limassol this will be the first published narrative from a Turkish Cypriot perspective.

The fact that it is appearing simultaneously in three languages will also make it accessible not only to all Cypriots, but also to other residents of Cyprus who will be interested in accounts of times gone by.

The 250-page book includes 180 photographs, mostly unpublished.

They cover a wide range of subjects from mosques and Ottoman-style houses, to traditional practices such as the hamam routine, the call to prayer, weddings and even divorces.

According to Terra Cypria, the accounts are peppered with stories about events and personalities, both Turkish and Greek Cypriot.

“Although intended as easy reading, the publication should prove to be a most useful source of reference on traditional professions and their practitioners, as well as an interesting account for the more casual reader,” it said.

The book will first be presented to the public at Limassol Town Hall on Wednesday in Greek. The event will be addressed by Limassol Mayor, Andreas Christou.

The previous day, October 21, academics and teachers will meet to discuss the book at the premises of the new Cyprus Technological University in Limassol. A presentation in English and Turkish, in association with the British Council, will be held in Nicosia on Thursday, while the Kerynia Liman Rotary Club will host a lunch presentation in Kerynia on November 5, for its members and guests. Additionally, the Cyprus Oxford Society is organising a presentation for its members in December.

Terra Cypria is a non-profit-making foundation promoting environmental education and advocacy in the widest sense. The Foundation has undertaken many local, international and bi-communal projects and this book project The Kerynia Liman Rotary Club is a partner in the project.

The project also involves a number of organised walks for schools in the Turkish sector of Limassol to be led by the authors and other researchers.

 

The violent road to division
(archive article - Sunday, October 12, 2008)

The Cyprus Republic, which was established in 1960, collapsed in 1963 after Archbishop Makarios’ 13-points proposal for the amendment of the constitution. A detailed account of the ensuing crisis is given in Makarios Droushiotis’ book The First Partition, which has been published in English. The excerpt below details the shocking events of December1963 as Cyprus hovered on the brink of war with Turkey.

The Turkish Cypriot extremist organisation TMT had been active in Cyprus since 1959, while in 1961 the then Interior Minister Polycarpos Yiorkadjis, with the blessing of Makarios, had set up a Greek Cypriot equivalent known as the ‘Organisation’. Neither group believed in the Republic and nor did Makarios, who had not given up the aim of Union with Greece, despite his assurances that his only concern was the improvement of the constitution.

At the beginning of December 1963, the General Staff of the Greek Army prepared a study on the situation in Cyprus. This study, signed by the Chief of Staff Ioannis Pipiles, records the four stages which were outlined in the ‘Makarios Plan’ for the achievement of Enosis:

a. Stage 1: Attack against the negative points of the Constitution.

b. Stage 2: Denunciation of the Treaty of Guarantee

c. Stage 3: Self-Determination

d. Stage 4: Submission of application to the “Greek Government to accept the unification of CYPRUS with the Greek Core”.

On 3 December 1963, three days after Makarios’ proposals for constitutional revision had been communicated to the Turks, members of the Organisation blew up the statue of EOKA hero Markos Drakos near Paphos Gate in Nicosia. The Greek Cypriot leadership blamed the Turkish Cypriots and the first anti-Turkish demonstrations took place in Nicosia, while the Organisation went into a state of emergency. Some of its members, on instructions from the leadership, patrolled the Turkish enclaves in order to monitor Turkish Cypriot movements. The climate in the capital deteriorated rapidly and everybody braced themselves for the impending clash.

A tripartite committee under Rauf Denktash set about preparing the Turkish Cypriot answer to Makarios’ proposals. On 20 December, British High Commissioner Sir Arthur Clark had meetings with Makarios and Vice-President Fazil Küçük in Nicosia. The British diplomat, who was leaving for London on holiday, received assurances from Küçük that the Turkish Cypriots were working on their answer, which was due to be submitted to the Greek Cypriot side at the beginning of January. Makarios assured Clark that he would not be making any moves before receiving the Turkish Cypriot answer, which he said he would study carefully. Makarios told Clark he could go to London and enjoy his holiday in peace. Clark was surprised by their moderate approach, but, taking stock of the situation on the island, he told Fraser Wilkins, the American Ambassador, that “there would be no new developments in the immediate future, unless there should be some bombing incident”.

