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Cypriots hopeful about a solution
By Stefanos Evripidou
(archive article - Thursday, April 9, 2009)
A RECENT
survey revealed that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots may be pessimistic about a
Cyprus solution yet both communities remain hopeful that the two leaders can
reach a mutually acceptable solution.
According to a study presented yesterday by the Brussels-based think tank, the
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 56 per cent of Greek Cypriots and 61
per cent of Turkish Cypriots are pessimistic about the direct talks ongoing
between the two community leaders.
However, the study revealed that 64 per cent of Greek Cypriots and 65 per cent
of Turkish Cypriots expressed hope that the two leaders reach a mutually
acceptable solution.
The poll, conducted in partnership with local researchers in January and
February of this year, involved 1,000 respondents on the island.
According to the poll, 80 per cent of Greek Cypriots want a unified state with a
central government, while 71 per cent of Turkish Cypriots are in favour of two
separate states with international recognition.
A solution entailing a bizonal, bicommunal federation gets 44 per cent of the
Greek Cypriot vote and 49 per cent of the Turkish Cypriot vote.
Only ten per cent of Greek Cypriots, compared to 33 per cent of Turkish
Cypriots, wish to see the continuation of the status quo.
A federal solution with two sovereign states is preferred by nine per cent of
Greek Cypriots and 39 per cent of Turkish Cypriots.
Asked what they would vote in a new referendum, assuming the talks end in
agreement, 19 per cent of Greek Cypriots and 30 per cent of Turkish Cypriots
said they would certainly vote YES, while 25 per cent of Greek Cypriots and 29
per cent of Turkish Cypriots would certainly vote NO.
The swing vote remains substantial with 44 per cent of Greek Cypriots and 21 per
cent of Turkish Cypriots stating they are undecided as to which way they’ll
vote.
Among the Greek Cypriot community, 24 per cent of DISY supporters would
certainly vote YES, as would 21 per cent of AKEL voters, 19 per cent of DIKO
voters and 16 per cent of EDEK voters.
Among the Turkish Cypriot community, 61 per cent of the Republican Turkish Party
would certainly vote YES, as would 46 per cent of the Communal Democracy Party,
11 per cent of the Democratic Party and 16 per cent of the National Unity Party.
Talat’s brave
pledge is a lesson for our politicians
By Loucas
Charalambous
(archive
article - Sunday, March 22, 2009)
TURKISH Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali
Talat, made a statement in Istanbul on March 6, which was given very little
coverage by our media. However I think it was one of the most significant
statements made by a Cypriot politician in 50 years and deserved much more
attention than it was given.
Talat said: “My aim is to achieve a settlement in 2009. But the procedure is
moving at a very slow pace. If the hope of settlement vanishes, then my mission
will come to an end.” In such a case, Talat said, he would not be a candidate in
the elections scheduled in the north for this time next year.
This was the first time that a political leader in Cyprus directly linked his
political career to the achievement of something tangible in the national
problem. Ever since 1960, the politicians of our side have been doing the exact
opposite. They link their political career to the course of the Cyprus problem
in reverse fashion. They use the prolonging of the problem as an excuse to
prolong their own participation in political life.
Every time they need to justify their candidacy, they invoke the Cyprus problem,
which supposedly requires their continued services. Has anyone ever heard any of
our politicians seeking a political post for any reason other than the burning
desire to serve his country for the sake of the Cyprus problem? I have not. They
are all supposedly needed by their country because the Cyprus problem is
unsolved and, invariably, going through “its most critical phase”.
An unsolved Cyprus problem is necessary so that our illustrious leaders can
justify their political careers, as former DISY deputy Constantinos Lordos
astutely pointed out several years ago. In the absence of the problem, their
services would not be needed.
In this desert of political cant, Talat is offering everyone a lesson in correct
behaviour. If I am not mistaken, the Turkish Cypriot leader must be about 57
today, an age at which our political elephants start to entertain ambitions for
the presidency, in the next 20 years (our previous two presidents were governing
us in their 70s and 80s).
And why would Talat step down? As he said, if he did not realise his dream to
solve the Cyprus problem this year, he would have no reason to stay in politics.
It takes a lot of political and moral courage for someone who is in the highest
public post of his society to take such a decision at the age of 57.
This commendable political decision by Talat has once again exposed the
political immaturity that plagues our side. None of our politicians responded to
Talat’s comment, presumably because they would feel uncomfortable with
comparisons of their own choices.
On our side, none of those who created – or failed to solve – the problem has
had the decency to come out and publicly state that he had failed, that his
mission was over and he would be going home. Not once in the last 50 years has
this happened.
Sometimes, there is no shame in learning things from your rival. In this case,
Talat gave our politicians a very useful lesson in decent political behaviour.
TIME HAS HEALED THE PROPERTY
ISSUE FOR US
Opinion by Loucas G. Charalambous
1
March 2009 - SUNDAY MAIL
THE PROPERTY issue was once again discussed between President Christofias and
Turkish Cypriot leader Talat last Wednesday. All the media reported that there
was a significant divergence of views as regards the criteria for settling the
matter.
Christofias reportedly is insisting that the owner must have the first say
about what will happen to a property, while Talat supports a more general
approach to the matter, based on three options: exchange, compensation and
return. He has also said that before a property is disposed of, the view of the
owner should be heard.
If these are indeed the two approaches, I have to say that Talat's is the more
practical of the two. Christofias' approach is correct in theory but in practice
it is not conducive to resolving the problem.
It effectively ignores the fact that this problem has, to a large extent, been
addressed by the time factor - and exacerbated by the demagoguery of our
politicians.
As I have written in the past, the property owned by Greek Cypriots in the north
is roughly 1.5 million donums and by the Turkish Cypriots in the south about
half a million donums. The land that would have been returned to the Greek
Cypriots by the territorial re-adjustments proposed in the Annan plan would
have covered half a million 10 donums.
So if there were to be an exchange of properties, there would have to be some
decision over the remaining half a million donums of land in the north belonging
to Greek Cypriots (assuming that the Turkish Cypriots would still accept the
old plan) .
If the Turkish Cypriot side agreed to return half this land to its owners, all
that would remain would be the issue of compensation for the remaining 250,000
donums. In such a case, the problem would become more manageable.
The property issue for the Greek Cypriots has for decades been addressed by the
slogan that all refugees should return to their homes. It is a slogan that
encapsulates the hypocritical populism of our politicians. From the moment we
agreed to a settlement of a bizonal federation, we knew that it would not be
possible for all refugees (not even most refugees) to return to their homes.
In short, the slogan of return was nothing more than demagoguery. In
this way, it was left; to the passing of time to solve this problem and I
think this is exactly what happened. Most refugees who were over 45 in 1974 are
now dead. In the next 25 years, most refugees who were between 20 and 45
during the invasion will also have passed away.
In 25 years there will hardly be any refugees left to return to their homes. I
will not even go into the fact that from most of those who are alive today, a
tiny number would want to settle in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state. This
is why I believe Christofias is not being practical.
The English saying 'time is the best healer' has been proved correct. While
politicians like Lyssarides, Kyprianou, Papadopoulos and Christofias were
mouthing off the tired rhetoric about the return of all refugees, the problem
solved itself without any of them realizing it. In fact it has been solved so
comprehensively, one wonders why Christofias is finding it so difficult now to
agree to a practical arrangement of the issue.
Inertia biggest threat to a
solution
By Jean
Christou (Cyprus Mail, 20 November 2008)
THE BIGGEST obstacle of all to a
Cyprus solution is now inertia, and if the current process breaks down it will
likely be the last attempt for many years, the International Crisis Group (IGC)
said yesterday.
In an article, Hugh Pope, the Turkey/Cyprus project director for the IGC, said
that as far as the inertia was concerned, the EU had not yet woken up to the
opportunity and risks it faced in Cyprus.
Pope said that on the island, cynicism remained widespread. Polls show that
fully40 per cent of the population had become so used to the status quo that
they simply did not believe that a settlement would ever happen.