Only 24 hours after Clark’s assessment, there was indeed an incident, which provided the spark for a general clash between Greek and Turkish Cypriot para-state organisations. At dawn on 21 December, one of Yiorkadjis’ armed patrols clashed with some Turkish Cypriots. Shots were exchanged and two Turkish Cypriots were killed. In Nicosia, which was already a powder keg, there was little patience for more sober reflection. The crisis rapidly escalated and, on 23 December, clashes broke out all over town.

At lunchtime on 23 December, Makarios and Küçük addressed a joint appeal to the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus “to put an end to the fighting between them”. This intervention from the Repubic’s President and Vice-president had no real influence on events. The fighting continued, and 10 people were killed - nine Turkish Cypriots and one Greek Cypriot. Twenty people were injured, 13 Greek Cypriots and seven Turkish Cypriots.

At 10 in the evening, Makarios made another appeal to the people, asking them to refrain from any unlawful act or provocation. Vice-president Küçük addressed a similar message but to no avail. On the morning of 24 December, the clashes in Nicosia spread along the entire length of the line separating the Turkish quarter from the rest of the town. The fiercest fighting took place in Kaimakli, Constantia, Neapolis, Ledra Palace and especially Omorphita, where the armed groups of Vassos Lyssarides and Nicos Sampson fought side by side. According to American sources there were 17 dead, most of them Turkish Cypriots, and 70 wounded.

Makarios requested a meeting with Küçük in the presence of the Acting British High Commissioner and the American Ambassador. The meeting took place at midday on December 24 at the Paphos Gate police station, between the Greek and Turkish sectors of Nicosia. The Turkish Cypriot representatives attended the meeting unshaven, denouncing the fact that the water supply network had been cut off, and protesting vigorously to Makarios about the imposition of a total blockade on the population. Küçük raised the humanitarian issue of 800 Turkish Cypriots who had moved from the Omorphita area to the Turkish sector of Nicosia inside the walls and were living in squalid conditions, without water or food. One side blamed the other for the incidents, as well as for the failure to implement the ceasefire. It was decided to set up a mixed team under the president of the House of Representatives, Glafkos Clerides, Defence Minister Osman Orek, Interior Minister Yiorkadjis and Agriculture Minister Fasil Plümer, who would oversee
the ceasefire and ensure a return to normality. Clerides and Orek undertook to visit the areas where fighting had taken place and make sure that the wounded were attended to. This committee failed entirely in its mission.

In the American Ambassador’s view, Makarios and Küçük were trying to secure a ceasefire, but that “Greek and Turkish Cypriot extremist groups and especially EOKA [meaning the Organisation] are out of control”. The British found Clerides’ efforts to secure a ceasefire during the meeting at Paphos Gate extremely constructive. However, in the case of Yiorkadjis, who controlled 80 per cent of the Greek Cypriot military forces, they noted that he had made no contribution at all to that end.

?t midnight on December 24, and in view of the escalation of hostilities especially in the Omorphita area, Turkey took the decision to ask the other two guarantor powers to mount a joint intervention in Cyprus. On December 25, Turkey’s Prime Minister Ismet Inönü sent an ultimatum to Makarios that, if the attacks did not cease, Turkey would intervene militarily. At 2.30 that afternoon, three Turkish fighter jets flew at low altitude over Nicosia, while four Turkish ships appeared north of Kyrenia. At 3.20pm, the Turkish Military Contingent left its camp in Yerolakos, west of Nicosia, and moved towards Gönyeli. The movements of the Turkish troops sowed panic among the Greek Cypriot leadership, which now dreaded a Turkish intervention in Cyprus. Through the British High Commissioner, therefore, it threatened that if the Turkish Contingent did not halt its movements, 300 Turkish Cypriots being held hostage at the Kykkos Gymnasium in Nicosia would be executed. The Turkish Cypriots had been detained by irregulars a
cting on Sampson’s orders in the Omorphita area.