“The leaderships, supported by powerful voices from Turkey, Greece and beyond,
must begin to tell the story of what a post-settlement Cyprus could look like,”
said Pope.
“If this year's process breaks down… it will likely be the last attempt at a
comprehensive settlement for many years,” he added.
Pope said in such an event, the world might “one day” consider a two-state
solution on the island.
“All sides should count the costs of waiting indefinitely. The old comfort of an
unthreatening status quo is no longer available,” said Pope.
He said now that Greek Cypriots were full members of the EU, the stakes and
risks were higher.
“Failure could lead to new insecurity and even military tensions between Cyprus
and Turkey,” Pope said.
“For the Turkish Cypriots, meanwhile it would mean becoming completely dependent
on Turkey. And for Turkey, Cyprus would become a worse problem than before: an
economic cost, a diplomatic burden, and, above all, the biggest obstacle between
the Turks and their ambition for a full place in the European family of nations.”
Normalisation of relations between Cyprus and Turkey would on the other hand
bring huge economic and other benefits to both countries.
“There are thus many reasons for Christofias to join with Talat to start real
work on a settlement,” said Pope, referring to their long-established dialogue
and friendship based on their left-wing parties' common anti-nationalist cause.
He said in the past six months, despite altercations in the media, they have
held long private discussions after their official meetings.
As far as Turkey was concerned, Pope said a successful outcome of the Cyprus
talks would be a chance to set Turkey's EU convergence process back on track.
“As a guarantor power in Cyprus, Turkey will have its word to say on the
settlement. As former Chief of Staff General Yasar Büyükanit has said, it will
have to agree that the Turkish Cypriots will be safe within a well-constructed
agreement,” Pope said.
“Public opinion over Cyprus is not the problem some in Turkey pretend that it
is: polls show a majority once again support the goal of EU membership. Most
Turks… have internalised the idea that the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots
can safely live together within the EU.”
Spotlight on Turkish
Cypriot lives in Limassol
By
Jean Christou (19 October 2008)
A NEW book
being launched next week gives a unique insight into Limassol from a Turkish
Cypriot perspective.
The book, titled Echoes from the past: the Turkish Cypriot community and its
heritage, is the work of two former Limassolians, brothers, Selchuk and Ozay
Akif.
It is being published in English, Turkish and Greek and will be disseminated
free of charge to all secondary schools, colleges and universities on the island.
The project is being launched by Terra Cypria, the Cyprus Conservation
Foundation and has been largely funded by the UNDP Programme Action for
Cooperation and Trust with support from the Cyprus Ministry of Education and
Culture.
It arose from the work conducted by Terra Cypria during a previous UNOPS project
called ‘A study of the Old Town Limassol’, through which the two Turkish Cypriot
brothers produced a wealth of information, based on their research and personal
knowledge. It was all considered too valuable to remain as only an appendix to
the project report.
“The publication of a book such as this will act as another milestone on the
road to reconciliation in Cyprus through its demonstration of the fact that
peaceful multicultural coexistence between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots
in a community such as Limassol once existed, and will also educate the youth on
their heritage,” the UNDP said
According to the overall editor, Dr Artemis Yiordamli, who also translated the
book into Greek from the original English text, the book is significant because
it fills a gap.
She said that while a number of Greek Cypriots have written memoirs or studies
about Limassol this will be the first published narrative from a Turkish Cypriot
perspective.
The fact that it is appearing simultaneously in three languages will also make
it accessible not only to all Cypriots, but also to other residents of Cyprus
who will be interested in accounts of times gone by.
The 250-page book includes 180 photographs, mostly unpublished.
They cover a wide range of subjects from mosques and Ottoman-style houses, to
traditional practices such as the hamam routine, the call to prayer, weddings
and even divorces.
According to Terra Cypria, the accounts are peppered with stories about events
and personalities, both Turkish and Greek Cypriot.
“Although intended as easy reading, the publication should prove to be a most
useful source of reference on traditional professions and their practitioners,
as well as an interesting account for the more casual reader,” it said.