According to the Greek Cypriot leadership’s operation plans, in the event of a clash, the Organisation would become responsible for the protection of the Greek Cypriots, with the assistance and cooperation of the Greek Military Contingent. However, as soon as hostilities broke out, those Greek officers, who were members of the Organisation’s commanding staff, abandoned its headquarters.

Chrysafis Chrysafi, an officer in the Cyprus army who was transferred to the Organisation, describes the scene where Yiorkadjis, clearly annoyed, was ringing the Greek Military Contingent’s commander, Colonel Tzouvelakis, requesting he keep to the promises he had made. “It appears that ELDYK’s (the Greek Contingent’s) commander was telling him he had orders that every single soldier should stay in camp. ‘What’s to become of us, we have no weapons, nothing,’ Yiorkadjis told him. Tzouvelakis must have replied something and Yiorkadjis retorted furiously: ‘Screw you, Commander’. Tzouvelakis answered back to Georkadjis, who replied, ‘Screw you again,’ and slammed the phone down”.

According to Chrysafis, Yiorkadjis, beyond himself with rage, ordered a van to be brought to him. “We went out on the street and requisitioned the first van passing by. Yiorkadjis ordered Kyriacos Patatakos to fit loudspeakers on it and then he sent his men outside ELDYK’s barracks, calling on the soldiers to come out”.

Makarios asked Greece for military support, but the response was negative. Turkey was threatening to invade and Greece was refusing to help. Makarios finally realised that the situation was grave. He then put the blame for the dramatic turn of events on Yiorkadjis and the Organisation and set out on foot from the Presidential Palace to the Organisation’s headquarters in the nearby government housing complex to assess the situation first hand.

The Organisation’s leadership was in a meeting. “There was panic and confusion and nobody knew what to do when we were told that Makarios was on his way to the headquarters on foot,” Chrysafis explained. “Yiorkadjis was not in a position to face him and he asked Clerides to try and appease him. He then hid himself behind a large curtain so that Makarios would not become aware of his presence”.

Clerides stayed there and took the brunt of Makarios’ fury, as the latter pounded his staff angrily on the table. “Why did you start the troubles? You will ruin the country with your idiocies,” he yelled furiously, while Clerides tried to calm him down. “An attempt was made to convince the Archbishop that it was not our fault and that it was the Turks who had started it all first, which was not, in fact, true,” said Chrysafis.

What took place at the Organisation’s headquarters was indicative of the irresponsibility of the Cypriot political leadership. Fixing loudspeakers to a van so that the Greek soldiers would come out of their barracks, Yiorkadjis hiding like a little boy behind a curtain to avoid Makarios’ wrath, and the latter pounding his staff on the table in despair reveals the astonishing thoughtlessness with which the Greek Cypriot leadership provoked and then handled a crisis that brought Cyprus to the brink of war with Turkey.

The price Cyprus paid as a result of this latest crisis was an agreement on the first form of separation in Nicosia. Following long negotiations, a memorandum was signed on December 30 which set the boundaries of a neutral zone - under British control - dividing the Greek and Turkish sectors of the city. This zone was drawn on the map with a green pencil and therefore came to be known as the Green Line.

The First Partition, by Makarios Droushiotis, is published by Alphadi Publications and will be available in English from October 30, 2008

 

 

How the Zurich agreements unravelled
By Rauf R. Denktash
(archive article - Friday, October 10, 2008)

MAKARIOS Droushiotis’ article “Zurich, from curse to blessing in disguise” (Cyprus Mail, October 1, 2008) gets full marks on impartiality and adherence to facts. Yet a few points need clarification:

a) Under the sub-title “After The Collapse” Droushiotis writes:

“Immediately after the collapse of the Zurich agreements in December 1963, the Turkish government under Prime Minister Inönü urged the Turkish Cypriots to return to the Republic of Cyprus. In a letter to Vice President Faz?l Kuchuk dated March 9, 1964, ?smet ?nönü called upon him to seek an understanding with President Makarios and return to the government, with the Vice President and Ministers leading, and the Ministers, the Representatives and later, the civil servants, following.