The book will first be presented to the public at Limassol Town Hall on
Wednesday in Greek. The event will be addressed by Limassol Mayor, Andreas
Christou.
The previous day, October 21, academics and teachers will meet to discuss the
book at the premises of the new Cyprus Technological University in Limassol. A
presentation in English and Turkish, in association with the British Council,
will be held in Nicosia on Thursday, while the Kerynia Liman Rotary Club will
host a lunch presentation in Kerynia on November 5, for its members and guests.
Additionally, the Cyprus Oxford Society is organising a presentation for its
members in December.
Terra Cypria is a non-profit-making foundation promoting environmental education
and advocacy in the widest sense. The Foundation has undertaken many local,
international and bi-communal projects and this book project The Kerynia Liman
Rotary Club is a partner in the project.
The project also involves a number of organised walks for schools in the Turkish
sector of Limassol to be led by the authors and other researchers.
The violent road to division
(archive
article - Sunday, October 12, 2008)
The Cyprus
Republic, which was established in 1960, collapsed in 1963 after Archbishop
Makarios’ 13-points proposal for the amendment of the constitution. A detailed
account of the ensuing crisis is given in Makarios Droushiotis’ book The First
Partition, which has been published in English. The excerpt below details the
shocking events of December1963 as Cyprus hovered on the brink of war with
Turkey.
The Turkish Cypriot extremist organisation TMT had been active in Cyprus since
1959, while in 1961 the then Interior Minister Polycarpos Yiorkadjis, with the
blessing of Makarios, had set up a Greek Cypriot equivalent known as the ‘Organisation’.
Neither group believed in the Republic and nor did Makarios, who had not given
up the aim of Union with Greece, despite his assurances that his only concern
was the improvement of the constitution.
At the beginning of December 1963, the General Staff of the Greek Army prepared
a study on the situation in Cyprus. This study, signed by the Chief of Staff
Ioannis Pipiles, records the four stages which were outlined in the ‘Makarios
Plan’ for the achievement of Enosis:
a. Stage 1: Attack against the negative points of the Constitution.
b. Stage 2: Denunciation of the Treaty of Guarantee
c. Stage 3: Self-Determination
d. Stage 4: Submission of application to the “Greek Government to accept the
unification of CYPRUS with the Greek Core”.
On 3 December 1963, three days after Makarios’ proposals for constitutional
revision had been communicated to the Turks, members of the Organisation blew up
the statue of EOKA hero Markos Drakos near Paphos Gate in Nicosia. The Greek
Cypriot leadership blamed the Turkish Cypriots and the first anti-Turkish
demonstrations took place in Nicosia, while the Organisation went into a state
of emergency. Some of its members, on instructions from the leadership,
patrolled the Turkish enclaves in order to monitor Turkish Cypriot movements.
The climate in the capital deteriorated rapidly and everybody braced themselves
for the impending clash.
A tripartite committee under Rauf Denktash set about preparing the Turkish
Cypriot answer to Makarios’ proposals. On 20 December, British High Commissioner
Sir Arthur Clark had meetings with Makarios and Vice-President Fazil Küçük in
Nicosia. The British diplomat, who was leaving for London on holiday, received
assurances from Küçük that the Turkish Cypriots were working on their answer,
which was due to be submitted to the Greek Cypriot side at the beginning of
January. Makarios assured Clark that he would not be making any moves before
receiving the Turkish Cypriot answer, which he said he would study carefully.
Makarios told Clark he could go to London and enjoy his holiday in peace. Clark
was surprised by their moderate approach, but, taking stock of the situation on
the island, he told Fraser Wilkins, the American Ambassador, that “there would
be no new developments in the immediate future, unless there should be some
bombing incident”.
Only 24 hours after Clark’s assessment, there was indeed an incident, which
provided the spark for a general clash between Greek and Turkish Cypriot para-state
organisations. At dawn on 21 December, one of Yiorkadjis’ armed patrols clashed
with some Turkish Cypriots. Shots were exchanged and two Turkish Cypriots were
killed. In Nicosia, which was already a powder keg, there was little patience
for more sober reflection. The crisis rapidly escalated and, on 23 December,
clashes broke out all over town.
At lunchtime on 23 December, Makarios and Küçük addressed a joint appeal to the
Greeks and Turks of Cyprus “to put an end to the fighting between them”. This
intervention from the Repubic’s President and Vice-president had no real
influence on events. The fighting continued, and 10 people were killed - nine
Turkish Cypriots and one Greek Cypriot. Twenty people were injured, 13 Greek
Cypriots and seven Turkish Cypriots.
At 10 in the evening, Makarios made another appeal to the people, asking them to
refrain from any unlawful act or provocation. Vice-president Küçük addressed a
similar message but to no avail. On the morning of 24 December, the clashes in
Nicosia spread along the entire length of the line separating the Turkish
quarter from the rest of the town. The fiercest fighting took place in Kaimakli,
Constantia, Neapolis, Ledra Palace and especially Omorphita, where the armed
groups of Vassos Lyssarides and Nicos Sampson fought side by side. According to
American sources there were 17 dead, most of them Turkish Cypriots, and 70
wounded.
Makarios requested a meeting with Küçük in the presence of the Acting British
High Commissioner and the American Ambassador. The meeting took place at midday
on December 24 at the Paphos Gate police station, between the Greek and Turkish
sectors of Nicosia. The Turkish Cypriot representatives attended the meeting
unshaven, denouncing the fact that the water supply network had been cut off,
and protesting vigorously to Makarios about the imposition of a total blockade
on the population. Küçük raised the humanitarian issue of 800 Turkish Cypriots
who had moved from the Omorphita area to the Turkish sector of Nicosia inside
the walls and were living in squalid conditions, without water or food. One side
blamed the other for the incidents, as well as for the failure to implement the
ceasefire. It was decided to set up a mixed team under the president of the
House of Representatives, Glafkos Clerides, Defence Minister Osman Orek,
Interior Minister Yiorkadjis and Agriculture Minister Fasil Plümer, who would
oversee
the ceasefire and ensure a return to normality. Clerides and Orek undertook to
visit the areas where fighting had taken place and make sure that the wounded
were attended to. This committee failed entirely in its mission.
In the American Ambassador’s view, Makarios and Küçük were trying to secure a
ceasefire, but that “Greek and Turkish Cypriot extremist groups and especially
EOKA [meaning the Organisation] are out of control”. The British found Clerides’
efforts to secure a ceasefire during the meeting at Paphos Gate extremely
constructive. However, in the case of Yiorkadjis, who controlled 80 per cent of
the Greek Cypriot military forces, they noted that he had made no contribution
at all to that end.
?t midnight on December 24, and in view of the escalation of hostilities
especially in the Omorphita area, Turkey took the decision to ask the other two
guarantor powers to mount a joint intervention in Cyprus. On December 25,
Turkey’s Prime Minister Ismet Inönü sent an ultimatum to Makarios that, if the
attacks did not cease, Turkey would intervene militarily. At 2.30 that afternoon,
three Turkish fighter jets flew at low altitude over Nicosia, while four Turkish
ships appeared north of Kyrenia. At 3.20pm, the Turkish Military Contingent left
its camp in Yerolakos, west of Nicosia, and moved towards Gönyeli. The movements
of the Turkish troops sowed panic among the Greek Cypriot leadership, which now
dreaded a Turkish intervention in Cyprus. Through the British High Commissioner,
therefore, it threatened that if the Turkish Contingent did not halt its
movements, 300 Turkish Cypriots being held hostage at the Kykkos Gymnasium in
Nicosia would be executed. The Turkish Cypriots had been detained by irregulars
a
cting on Sampson’s orders in the Omorphita area.
According to the Greek Cypriot leadership’s operation plans, in the event of a
clash, the Organisation would become responsible for the protection of the Greek
Cypriots, with the assistance and cooperation of the Greek Military Contingent.