Kuchuk replied the next day, saying that this was impossible, citing a crisis of confidence and fear, and claiming (that if he insisted, the Turkish Cypriot officials would resign their posts.”

Dr. Kuchuk’s reaction to Inönü’s suggestion is understandable. Inönü, rightly and wisely, wanted to prevent the collapse of the 1960 set-up (a guaranteed partnership, a functional federation, and not a unitary state as alleged), believing that it could be saved, whereas Dr Kuchuk was not even able to go to his office which was now on the Greek side and had already been taken over by the gunmen of the organisation as per the Akritas Plan.

Makarios had already declared the constitution to be “dead and buried” and Turkish inhabitants of 103 villages had already become refugees in what became known as Turkish enclaves. Schoolchildren were unable to go to their villages and Makarios, who had declared that he recognised no Vice-President, had cut off even telephone contacts with Dr Kuchuk. Omorfita had been taken over by Sampson and his gunmen, while Turkish Cypriots moving from one place to another were being “arrested” never to be seen again. Inönü’s request therefore was out of line with the realities in the island.

A few Turkish Cypriots who had taken the risk and attended their jobs were not seen again until recently, when their bones were recovered in different places. Murder was afoot for any Turk who dared to enter the areas patrolled by the Enosis patriots.

b)Another aspect of Mr Droushiotis’ piece, which needs correction is the paragraph which reads:

“The Turkish government of the day was in conflict with the Turkish Army and desired the implementation of the Zurich agreements. That is why they forced Rauf Denktash to remain exiled in Turkey from 1964 until 1968. The Turkish Cypriot leadership and the paramilitary organisation TMT were under the influence of the army, which desired the division of Cyprus.”

It was not the Turkish government which prevented me from coming to Cyprus; it was the “order of the day” issued by Makarios and his Minister of Interior, the commander of “the organisation” Yiorkadjis, who declared me, unconstitutionally, to be “persona non grata to be arrested for starting the Turkish uprising etc.” Being “arrested” in those days meant disappearing.

Inönü believed that the arrival of UNFICYP would help in my safe entering the country. This also did not work. In the end I had to try and enter the island once through Erenköy (Kokkina) and a second time through Larnaca when we were caught in November 1967 and sent back without any charge of “responsibility for the so-called non-existent uprising or any other crime”.

The aftermath of my arrest and return to Turkey was the attack on Kofinou (Geçitkale) and Bo?aziçi which resulted in a near military intervention by Turkey, which was prevented by Cyrus Vance’s efforts in sending Grivas and some of the Greek Army personnel back to Greece, Makarios promising to compensate the villagers for deaths and damage (which he never did) and agreement to start unofficial talks between me and Mr Clerides, which began in Beirut soon afterwards.

The result was a very close agreement on local autonomy, which Makarios rejected because I had not accepted minority status for my people and he had not managed to get rid of the Treaty of Guarantee. Today Mr Christofias is still trying to achieve these ends through smooth talking.

As to the finding of Mr Droushiotis that Makarios instructed Clerides to offer me a return to the 1960 set-up, this is also true but it was obvious that this was a tactical move by Makarios in order to put a swift end to Turkish intervention. Clerides came to me with this offer and I did tell him that, though I saw no merit in it, I would discuss it with the Turkish government.

In order to do so, I had to be satisfied that Clerides was really in charge of the situation. He was not. He had taken over the Sampson government and EOKA B with some or all of the Junta officers still active all over the country.

The return of Turkish refugees to their destroyed homes in 103 villages in safety could not be assured. Those who had staged the coup could not be arrested and tried. It was quite obvious that Makarios was up to his tricks again and the offer of going back to a situation which had given us no protection for eleven years could not be treated as a serious offer.

By the time I replied, the three guarantors were already discussing the situation and at the first Geneva Talks they had agreed that two separate administrations existed in the island.

The rebirth of the destroyed Partnership Republic and the treatment of its destroyers as the government of Cyprus has prolonged the settlement of the problem so far.


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