However, as soon as hostilities broke out, those Greek officers, who were
members of the Organisation’s commanding staff, abandoned its headquarters.
Chrysafis Chrysafi, an officer in the Cyprus army who was transferred to the
Organisation, describes the scene where Yiorkadjis, clearly annoyed, was ringing
the Greek Military Contingent’s commander, Colonel Tzouvelakis, requesting he
keep to the promises he had made. “It appears that ELDYK’s (the Greek
Contingent’s) commander was telling him he had orders that every single soldier
should stay in camp. ‘What’s to become of us, we have no weapons, nothing,’
Yiorkadjis told him. Tzouvelakis must have replied something and Yiorkadjis
retorted furiously: ‘Screw you, Commander’. Tzouvelakis answered back to
Georkadjis, who replied, ‘Screw you again,’ and slammed the phone down”.
According to Chrysafis, Yiorkadjis, beyond himself with rage, ordered a van to
be brought to him. “We went out on the street and requisitioned the first van
passing by. Yiorkadjis ordered Kyriacos Patatakos to fit loudspeakers on it and
then he sent his men outside ELDYK’s barracks, calling on the soldiers to come
out”.
Makarios asked Greece for military support, but the response was negative.
Turkey was threatening to invade and Greece was refusing to help. Makarios
finally realised that the situation was grave. He then put the blame for the
dramatic turn of events on Yiorkadjis and the Organisation and set out on foot
from the Presidential Palace to the Organisation’s headquarters in the nearby
government housing complex to assess the situation first hand.
The Organisation’s leadership was in a meeting. “There was panic and confusion
and nobody knew what to do when we were told that Makarios was on his way to the
headquarters on foot,” Chrysafis explained. “Yiorkadjis was not in a position to
face him and he asked Clerides to try and appease him. He then hid himself
behind a large curtain so that Makarios would not become aware of his presence”.
Clerides stayed there and took the brunt of Makarios’ fury, as the latter
pounded his staff angrily on the table. “Why did you start the troubles? You
will ruin the country with your idiocies,” he yelled furiously, while Clerides
tried to calm him down. “An attempt was made to convince the Archbishop that it
was not our fault and that it was the Turks who had started it all first, which
was not, in fact, true,” said Chrysafis.
What took place at the Organisation’s headquarters was indicative of the
irresponsibility of the Cypriot political leadership. Fixing loudspeakers to a
van so that the Greek soldiers would come out of their barracks, Yiorkadjis
hiding like a little boy behind a curtain to avoid Makarios’ wrath, and the
latter pounding his staff on the table in despair reveals the astonishing
thoughtlessness with which the Greek Cypriot leadership provoked and then
handled a crisis that brought Cyprus to the brink of war with Turkey.
The price Cyprus paid as a result of this latest crisis was an agreement on the
first form of separation in Nicosia. Following long negotiations, a memorandum
was signed on December 30 which set the boundaries of a neutral zone - under
British control - dividing the Greek and Turkish sectors of the city. This zone
was drawn on the map with a green pencil and therefore came to be known as the
Green Line.
The First Partition, by Makarios Droushiotis, is published by Alphadi
Publications and will be available in English from October 30, 2008
How the Zurich agreements
unravelled
By
Rauf R. Denktash
(archive article - Friday, October 10, 2008)
MAKARIOS Droushiotis’ article
“Zurich, from curse to blessing in disguise” (Cyprus Mail, October 1, 2008) gets
full marks on impartiality and adherence to facts. Yet a few points need
clarification:
a) Under the sub-title “After The Collapse” Droushiotis writes:
“Immediately after the collapse of the Zurich agreements in December 1963, the
Turkish government under Prime Minister Inönü urged the Turkish Cypriots to
return to the Republic of Cyprus. In a letter to Vice President Faz?l Kuchuk
dated March 9, 1964, ?smet ?nönü called upon him to seek an understanding with
President Makarios and return to the government, with the Vice President and
Ministers leading, and the Ministers, the Representatives and later, the civil
servants, following.
Kuchuk replied the next day, saying that this was impossible, citing a crisis of
confidence and fear, and claiming (that if he insisted, the Turkish Cypriot
officials would resign their posts.”
Dr. Kuchuk’s reaction to Inönü’s suggestion is understandable. Inönü, rightly
and wisely, wanted to prevent the collapse of the 1960 set-up (a guaranteed
partnership, a functional federation, and not a unitary state as alleged),
believing that it could be saved, whereas Dr Kuchuk was not even able to go to
his office which was now on the Greek side and had already been taken over by
the gunmen of the organisation as per the Akritas Plan.
Makarios had already declared the constitution to be “dead and buried” and
Turkish inhabitants of 103 villages had already become refugees in what became
known as Turkish enclaves. Schoolchildren were unable to go to their villages
and Makarios, who had declared that he recognised no Vice-President, had cut off
even telephone contacts with Dr Kuchuk. Omorfita had been taken over by Sampson
and his gunmen, while Turkish Cypriots moving from one place to another were
being “arrested” never to be seen again. Inönü’s request therefore was out of
line with the realities in the island.
A few Turkish Cypriots who had taken the risk and attended their jobs were not
seen again until recently, when their bones were recovered in different places.
Murder was afoot for any Turk who dared to enter the areas patrolled by the
Enosis patriots.
b)Another aspect of Mr Droushiotis’ piece, which needs correction is the
paragraph which reads:
“The Turkish government of the day was in conflict with the Turkish Army and
desired the implementation of the Zurich agreements. That is why they forced
Rauf Denktash to remain exiled in Turkey from 1964 until 1968. The Turkish
Cypriot leadership and the paramilitary organisation TMT were under the
influence of the army, which desired the division of Cyprus.”
It was not the Turkish government which prevented me from coming to Cyprus; it
was the “order of the day” issued by Makarios and his Minister of Interior, the
commander of “the organisation” Yiorkadjis, who declared me, unconstitutionally,
to be “persona non grata to be arrested for starting the Turkish uprising etc.”
Being “arrested” in those days meant disappearing.
Inönü believed that the arrival of UNFICYP would help in my safe entering the
country. This also did not work. In the end I had to try and enter the island
once through Erenköy (Kokkina) and a second time through Larnaca when we were
caught in November 1967 and sent back without any charge of “responsibility for
the so-called non-existent uprising or any other crime”.
The aftermath of my arrest and return to Turkey was the attack on Kofinou (Geçitkale)
and Bo?aziçi which resulted in a near military intervention by Turkey, which was
prevented by Cyrus Vance’s efforts in sending Grivas and some of the Greek Army
personnel back to Greece, Makarios promising to compensate the villagers for
deaths and damage (which he never did) and agreement to start unofficial talks
between me and Mr Clerides, which began in Beirut soon afterwards.
The result was a very close agreement on local autonomy, which Makarios rejected
because I had not accepted minority status for my people and he had not managed
to get rid of the Treaty of Guarantee. Today Mr Christofias is still trying to
achieve these ends through smooth talking.
As to the finding of Mr Droushiotis that Makarios instructed Clerides to offer
me a return to the 1960 set-up, this is also true but it was obvious that this
was a tactical move by Makarios in order to put a swift end to Turkish
intervention. Clerides came to me with this offer and I did tell him that,
though I saw no merit in it, I would discuss it with the Turkish government.
In order to do so, I had to be satisfied that Clerides was really in charge of
the situation. He was not. He had taken over the Sampson government and EOKA B
with some or all of the Junta officers still active all over the country.
The return of Turkish refugees to their destroyed homes in 103 villages in
safety could not be assured. Those who had staged the coup could not be arrested
and tried. It was quite obvious that Makarios was up to his tricks again and the
offer of going back to a situation which had given us no protection for eleven
years could not be treated as a serious offer.
By the time I replied, the three guarantors were already discussing the
situation and at the first Geneva Talks they had agreed that two separate
administrations existed in the island.
The rebirth of the destroyed Partnership Republic and the treatment of its
destroyers as the government of Cyprus has prolonged the settlement of the
problem so far. |
